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IV Executive Summary 
1.  The  Findings 
The bases on which a nation can acquire competitive advantages in order to in-
crease its material welfare are manifold· and depend on its endowment with resources, its 
stock of total capital and its institutional infrastructure. The stock of  total capital is com-
posed of physical capital, knowledge capital and human capital. For a long time, know-
ledge capital and human capital have been treated by governments, at most, as second-
hand targets in the economic policy formation. Physical investment and labor were the 
focus targets around which it was thought an efficient economic policy could be de-
signed. In the late seventies, the flagrant inefficiency of  economic policies showed policy 
makers that knowledge and human capital were really the active sources of economic 
growth and competitiveness. This led them to review their conception of science and 
technology policy as well as education and training policy and to adapt their institutional 
system accordingly. In the search for a higher efficiency of the science and technology 
policy, public managers increasingly view science and technology assessment as an inte-
gral component of  policy management At the roots of  the present science and technology 
policies, there is the objective to stimulate innovative activities as a means of fostering 
economic growth and strengthening competitiveness. Therefore, the ultimate question of 
the policy evaluation process should be : what are the economic impacts of the science 
and technology policy ? This questioning then leads them to try and find how to measure 
these economic impacts and, in a further stage, when searching the toolbox of policy 
makers, these wonder whether using econometric methods and models might be advis-
able. 
Econometric methods are extensively used as an economic policy evaluation tool. 
Nevertheless, its credibility and usefulness in the field of science and technology policy 
is, to a large extent, subject to controversy. Main arguments against them are the identifi-
cation problem of the causal relationship between technological petfonnance and econo-
mic development, the time lag between knowledge investment and its economic impact, 
the variability of  results, the complexity and uncertain nature of innovation. Besides, lots 
of  evaluation studies point out that the evaluation processes are mainly focused on tech-
nological aspects and neglect economic impacts. When economic impacts are covered by 
the evaluation process, the methods used are essentially case studies and sutveys. The 
drawback of these methods is that results obtained from case studies cannot be easily 
generalized and that sutveys may provide biased results. So, these methods have their 
v advantages and disadvantages. The modalities of their use are varied. They should be 
simultaneously used in some cases in order to improve the reliability of  observations and, 
when the results are divergent, to reinforce the evaluation process by learning about 
sources of  divergence. Besides, they could be separately used depending on specific ob-
jectives. Yet, some criticisms against econometric methods are grounded. Hence, the 
problems econometric techniques of impact evaluation are faced with are threefold : the 
methodological drawbacks, the measurement issue and data availability. 
The methodological drawbacks essentially follow from the treatment of  technical 
change in economic analysis. Indeed, technical change is conceived as an intrinsically 
exogepous process in economic theory and, consequently, in economic models. It is 
exogenous because assumed to depend exclusively on technical constraints. The empi-
rical consequence is that it is rudimentarily measured through a time trend. It is intrin-
sically exogenous because any attempts to grasp how it operates, as is the case for the 
inducement and embodiment hypotheses, have not removed the exogeneity, and hence 
the time dependence. Yet, in the past thirty years, a great amount of research has been 
devoted to relaxing this hypothesis by introducing research and development (R & D) in 
production functions. As long as R & D investment is only integrated as a production 
factor without being itself, at least partially explained, by economic mechanisms, we have 
only identified but not endogenized one of the sources of  technical change. Nevertheless, 
we may agree that it is a ftrSt important step towards endogenization. 
Despite its limitations, the production function approach is presently the only 
operational way of assessing the economic impact of R & D. This impact is measured by 
estimating the relationship between R &  D  and productivity. The main attempts to 
measure the impact of R & D on economic growth rely on the Cob)?: Douglas production 
function and make use of two alternative theoretical frameworks. The first one is based 
on the estimation of the R & D capital elasticity with respect to the output and the second 
one on the estimation of  the rate of  return on R & D investment It is worth noting that the 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients will differ depending on the level of data 
aggregation. Indeed, empirical analyses can be performed at three levels: micro (i.e. on 
firm data), meso (i.e. on industry data), macro (i.e. on nationwide data). At the micro 
level, both coefficients only deal with the private effect of  R & D. At the meso level, both 
coefficients can be assumed to measure the intra-industry social effect of R & D. At the 
macro level, both coefficients should provide an estimate of the nationwide social effect 
of  R & D. Furthermore, regression analyses can be alternatively petformed on time-series 
data, cross-section data or both. The high variability observed in the estimates can, to a 
large extent, be explained by data characteristics. When firm sales are used as output 
measure the mean value of R & D elasticity is .05 for time-series data against .10 for 
VI cross-sections and the mean value of the rate of return is 15 percent. The use of value 
added as output measure provides weaker estimates which often tum to be non-signifi-
cant. The estimates are higher when data are corrected for double counting and expensing 
and in scientific sectors. At the industry level, the mean value of the rate of return is 22 
percent and amounts to 35 percent when the fall observed in the rates of  return during the 
sixties is taken into account. At the nationwide level, the R & D elasticity noticeably 
differs from one country to the other. The mean value is about .40. In recent years, 
dynamic disequilibrium models have been applied to measure the contribution of R & D 
to the changes in output. These adjustment cost models consider R & D as a quasi-fixed 
factor which does not adjust instantaneously to its optimal level and which is endo-
genously determined by demand, input prices and inputs. At the nationwide level, the 
estimates short-run elasticity ofR & D for the manufacturing sector is about .15 and the 
net internal rate of return on R & D investment is about 13 percent. There is no major 
contradiction between these estimates and the latter are strikingly compatible with results 
obtained from case studies. So, these studies undoubtedly put forward the influence of  R 
& D activity on productivity. Nevertheless, this contribution varies from one sector to an 
other. In the scientific sector, the R & D elasticity is higher than in other sectors, its mean 
value being .13 for time-series against .18 for cross-sections. Regarding its rate of 
return, it is 10 percent higher than in other sectors. Furthermore, as shown by case 
studies, its impact changes over time and occurs with a variable lag depending ot:t the 
orientation of research. Finally, econometric studies are faced with ·two categories of 
problems : conceptual fuzziness and methodological drawbacks. The former principally 
concerns the interpretation of estimates and data to be used and the latter, econometric 
techniques implemented and data measurement. 
There is a general agreement that the social return to R & D is higher than the 
private return because the effects of R & D go beyond the fmn, the industry and the 
country which perform the investment. Indeed, the returns to R & D may not be com-
pletely appropriable because knowledge produced by R & D investment performed in a 
fmn is a public good which allows other fmns to develop new innovations with less R & 
D efforts than otherwise. This spillover effect is a positive externality which causes the 
social rate of return on R & D to be generally higher than the private rate of return, an 
observation largely confirmed by empirical studies. The literature reports several methods 
dealing with the measure of spillovers. A fmt method is to take into account the proximi-
ty between industries by giving weights to R & D stocks according to how close to each 
other industries are. The different proximity measures which have been suggested are 
successively : weights proportional to the flows of intermediate input purchases, to the 
flows of patents or innovations or again to the firm's position in a technology space. A 
second approach is to consider the outside pool of R & D stock globally. A last method is 
VII to enter separately into the production function the R & D stock of  each potential source 
of spillover. According to the inter-industry technology flow approaches, the rate of 
return on external R & D should be around 50 percent Yet, the relationship between 
external R & D and productivity varies across industry and over time. The use of  inter-
mediate input purchases, patents or innovations in order to identify technology flows is 
not free from criticisms. If intermediate input purchases may be assumed to be a good 
proxy of embodied R &  D, it is not necessarily a good measure of technological op-
portunities. On the other hand, when patents or innovations are used, they are assumed to 
be equally important, which is far from being right. When technological proximity is 
measured by characterizing the fmn's position in the technological space, patents are 
made use of to distribute firms according to their research interests across technological 
areas. The results obtained from this approach show that fmns in R & D intensive areas 
have, on average, relatively more patents and a higher return toR & D though low R & D 
intensity finns have lower return if their neighbors are R & D intensive. Further, firms 
adjust their technological positions in response to technological opportunities. In the 
approach considering the unweighted outside pool of R & D knowledge, the spillover 
effects are measured by estimating a cost function which includes intraindustry and inter-
industry spillover variables. The empirical evidence based on this approach is very 
limited. The findings suggest that interindustry spillovers cause unit costs to decline 
substantially more than intra-industry spillovers. However, the contribution of the inter-
industry spillover to the social rate of return appears to be lower than the intraindustry 
spillover effect. The latter contributes of about 10 percent against 2 percent for the 
former. Not only is there a substantial difference between the social and private rates of 
return but the spillover effects, to a large extent, differ across sectors. The latter ap-
proach, which separately enters the R & D stock of  each potential source of  spillover into 
the cost function empirically demonstrates that tracing the sources and beneficiaries of 
spillovers is econometrically feasible. However, only main spillover sources can be 
significantly identified because of multicollinearity. Each producer is treated as a distinct 
spillover source and the direction and magnitude of the interindustry spillovers can vary 
across receiving industries so that the spillover network of senders and receivers can be 
traced. The results obtained for the few empirical investigations show that all industries 
are influenced by spillovers but not all are sender industries. All industries are charac-
terized by very high private rates of return, which, on average, amount to 25 percent. 
Besides, the social rate of return greatly varies across industries and can be three to four 
times as big as the private rate of  return, as seems to be the case in the sectors of  scientific 
instruments, nonelectrical machinery and chemical products. R &  D spillovers do not 
only affect production characteristics but both output supply and input demand decisions. 
Moreovet," spillovers are intertemporal externalities because they result from present and 
past decisions about R & D investment process. Such features can be taken into account 
VIII by considering simultaneously cost and product demand functions in which R & D stocks 
are defined as quasi-fixed factors of production which, because of adjustment costs, do 
not adjust instantaneously. A last point is that it would be useful to extend the input-
output by treating R & D activities as an independent activity in the input-output structure. 
As R & D investment is a strategic policy variable which increases the future production 
potential and not principally the current production, it should be regarded as a final de-
mand component. Then, an R & D input-output matrix should be constructed in order to 
have a disaggregation of R & D final demand between consumer sectors and producer 
sectors. 
Most efforts  .. in the econometrics of R & D have been devoted to measuring the 
impact of industrial R & D. Econometric methods are only marginally used as policy 
evaluation tool in the field of science and technology. Yet, assessing economic impacts of 
policy intervention is not an easy task because a variety of effects and causes may con-
tribute to specific outcomes. So far, only a few empirical pinpoint studies have en-
deavoured to estimate the economic impact of  R & D policy. They principally make use 
of two direct approaches. In the first one, the productivity approach, the respective ef-
fects of privately-funded and publicly-funded R & D expenditures on productivity are 
me&Sured. These studies provide evidence of  the output elasticity of  public R & D or of 
its rate of return. The second one, the investment approach, evaluates to what extent 
publicly-funded R & D crowds out, complements or stimulates private R & D. Besides 
these two conceptual approaches, probabilistic models which deal with qualitative data, 
and a supply approach, which is an alternative indirect method to the productivity ap-
proach, are also used. Studies dealing with the impact on productivity of government-
funded R & D often fail to find evidence that public support to R & D is productive. Yet, 
some studies show that the relationship between government R & D and productivity is 
more subtle than the link between private R & D and productivity growth. The objectives 
of public support, the rules that govern the allocation of  public funds and the character of 
use of government R  &  D  are all  elements  which  might strongly  influence the 
effectiveness of public R & D investments. So, defense-oriented R & D is not directly 
aimed at furthering economic growth, basic research certainly sustains more long-term 
economic growth than short-term objectives and the effectiveness of public support to 
new economic products and processes produced by business enterprises strongly de-
pends on the recipient private enterprise's own economic effectiveness. Studies taking 
into account some of these characteristics provide evidence that public support has a 
positive and significant influence on productivity and also show that this productivity 
effect cannot be generalized to the whole public R & D. Turning now to the impact of 
public support on private R & D, studies, to a large extent, emphasize a marginally stimu-
lating effect of publicly-funded R & D on privately-funded R & D. Yet, here too, the 
IX effectiveness of public support depends on the characteristics of public intervention. 
Furthermore, the impact largely differs from one country to the other. Unfortunately, like 
the productivity approach, most of the evidence comes from the United States and shows 
that the relationship between government-financed and company-fmanced R & D is more 
subtle than suggested by global approaches. Although results are highly variable, the 
studies support the complementary hypothesis. In other words, government R & D al-
locations to industry should not substitute for privately-financed R & D. This observation 
is confmned by other approaches. All these approaches suffer from the same drawbacks 
than studies on the impact of  R & D on productivity. Moreover, a striking feature of these 
studies is their lack of grounded theoretical framework. So, what are the theoretical links 
between the productivity and investment approaches ? What is the behavior of the fmn 
regarding public support ? How to explain the apparent divergence of  results obtained 
from alternative approaches ? Why should the impact of  public support on productivity be 
less effective than private R & D ? If  the accumulated empirical evidence proves that eco-
nometric methods can be usefully used for policy evaluation, the theoretical background 
of models should be improved and any analysis should be grounded on a reliable specifi-
cation of both causal relationships and the economic environment. 
A fundamental distinction between science and technology policy and a large part 
of  other economic policies is that the former is largely motivated by strategic issues and is 
designed to deal with a highly competitive technological environment. While, in recent 
years, there has been an important literature dealing with both technological rivalry and 
public R & D-incentive policies, in the present state-of-the-art, it has not led to clear-cut 
recommendations on how to implement an efficient R & D policy. When a potential 
strategic public policy is being designed, the endogenous characteristics of each industry 
must be taken into account to use the most appropriate instruments. An effective policy in 
an industry might be totally ineffective in another. So, it should be fruitful to learn about 
how different industries might react to different instruments. The public policy should 
also take into account the fact that its effectiveness is to a large extent conditioned by the 
existence of critical mass. Technological opportunities, cumulativeness and the degree of 
appropriability are characteristics which underlie sectoral and national technological per-
formances and may lead R & D to agglomerate. This phenomenon is also an important 
component for the policy design. Coming back to a more general viewpoint, it is worth 
emphasizing that R & D public policy is increasingly viewed as a strategic activity imple-
mented as a response to external challenges. R & D is a major determinant of non-price 
competition and a primary means of gaining market shares. So, besides the productivity 
approach, a demand approach might be suggested to study how successful R & D is in 
generating greater demand and to what extent rivals are able to annihilate this demand 
increase through R & D efforts. 
X In oligopolistic situations, firms are thought to react to rivals' decisions in order to 
preserve and increase their market shares. Therefore, on the one hand, market share 
models are well-suited to capture the interdependence among firms and, on the other 
hand, reaction functions are able to provide evidence on how fmns move in response to 
strategic actions undertaken by rivals. This approach could give information on the 
magnitude of  asymmetries firms are faced with and on the extent of submissive multiple 
reactions which underlie the fmn's behavior. Furthermore, public policy considerations 
might be integrated into the model to measure how R & D subsidies influence firms' reac-
tions and market shares and how strategic partnership affects economic performance. 
While such a model still has to be developed, its advantage in comparison with the pre-
ceding ones""is to introduce the strategic component into the model and to evaluate how 
both fmns' and governments' strategic behaviors are effective to increase market share. 
2.  The  Appraisal 
1.  The economic quantitative methods, particularly econometric models, should be 
viewed as an ex post quantitative evaluation tool of the economic impacts of science 
and technology policy. They have their shortcomings and limits. They are an instru-
ment in the toolbox of  policy evaluation which can be used for structured quantitative 
analyses of  the economic impact of  R & D policy. 
2.  The economic analysis of technological change remains a fallow field impounded by 
the neo-classical paradigm of exogenous technical change. Over the last thirty years, 
empirical evidence has been accumulated on the economic impact of technical change 
and recently new promising avenues have been opened for future research. 
3.  The applied economics of R & D has emphasized the link between R & D and pro-
ductivity. The experiments cover the micro-, meso- and macro-levels and the esti-
mates bear on the R & D elasticity with respect to output and the rate of  return on R & 
D. A large part of  divergences observed in results can be explained by data character-
istics. Nevertheless, this approach is still faced with measurement problems and 
conceptual inaccuracies. 
4.  The spillovers of R & D investment are very high due to the inability of fmns to 
appropriate all the benefits of their own R & D. Several alternatives have been applied 
to the measure of spillover effects.  Besides the approaches based on proximity 
measures, some recent econometric works have put forward that tracing sources and 
XI receivers of spillovers was feasible and that the social rate of return on R & D greatly 
varies across industries. 
5.  The economic impact of government-financed R & D might be evaluated by using 
simultaneously existing pinpoint methods and extended macroeconometric models. 
While existing pinpoint methods are numerous, the most commonly used ones are the 
productivity and the investment approaches. Extended macroeconometric models 
might be conceived by adapting present macromodels or developing adequate mo-
dules. 
6.  Public R & D policy is designed in a competitive environment so that the strategic 
grounding of science and teChnology policy needs to view the evaluation process of 
the economic impacts of  R & D programmes as a strategic activity. To deal with this 
issue, competitive interaction models could be fruitfully used as a complement to the 
preceding approaches. 
7.  Econometric methods are suitable for policy evaluation but several techniques can be 
used. The choice of a measurement method depends on four criteria : the objective of 
the evaluation, the data availability, the time devoted to the evaluation and the imple-
mentation cost. 
8.  The evaluation of the economic impact of R & D programmes provides an ultimate 
objective judgment of the science and technology policy and, to some extent, of the 
complex, subjective and interactive technology assessment process. Its results should 
serve as a discussion basis to improve policy design. 
XII Introduction 
The economic turbulences of the seventies have disrupted the technological tra-
jectories on which the industrialized countries had built their prosperity. The traditional 
instruments of economic policy have proved to be ineffective to overcome the slackness 
which Western economies are faced with. The process of  creative destruction which goes 
together with it reminds the industrial·countries that investment and employment are not 
the only sources of growth. Indeed, they observe that any policy aiming at promoting 
either of these variables only gives paltry results if  it is not mixed with technological 
mastery. The latter will be the real motor of growth. So, although investment and em-
ployment are conducive to growth, they are themselves boosted by technological change. 
But technological change is not manna from heavens and requires some types of invest-
ment, namely, investment in research and development but also investment in education 
and on-the-job training, which are the main factors through which economic growth can 
be restored. 
The sudden awareness of the central role played by technological change has led 
governments to review their conception of science and technological policy and pay 
particular attention to its interconnexion with economic policy. Yet, in lots of countries, 
science and technology policies are implemented in a context of budgetary austerity which 
obliges them to define priorities to look out for the efficiency of the system set up. Since 
its resources are strongly limited, the Commission of European Communities is faced 
with the same problem. In view of the lack of  resources to finance R & D activities on the 
one hand, and of the increasing importance of these activities, on the other hand, a great 
number of countries have become aware of the necessity of implementing procedures in 
order to improve the efficiency of their science and technology system. To do that, public 
authorities are incorporating evaluation into their research programmes. If the practice of 
evaluation is not a new issue, its generalization is certainly a recent phenomenon. 
Among the problems the evaluation must deal with, there is that of the economic 
impacts of R & D programmes. The evaluation of these impacts raises the issue of their 
measurement, i.e. their quantification. So, the questions at stake are : What can quantita-
tive methods, and particularly econometric techniques, bring to the evaluation of the eco-
nomic impacts of R & D programmes ? What are their strengths and weaknesses ? In 
what context and to what end could they be used ? Through this research, we have tried 
to shed light on these questions. Research on the state-of-the-art of  economic quantitative methods for the assess-
ment of  the impact of R & D programmes can be conducted in two ways. The first one is 
to write a synthesis on quantitative methods and to think about their potential use in a 
field such as the evaluation of  science and technology policy. The second one is to review 
how quantitative methods, particularly econometrics, are used to evaluate the economic 
impact of  R & D and to show what their results are. It is this alternative approach which 
has been adopted here because, to a large extent, these methods speak by themselves and 
the reader can easily deduce their advantages and disadvantages as well as the limits for 
their use. 
In their analytical synthesis on evaluation methods in use at the Commission of 
European Communities, Bobe and Viala (1990) point out that substantial progress in 
methodologies and instruments necessary for the evaluation of the socio-economic im-
pacts of R &  D programmes should be made during the nineties. Despite the efforts 
undertaken in the past forty years to highlight the mechanisms which underlie the rela-
tions between economic growth and technical change, the relative weakness of the ac-
cumulated knowledge in this field will lead anyone to consider such an agenda as an im-
possible challenge. Credibility and usefulness of economic quantitative methods in the 
field of technology assessment is often questioned. Yet, the use of econometric tech-
niques in economic policy formation has become common place. Policy decisions in the 
field of macroeconomic policy are now largely checked against a macroeconometric 
model. While models are only an imperfect representation of economic reality, it is 
generally admitted that it is more rational to test a potential policy decision by experiment-
ing through a model rather than to subject the real economy to the experience, which may 
turn out to be a crash. Besides, the pervasive handling of the economic process by public 
authorities and the questioning about its results have enhanced the need for a systematic 
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evaluation of their interventions. So, econometric methods are extensively used as a 
policy evaluation tool for economic matters. To the extent that science and technology 
policy deals with economic matters, technical expertise based on econometric modelling 
may be considered to be a helpful guide in science and technology policy formation. For 
example, econometric techniques are the only way to give information on the global eco-
nomic effects of a science and technology policy. They may also be used as a comple-
ment or an alternative to other methods when economic issues are under scrutiny. 
The first chapter gives an overview of the main technology assessment methods 
presently used. Its object is to emphasize that all these methods have their advantages and 
their drawbacks and to position econometric methods in the tool box of  evaluation tech-
niques. Lots of methods are directly concerned with scientific and technological matters. 
The issue of the economic impacts of  R & D policy often remains uncovered by evalua-
2 tion exercises because of  methodological drawbacks and limits of  economic quantitative 
methods. As evaluation is a trial and error process, any method has its own deficiencies 
and each of  them contributes something to the evaluation process. 
The economic analysis of technical change is the focus of the second chapter. 
After defming main concepts and notions, we describe how technical change is taken into 
account in production functions. In economic textbooks, technical change is regarded as a 
black box in which no component except output is faced with economic rules. But even 
the way in which this output is appraised, i.e. time, is ridiculously rudimentary when 
compared with the high sophistication of  economic theory and models. 
Yet, over the past thirty years, experiments have been performed in order to sub-
stitute a better candidate as a proxy for technological change. Given the methodological 
difficulties to define a clear output variable of the science and technology process, re-
searchers turned to an input variable to measure technological change, i.e. research and 
development investment. The latter has then been introduced in models aiming at ex-
plaining productivity growth. It is to a review of this literature that chapter three has been 
devoted. 
While the R & D investment performed by a frrm, an industry or a country will 
ftrstly benefit to its originator, the new knowledge so created may not be fully secured by 
the innovator but spills over in the economy through improved equipment and new pro-
ducts. In recent years, there have been substantial efforts to measure these spillover ef-
fects. As these effects are not uniformly distributed among industries, some methods 
have been developed to trace technology flows among industries. In chapter four, we 
summarize the main attempts to measure these spillovers at the aggregate level as well as 
when receiving industries are separately identified. 
The issue of the quantitative measure of the economic impact of government fi-
nancing is dealt with in chapter five. Only studies dealing with direct public intervention 
in the field of R & D are reviewed. More indirect subsidy instruments like tax deduction 
and loans for R & D investment are not covered in this survey. Besides studies which 
have introduced R & D investment into productivity growth models through sources of 
financing (private versus public), an alternative approach has been developed which aims 
at estimating what is the stimulus-response effect of  public financing on private financ-
ing. Although the main amount of research has been devoted to these two approaches, 
alternative methods have also been implemented in order to analyze some specific effects. 
3 Some strategic considerations are discussed in the last chapter. Contrary to the 
traditional economic policy, the design of an efficient science and technology policy is 
directly conceived to help firms to adapt to technological competition. In the past few 
years, several nonnative models of technological competitive behavior have been deve-
loped. After a rapid glance at these models regarding their possible empirical implementa-
tion, some empirical studies grappling with some strategic aspects are discussed. Finally, 
a multiple competitive reaction model is considered. This approach, although exploratory, 
might serve as an analytical framework to analyze the nature of technological competition 
when both enterprises and governments are regarded as strategic oligopolists. 
4 Chapter  1.  Technology Assessment  : An  Overview 
In a world in which capital, work, and technology determine the national produc-
tion limits, advanced economies resolutely attempt to organize the research process in 
order to gain competitive edge, especially on the NIC's. Technological knowledge proves 
to be the ultimate constraint of growth. 
As research and development expenditures in the industrialized countries are sub-
stantial, as both the European Community and the member States are implementing re-
search and development programmes, which mobilize considerable resources, the time is 
ripe for assessing their impact on the economy so as to justify the investments, direct later 
choices, and define the productive potential of a technology. This is why a quantitative 
analysis is useful. 
Besides, the positive and negative effects of research on society and the environ-
ment have raised questions about how they can be anticipated. Besides, too budgetary 
restrictions due to the crisis have required the definition of primary objectives and 
projects. The staggeringly fast development of scientific and technical activities also 
accounts for the interest taken in technology assessment methods. 
As we have pointed out already, research finds its justification in the advantages 
expected for the community. This same economic justification is required to buttress pro-
jects and programmes. 
Actually, the question is what the economic performance would have been, if there 
had not been any technological change. And in this respect, besides the research and de-
velopment expenditures made by enterprises, and the patenting costs, one should not for-
get the importance of the transfer of technological know-how between enterprises and in-
dustries through the market mechanisms or industrial liaisons. 
An assessment is crucial because, through its diagnosis of the implemented policies 
and the technological choices it implies, it conditions the satisfaction of individual and 
collective needs. In fact, research and development investments affect all aspects of eco-
nomic and social life. Productivity, commercial performance, employment, investments, 
income distribution, quality of goods, economic growth, inflation, environment, safety, 
industrial structure of the economy, ... to name just a few, are variables influenced by 
5 technical progress. Obviously, it is at the diffusion stage that those impacts are materiali-
zed. That is why, regarding that particular stage, numerous assessing methods have been 
developed. 
1.1.  How  Can  One  Assess  ? 
The idea of assessing technology first came up in the United States to comply with 
the will to guide choices regarding R & D programmes. Value systems, technical and eco-
nomic approaches were to be taken into account 
How can the profit actually derived from R & D investments be measured ? How 
can the degree of accuracy of  the measurement be defined if  one cannot define the object 
to be measured (some even speak of measurement of the intangible) ? How can one ex-
periment in this field ? Which model should be chosen ? How abstract is it realistic to be ? 
Is a "closed" system relevant to represent an "open" system? These are a few questions 
that arise when one analyzes the techniques and methods of  technological assessment 
A major feature of R & D investments is that, compared with traditional invest-
ments, they are mainly made up-stream. Although R & D expenditures are preeminently 
creative investments, since they are aimed at generating products, technical procedures, 
and new services, or at improving those already existing on the market, yet, they also 
mean considerably lenghtening the production process. The average ripening time of  an R 
& D investment, even though it varies from one sector to another, is about one to three 
years and even more in some industries (e.g. drugs and medecine) and  some research 
fields (e.g. basic research)l.  So, in some cases, the decision to invest must therefore 
often be taken some 10 years earlier, which does not always allow for letting oneself be 
suitably guided by market reactions. Hence, the forecasts are long-term ones. The low 
success rate of R & D projects, and the risk involved in them account for the fact that a 
part of the R & D investments are financed with public funds. However, even though the 
risk is high, this type of investment remains a strategic weapon in the competitive climate 
that reigns between enterprises and countries. 
1  The R & D gestation lag would be about 2 years [Pakes and Schankerman (1984a) Ravenscraft and 
Scherer (1982) ].  Mansfield (1991) reports an average time lag of 7 years between an academic research 
finding and its first commercial exploitation.  It is also well-known that the lag between the discovery 
of a new  potential  product and  its  launching  out to  the  market  can  reach  fifteen  years  in  the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
6 As a concept, research assessment may mean quite different things : it may be a 
simple observation, a systematic analysis, or a global examination of the extent to which 
results meet earlier defined objectives, or even an assessment of the impacts of  research 
on the economic and social world. According to Gibbons (1984), the term "assessment" 
should be reserved to the measurement of the extent to which activities have been modi-
fied following the adoption of  a measure or a policy. 
However this may be, several levels of  assessment can be envisaged : 
- assessment of  individual projects; 
- assessment of  programmes; 
- assessment of the national research and of  it~ efficiency, which is, of  course, the high-
est aggregation level. It is the macroeconomic level; 
- assessment of  research sectors such as university research or industrial research; 
- , assessment of individual researchers; 
- assessment of  research institutions. 
The last two points are beyond the scope of this analysis and will not further be 
dealt with. 
Finally, the evaluation process can also cover the different stages of research. 
Generally, the three following phases are distinguished: 
- ex ante evaluation : before launching the project; 
- on going evaluation : during the research process; 
- ex post evaluation : when the project has been completed; 
The ex ante evaluation (done during the planning period) is closely linked to the 
selection and implementation of the orientations of the research, and proves useful to de-
fine the research priorities, and, in some cases, alternatives (except at university level). It 
can also allow to set standards for resources and outputs, and determine how resources 
will be allocated. So, it proves necessary to assess and select innovation strategies. 
The on going evaluation allows a permanent assessment of the situation which may 
lead to re-calibrate the project or programme under way. 
The ex post evaluation consists in analyzing to what extent the obtained results meet 
the objectives initially set. It can prove useful to implement further programmes. It gives 
an account of the outputs and of the resources used for them to be compared with the 
7 standards estimated during the planning period. So, the performance is assessed, which 
enables to take corrective actions, and to appreciate the impacts of technical progress on 
the economic variables. 
As Luukkonen-Gronow (1987) points out, the United States has mainly developed 
the ex-ante approach, while Great-Britain and the EEC have favoured the ex-post one1. 
R. Cordero (1990) suggests a systematic model to measure the performance of the 
fmns' R & D investments. The fmns are to define exactly what Lltey want to measure 
(outputs or inputs) as well as at which organizational level measuring is to take place 
(global, technical (in the case of fundamental research) or commercial performance). 
Measuring outputs allows to assess how effective R & D investments are, i.e. to what 
extent they can meet objectives, while input evaluation is more particularly aimed at as-
sessing how efficient they are, i.e. whether minimum quantities of  inputs are used. 
The evaluation procedures are quite different from each other depending on the field 
covered, the objective to be attained, and the criteria applied. As the social function of 
science and the structure of  the national research system have to be taken into account, it 
seems a priori little feasible or irrelevant to draw lessons from experiments made in other 
countries in order to sift out "the best technique". According to Luukkonen-Gronow 
again, the choice of a method for a particular purpose or circumstance cannot be guided 
with assurance. 
Indeed, when assessing the effects of research, one is faced with several difficul-
ties : 
1) The positive effects of research ~e  uncertain and cannot always be measured 
(this mainly hampers ex ante evaluation, but also ex post evaluation (especially with re-
gard to the consequences on society and on the environment). 
2) The time-lags for effects to appear are often long. 
3) For research to have positive effects on the economy, it has to result in innova-
tions. Yet, implementing the knowledge derived from research for product innovation 
purposes is a complex process. So, if a scenario of this process is not integrated into the 
input-output models, and one simply attempts to define the correlation between research 
1  For a review of methods being used in several countries, cf. Auben (1989) as well as the special issue 
of Research Policy in 1989 (vol. 18, n°4) devoted to this subject 
8 investment levels and other macro-economic results, the results obtained are unlikely to 
be convincing [Gibbons and Georghiou (1987)]. 
Hence, economic effects can not easily be spotted effectively, which is why resort-
ing to evaluation by the user has to be considered. 
For some years, the EEC has been trying to work out a strategy for the important 
research fields. An ex-post evaluation by peers, carried out over a 6- to 8- month period, 
is made about the technical and scientific results, the economic and social contribution of 
actions whose costs are shared, i.e. undertaken by national or private laboratories and 
substantially funded by the EEC. When the EEC's financial participation is smaller, a 
simple evaluation on the basis of a three-day interview is made. 
Let us again draw the attention to how important it is for an evaluation that the 
scientific and socio-economic objectives of the programmes should be clearly defined be-
forehand. It is the evaluation of the socio-economic incidence that raises the biggest 
methodological problems. With a view to remedying them, and in order to define the in-
cidence of R & D on the national variables, the EEC has ensured the collaboration of 
users and specialists of the cost- effectiveness analysis to the evaluation groups. Al-
though this cannot but improve the quality of the assessment, one may wonder whether 
this move can meet the requirements of  quantification. 
The issues are : 
- determining the amount of  funds to be devoted to R & D investment. 
- choosing between the different R & D programmes. 
- forecasting technological evolution. In this respect, two types of methods are usually 
distinguished : 
* the exploratory method, which is ill-adapted because it consists in an extrapolation 
of the past trend, which implies some continuity, while technical progress is in es-
sence discontinuous. 
* the normative methods which consist in setting a future objective to be attained at a 
given term, and in finding the "critical path" to attain it. 
- the impact of research and development expenditures on the economy. The aim is in 
fact to evaluate to what extent the invested means meet the objectives defined, and the-
reby justify public funding. 
9 Consequently, a systematic evaluation is a key element of  an effective, common re-
search policy. It is a retroaction circuit for the decisions regarding future management 
policies [Bobe and Viala, (1990)]. 
The methods developed hereunder are more particularly, or, sometimes, more ade-
quately suitable for one of these issues. This review of the literature is the obvious thing 
to do in so far as a judicious combination of  qualitative and quantitative methods would 
allow to achieve an optimum quantitative evaluation. So, for instance, exogeneous 
modifications of the parameters in a quantitative method could be introduced on the basis 
of  results provided by qualitative analyses. 
Further in this chapter we will give a synthetic overview of the different techniques 
for evaluating research activities, their advantages and drawbacks, as well as the fields in 
which they can be applied. 
Let us first notice that qualitative and quantitative methods can be more or less accu-
rately distinguished. The former are often aimed at selecting and sorting out the different 
projects but prove to be little useful to evaluate the economic impact of investments in re-
search and development. The latter, fairly heterogeneous, are aimed at developing quanti-
tative analyses and measurements of evaluation. Their degree of quantification varies. 
Most of these studies deal with the evaluation of R & D in terms of economic profits. 
They are mainly indicators. Subjective evaluation methods have indeed been developed to 
supplement the quantitative ones because, among other reasons, technical progress being 
discontinuous, the quantitative methods did not seem suitable for making reliable techno-
logical forecasts I, which makes them less interesting for a long-term perspective. Yet, the 
"subjective" methods do not seem to be more reliable for long-term evaluation.  But 
qualitative methods are above all used for more pragmatic objectives, particularly, 
operational and strategic management of research.  Both methods, qualitative and 
quantitative, have their own advantages and drawbacks and are more complementary than 
substitutable. 
Figure 1 classifies the different types of studies which can be made. Let us specify 
right away that socio-historical, technical, and theoretical economic studies are not co-
vered in this work. Yet, as it is difficult to remove all theoretical substratum from any ap-
proach made in terms of applied economics, some incursions into the theoretical econo-
mic foundations will prove necessary for a critical analysis of some methods. Among the 
1  In this respect, let us, however, note that technical progress is unlikely to show sudden ruptures. Be-
sides, to what extent don't the observed discontinuities partly result from economic fluctuations? 
10 applied quantitative studies, a distinction can be made between the economic approach, 
mainly centred on the intrinsically economic relations and the technico-economic ap-
proach in which technological structures (e.g. identification of innovation clusters and de-
velopment of  industrial applications) are assigned a predominant part. The economic ap-
proach itself can be decomposed on the basis of  the analytical levels considered : 
- micro-economic analysis if one considers studying the phenomena of industrial or-
ganisation; 
- meso-economic analysis if the formalisation of  the inter-industrial links is of  major im-
portance for the envisaged research; 
- macro-economic analysis which allows to build a complete scale model of the econo-
mic circuit. 
Obviously, there are interconnections between the three approaches and technico-
economic information can turn out to be quite useful to achieve a macro-economic loop. 
Figure I  - The Analysis  of Technical  Change 
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The literature reports plentiful methods of  research evaluation but only a very small 
part of them are really in use.  This overview of  the main methods does not deal with the 
technical aspects of methods but with their more prominent characteristics in order to 
emphasize their strengths and weaknesses and, hence, show that econometrics, rarely 
referred as a research evaluation tool - and when, it is treated with suspicion - is certainly 
no less credible than other methods.  There is now an extensive literature reviewing and 
surveying research evaluation methods to which we refer the interested readerl. 
1.2.1.  Assessment  by  Peers,  Questionnaires,  Interviews 
a.  Direct Assessment by Peers  - This  is  an  evaluation  made  by  one  or more 
specialists of the same discipline to appreciate in particular the scientific value of the 
research  [Gibbons  and Georghiou (1987)]. The drawbacks of this  method are  the 
following: 
- the subjectivity of the experts and of their diagnoses. This can be put down to : 
* (intellectual or scientific) fashions which can be found both in the answers and in 
the questions and prove difficult to get rid of. The solution to this problem is to re-
peat the assessment operation periodically. (Besides, the fashion bias can be evalua-
ted). However, there still is a risk that the experts may take the political and socio-
political objectives of the moment as forecasts; 
* the experts being insufficiently trained to reason in the prospective mode; 
* a lack of  rigour, 
* the fact that the maturation times required by some ideas are not sufficiently taken 
into account; 
* the desire to conform which impels into self-censorship; 
* the experts not being independent, which makes it necessary to have recourse to an 
anonymous questionnaire; 
* the fact that researchers are involved in the evaluation which entails the risk that 
their willingness to participate may be linked to the benefits they can derive from it 
That is why some precautions have to be taken regarding the choice of experts, 
which is a decisive criterion for the method to be valid. So, for instance, too close 
1  Among others, see Saint-Paul and Teniere-Buchot (1974) and Vinck (1991) for a description of 
techniques and Luukkonen-Gronow (1987), Gibbons and Georghiou (1987) and Danila (1989) for a 
critical review of methods. 
12 cooperative or polemical relations should be avoided, and experts should be chosen 
that are as open-minded as possible with regard to their schools of thought and their 
orientations. 
- The partial character of the forecasts. Using cross-impact matrices somewhat allows to 
remedy this problem. 
- When the evaluation criteria bear upon the socio-economic impacts, non-scientific 
members have to be included into the group of  experts (for instance, clients or potential 
users of the research, industrialists, economists, public authorities). This working 
method, used by the EEC, is what is called assessment modified by peers. 
- Assessing the social and economic effects of  research activities is a challenge for expert 
appraisements because their assessments are based on science-oriented criteria, which 
are not appropriate to make an assessment of this kind. 
- This method does not provide a sufficiently reliable basis to determine the global eco-
nomic impact of R & D expenditures. 
b.  Direct Assessment Modified by  Peers - This is a direct assessment but whose 
object is not only the scientific value of the research. So, other criteria, such as the 
economic and social influence are taken into account. This type of evaluation requires 
completing the group of  experts for it to cover domains in which scientific competence is 
not sufficient. Apart from this improvement, the advantages and drawbacks of this 
approach are the same as for the preceding method. 
c.  Questionnaire Method and Interviews  - This is a kind of assessment by peers 
but more systematic, based on standardized questionnaires. This method allows to work 
out quantitative indices provided the questions are phrased so that the answers can be 
marked. 
This method has the drawbacks of its advantages, i.e. : 
- a reduced quantity of information since the prephrased questions limit the number of 
possible answers, which can result in trivial information. 
- The necessity of making up structured questionnaires in which the questions have to be 
independent, accurate and quantifiable. Those who devise them have to combine their 
technical expertise with a thorough knowledge of the subject, which requires using 
complementary methods. 
13 d.  Direct-Systematic-Assesstnent-by-Peers  Method  - It cqnsists  in  sending  a 
closed questionnaire to a number of experts. A median opinion with an error margin and 
quartiles is deduced from the answers. This result is returned to the specialists who are to 
confirm or invalidate their estimates. After a number of iterations, the convergence gets 
clearer, the objective being to reduce the interquartile interval while making the median 
clearer [Schroeder, (1988)]. This method is often used to make technological forecasts 
and select projects. The Delphi method has so far been one of the most used methods. 
Among the methods based on consensus, we also find the Ringi method, used by the 
Japanese decision-makers, and the Rule of Thumb method, with which managers are to 
assess and estimate the risks and advantages of  projects [Danila, (1989)]. 
The indirect-assessment-by-peers method is often used as well. It adds to the direct 
assessment by peers a quantitative dimension and rests on the analysis of  indicators. Be-
sides, it is a further systematization of  the assessment-by-peers method. 
The drawbacks of the method are the following : 
- the method is not valid for comprehensive domains for it provides partial and incorrect 
results. 
The results are sensitive to radical changes. 
- The Delphi method gives quite a satisfactory answer to the occurrence question, but 
quite an unsatisfactory one to those bearing upon relevance (desirability for the enter-
prise or for the users), impact, and feasibility. The Probe and Soon techniques are an 
attempt to improve on this method. 
All the drawbacks mentioned earlier with regard to direct assessment by peers hold in 
this case as well. 
1.2.2.  Scoring  methods 
a. Matrix Approaches -~There can be two kinds: 
a.l. Analysis Matrices- They are applied for selecting and decision making. 
This approach is closer to economic analysis. They help put into shape "research-re-
search" and "research-industry" matrices similar to the input-output tables of interindus-
trial relations per branch or sector. 
Several stages can be distinguished, each of them leading to a matrix : 
14 - evaluation of the economic impact of the researches on the other researches (research-
research matrix); 
- evaluation of the economic impact of  the researches on the industrial sectors (research-
industry matrix); 
- multiplication of these two matrices, the product of which will give the impact of re-
search decisions on the rise of industries. Let us notice that by reversing this matrix, 
one can determine which researches should be chosen to maximise industrial develop-
ment. 
The main drawback of  this method is that it is difficult, if  not impossible, to collect 
the data required to make a matrix of  the interdependences between researches. 
The BIPE (Bureau d'Information et de Prevision Economique), specialized in 
technological "filieres", has oriented its researches towards isolating the motor vectors in 
order to determine and quantify the consequences of technological innovations on the dif-
ferent industrial branches. It has thus developed channels comparable to relevance trees 
whose different levels are the following : different research centres --> innovation --> 
functional sub-set --> basic technologies --> interested production enterprises. This 
method can be supplemented with a preliminary qualitative analysis. 
Among other methods, let us mention the Quest method, which is half-way bet-
ween analysis and decision-making matrices as it combines both subjectivity and matrix 
calculation through the following stages : 
- evaluating how much the technologies have contributed to achieving previously fixed 
objectives by means of  ordinal scales. Multiplying these scales by the weighted values 
·of the missions involved provides a value index of  the technologies. 
- evaluating, by means of a similar process, how much the various scientific researches 
made upstream (fundamental and applied) have contributed to the technologies. Questar 
(Quantitative Utility Evaluation Suggesting Targets for the Allocation of Resources) 
allows for instance to determine how much the R & D project has contributed to the 
commercial value of  the product. 
An extension of this method which incorporates the notion of budget constraint has 
been  suggested,  the  Macro-R  &  D  method.  So,  the research  lump  sum can  be 
determined, and the obtained selection can be j~stified. 
a.2.  Decision-Making Matrices- This method enables to arrange projects in 
order of importance. It is closer to technological evaluation techniques. It is made up of 
15 multicriteria appraisal grids (for instance, the Profile method  1  ). The stages of the method 
are: 
- detennining criteria and sub-criteria; 
- marking the projects in function of those criteria; 
- evaluating the correlation between the experts' answers with Spearman's formula and 
showing off the experts whose answers diverge from the "standard ones". 
Its advantages are that it systematizes decision making, rationalizes and simplifies 
choosing. In this category let us also mention the Seer method (besides Proftle) and the 
Trimatrix method (which combines Macro-Quest and Profile) which considers the socio-
political, technological, and economic viewpoints). 
Its drawbacks are that it is subjective, lacks flexibility, and uses a substantial num-
ber of statistical information. 
b.  Multicriteria Analysis  • This method consists in ranking and selecting  the 
projects according to several criteria weighted against each other.  So, it can be used to 
select projects under financial constraints. 
The different stages of  the method are the following : 
- listing the criteria; 
- formalizing the criteria : so, at each stage, the qualitative goals and the quantified ob-
jectives are inquired about; 
- the different criteria are weighted. 
Some methods allow to perform tests about the sensitiveness to one criterion or 
another, or to iterate the procedure according to how far advanced the project is. This is, 
for instance, the case of the Marsan-Electre method whose drawbacks are, on the one 
hand, the necessity to have recourse to a specialized coordination and execution group, 
and, on the other hand, the subjectivity involved in choosing the criteria and weighting 
them. Its application field is mainly sorting out and selecting projects. When the projects 
are characterized by a high dependence degree, the Electre-Oreste method proves more 
appropriate. 
1 The Profile method (Programmed Functional Indices for Laboratory Evaluation) is an example which 
attempts to sttucture the selection of R & D projects and to help manage them. 
16 c.  Relevance  Trees • This is a  combination of the  decision  theory  and of the 
operational research techniques. The aim of  the method is not so much selecting projects, 
but rather emphasizing the links between the different research projects, technology, and 
the economy in order to detennine to what extent the project is relevant. The drawbacks 
of this method are that it is very empirical, that working out a good tree is not an easy 
matter, the fact that it is heavy, and that it is difficult to assign relative quantitative values 
to how important it is to carry out those R & D projects. The advantage of  this method is 
basically that it provides lots of  information to those who manage to implement it.l 
1.2.3.  Systemic  Approaches 
a. Systemic Analyses· They combine the advanJges of the multicriteria analysis and 
of the relevance trees, and are the most advanced form of the methods providing aid to 
decision making. The resulting information is very rich. 
Regarding this type of  analysis, two complementary methods can be mentioned : 
1. the factor analysis whose purpose is to identify which elements form a system, 
and, hence, select criteria to evaluate arid select research programs; 
2. the structural analysis whose aim is to define the schedule and the control of the 
research process. 
System dynamics, which, among other things, studies the stability of systems, 
could, according to some, be regarded as belonging to this category. Yet, because of its 
specific characteristics, it has been classified separately. 
b. Dynamic Modelling· According to Allen (1986), economics better agrees with a 
concept of evolution than with one of equilibrium. Given the complexity and the 
permanent evolution of the  system in which  we  are living, innovation creation, 
acceptation, diffusion cannot, according to him, be envisaged in purely economic terms 
without taking elements into account such as history, culture, social and environmental 
structures. Economic decisions as a whole must therefore be made within a broader 
framework.  Any  action  will  have  effects  on  different  elements  and  feedback 
phenomenona will develop as well. That is how a complex chain of actions and reactions 
is  formed  which  little  fits  in  with  a  simple  and  intuitive  assessment.  Hence, 
1  The methods Pattern (Planning Assistance Through Technical Evaluation of Relevance) and CPE 
(Centre de Prospective et d'Evaluation) are examples of implementation. 
17 understanding technical change can only come from a better knowledge of  the problem as 
a whole. 
The system theory is based on the idea that big aggregates evolve towards a state of 
desequilibrium, phenomenon which alters the structures and induces qualitative changes. 
Yet, with a view to discussing the concepts of a system, a classification and an aggre-
gation on that basis prove necessary in order to reduce its complexity. Allen also shows 
that evolution does not necessarily lead to an optimal behaviour. Enterprises are thought 
to be prompted to make new discoveries only because their present production planning 
is imperfect. Besides, competition between fmns will lead to pro-active and retro-active 
moves on their part in reply to technical and organizational changes. Obviously, this con-
stant evolution advantages individuals or fmns that can easily adapt and understand new 
situations. 
The advantage of this approach is that the whole process is taken into account. 
Although the method may at ftrst seem very interesting because it considers all the aspects 
of  a system, the practical applications, however, are much less obvious. These works are 
along the lines of the analysis of evolution processes [Prygogine and Stengers (1979)] 
and of the dynamics of systems [Forrester (1973)]. The evolutionist approach with 
regard to technical progress has been developed by Nelson and Winter (1982). Its object 
is to identify and formalize the links between the elements which make up a dynamic 
system in order to study its stability properties. 
1.2.4.  Financial  Methods 
This general name encompasses lots of  methods worked out to define and quantify 
the social and economic consequences of projects and their financial return as well as 
their profitability and net social profit. 
a.  The  Cost  Benefit • Cost  Effectiveness Analysis • It deals with  the study of 
the advantages and drawbacks of a project. This method provides, besides the net present 
value, an estimate of  the impact of  the investment made on the annual profit of  the com-
panies which have made it. Any modification while the project is under way is taken into 
account in the form of sensitivity factors. The method usually consists in calculating the 
ratio between the expected profit and the cost. With regard to the economic index, the cal-
culation of the profit includes the probability of obtaining one, and the cost sometimes 
includes the capital; the most commonly used financial indices are the NPV (Net Present 
18 Value) and the ROI (Return on Investment). The relative perfonnance is evaluated on the 
basis of  the past industrial research and development expenditure and sales. This measu-
rement, R. Cordero (1990) reminds us, is not that of a profit for it does not include the 
resources used by the commercial units. Besides, it does not link the sales to the present 
research and development expenses but to those of the past year. In this respect, it is 
rather surprising, though that, usually, only the most recent information should be used, 
while the maturation times are longer. Let us note as well that "average delays" are usual-
ly worked with; as investments in development usually involve more substantial amounts 
of money than those in fundamental research, the average delay in question turns out to 
be shorter. To determine the relative force of the "commercializable" outputs, one can 
simply use market shares. Other measurements which allow to compare the output to 
industrial means, to past outputs or to those of another firm are the number of new pro-
ducts developed in the past few years in the percentage of current sales, the number of 
I  ..  I 
significant innovations during that period, the innovation output weighted by its impor-
tance as well as the success rate of a new product. 
Besides this, there are the methods of return on investment which are suitable for 
the selection of  projects. A return index has to be determined, i.e. an interest rate so that 
the actualized value of  the monetary incomings should be equal to the outgoings (in terms 
of  mathematical expectation). One deduces thus the interest rate by equalizing the .incom-
ing and outgoing flows. H it is higher than the interest rate of the market, the ·project in 
question is carried out. 
Many methods of maximising the present net value of projects (internal profitability 
rate, actualized self-financing) have been proposed in the literature (e.g. Disman, Hess, 
Dean-Segupta, Daude methods). The advantage of these methods is that they take 
expenses and receipts into account as they occur. Yet, their drawbacks are : 
- the substantial number of  statistical data required; 
- the fact that strategical conditions are ignored; 
- the fact that technical constraints are not analyzed; 
- the fact that competition is not analyzed; 
-evaluation difficulties similar to those encountered with the ratio method. 
From a theoretical point of  view, according to Gibbons and Georghiou (1987), the 
method is valid. Other drawbacks usually mentioned are the cost and the difficulty of 
gathering the required information as well as of choosing a realistic actualization rate. 
This method does not allow either to clearly determine the external effects of research 
works (not taken into account in the prices). Indeed, some effects or factors cannot be 
19 measured and evaluated in financial terms. This difficulty mainly arises as far as outputs 
are concerned. One can of course consider giving them an arbitrary value, but, in this 
case, the method is not more relevant than an~  qualitative evaluation. 
This problem affects almost all quantitative methods in so far as they require mak-
ing hypotheses, since some data on the research activities are not available. As for the re-
covering time method, inspired by similar concerns as those previously set out, it con-
sists in taking into account a compensation for the profits expected from research and de-
velopment and its costs, as well as those of  production, commercialization, and capital. 
Hence, an actualization rate, a success probability as well as the firm's level of  experience 
in the field have to be determined. 
b.  The Ratio Method - It deals with  the evaluation of the value of the investment 
compared to other items. The objective is not only to determine the financial lump sum to 
be devoted to R & D investment but also to measure the ex-post profitability of the pro-
granunes. The numerous ratios considered usually establish the link between profit (sav-
ings, incomes, profits, cash flow) and cost ofR & D. 
The drawbacks of this method are the following : 
- the time-lag between the research and development expenditures and their economic re-
sults is difficult to quantify (the econometric method could help clarify this problem); 
- it is not clear how many periods have to be taken into account; 
- the results can be quite different depending on the periods considered; 
- the result can be extremely hazardous. 
The most obvious advantage is the simplicity of the instruments used. 
The ratios have been generalized, using a technical or commercial criterion which 
evaluates how likely the project is to be successful. These are the score or desirability in-
dexes. The most commonly used indices are the Olsen, Pacifico, Teal, and Texas Instru-
ments ones. This method has its own limits as well, among which : 
- subjectivity when determining how likely success is: it is in fact a simple reduction co-
efficient and not a probability; 
- the fact that the estimating error is unknown; 
- sujectivity in the choice of  criteria (simplistic and mechanistic aggregation); 
- the traditional financial aspect of the mehod (at the expense of the technical or com-
mercial aspect or of the study of  the economic impact as a whole). 
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Besides, the ratio method provides us  with purely descriptive information. The 
economic impact it describes is only expressed in financial terms and is an evaluation cri-
terion inside the firm or sector only. Neither the impact on the economic variables, nor 
the indirect effects, nor the spillover effects, nor the relations between frrms are taken into 
account. The ratio for a firm may be very good in spite of an eviction effect on the other 
firms, which cancels the positive effect at sectorial level. 
The method can prove useful, though, since it provides a valuable analysis tool at 
firm level, and could, provided a few modifications are made, be integrated with the 
range of management tools for public projects. 
c.  The Hazard Profiles- It is a process by which projects are selected on the basis of 
the investor's aversion to risk. They simultaneously take into a~count the hazards linked 
to carrying out a project and the expected profitability. 
d.  Programming Models - These models maximise, for the whole set of evaluated 
projects, the expected gross value in order to distribute the budget optimally between the 
different projects selected. Others deal with the selection of R & D projects and the 
allocation of manpower. 
e.  Portfolio  Selection  Models  - Very developed in the  financial  world,  they are 
based on the definition of the usefulness of a project and on the expected value of the 
same project as well as on estimates regarding occurrence probabilities. 
1.2.5.  Technological  Forecasting  Methods 
a. Scenario Method - It is both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of heavy trends, 
which consists in building coherent and complete scenarios. Compared to the Delphi 
method, this method allows to reverse the "innovation-technology" causality chain and 
takes social changes into account. It also allows to show how the different research fields 
fit into one another. The drawbacks mentioned with regard to expert committees hold 
here as well. 
b. Cross-Impact Matrices (or interdependence matrices)- After events and/or trends 
regarded  as  important  have  been  identified,  they  are  aimed  at  emphasizing  the 
interactions,  i.e.  the  reciprocal  influences between  them,  and  at classifying them 
21 
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\ according to their degree of  influence. This method can be used in forecasting. It is again 
an improvement on the Delphi method to make up for the bias resulting from the potential 
links between the questions asked. So, it has the advantage of explicitly analyzing the 
relations which may exist between the events to be forecast. 
This method integrates both the a priori probabilities and the Monte Carlo methods, 
and leads to real quantified scenarios. It then consists in transforming the a priori 
probabilities into a posteriori probabilities thanks to a simulation of the stochastic type. 
One can also measure how sensitive the result is to a  modification of the a priori 
probabilities. Although it remedies some of the subjectivity, the method does not 
altogether ward it off. 
c.  Morphological  Analysis - This method of technological forecasting combines 
technological assessment methods and creativity techniques. Its discontinuous character 
makes it different from the other methods. Its objective is no longer tracing the evolution 
of situations or systems in time or forecasting an event but rather imagining what the as 
yet still unknown event will be. With this procedure forecasting verges on inventing. It is 
an inductive method. 
1.2.6.  Quantitative  Indicators 
a. Science and Technology Indicators - They have been developed for the ex-post 
evaluation. Their aim is to evaluate R & D activities and technological change, and to 
measure the effectiveness of the national R & D input at macroeconomic level. They rest 
upon the theories about invention, innovation, technological change and international 
competitiveness, and have recourse to measurements of the R  &  D investments of 
innovations, of patents, of the balance of technological payments, of the technological 
intensity of exchanges, and of the productivity growth. They also use  bibliometrical 
indicators.  The indicators worked out are  used  to determine the  direct technical, 
economic, social, and environmental consequences at an aggregate level. 
Their drawbacks are the following : 
- the fact that the indirect effects, which are often noticeably bigger than the direct ones, 
are not taken into account; 
- the indicators are difficult to interpret; 
- statistics may not be available or comparable; 
22 - these indicators infer macroeconomic relations while they are based on data which des-
cribe technological change at microeconomic level. 
b.  Bibliometrics • It allows to construct quantitative indicators of the outputs of 
scientific, mainly fundamental, research. It derives useful information from the analysis 
of  scientific periodicals. At the level of  fundamental research this method can be justified 
in three ways : 
- The results of scientific research are often presented in articles. 
- How frequently an article is referred to is a more or less reliable indicator of  its quality. 
- One gets accurate data about the activities described in the articles. 
It is an ex-post method which is less suitable for evaluating the experimental deve-
lopment. The main drawback of this method is that the indicator it provides is a partial 
one given the wide range of  ways in which results can be diffused (such as oral, personal 
communications and memos) and the secret which, for strategic reasons, may surround 
some breakthroughs. Besides, there is a time-lag between the moment when results are 
obtained, the moment when they are published, and the moment when they are quoted, 
which reduces the effectiveness of the bibliometric method. 
1.2.  7.  Econometric  Method 
It is the only global method that is available to answer the question regarding how 
much R & D contributes to growth and to globally measure the direct and indirect effects 
of R & D programmes on the macroeconomic aggregates. Indeed, if  the financial methods 
seem easy to implement, they do not allow to take the indirect effects into account. Yet, 
although the econometric approach seems able to estimate the main impact parameters, 
there are many reasons for doubting the value of the results, among which : 
- theoretical and methodological problems; 
- measuring problems and the availability of  statistics; 
- is having recourse to the past relevant to analyze the present and make forecasts ? It can 
only be a useful tool if production and technical progress keep on evolving as in the 
past; 
- the aggregation bias; 
- some variables are omitted. 
23 In a study about the evaluation of the economic effects of the Community's re-
search programmes, Toulemonde (  1990) stresses that the econometric quantitative me-
thod could be a valid instrument only if the statistical adjustments suppose a causal rela-
tionship but they do not prove it. He adds that reverse causal relationships can be ima-
gined so that the (productivity) performances affect the level of  research and development 
expenditures by increasing the resources available for all items, including research. This 
view seems somewhat severe, though, as it ignores phenomena which are well-known in 
econometrics, namely the delay effects, the retroaction phenomena and the analysis of 
simultaneous causality. He further rightly adds  that the  production functions  sys-
tematically ignore non-measurable factors (which can have a substantial influence on pro-
Quctivity) such as the technology exchanges between fmns or countries, sociological re-
sistances to change, and the organization of the innovation process. With regard to taking 
technology exchanges between firms or countries into account, a study based on the in-
put-output matrices could prove quite useful. As for sociological resistances to change 
and the organization of the innovation process, one can consider combining econometric 
methods with more subjective methods as well as making use of the firm organization 
and management theory. 
Case studies can prove useful to study the links existing between research and its 
economic and social effects. The drawbacks of the method are that it concentrates on 
specific fields, which biases the measurement of global impact, how much such studies 
cost and how long they take. Supposing that making such a study has been opted for, 
methodology has to be paid special attention to. This approach emphasizes how difficult 
it is to economically justify fundamental and strategic research works, which leads to 
pass a critical judgement on economic and other quantitative models. In the following 
chapters we describe the advantages and drawbacks of these methods. 
In a conference held at the EEC in 1982, Davignon insisted on clearly defining the 
objectives, clearly evaluating the way in which the objectives are achieved, no matter 
which instrument may be chosen to this endl. So, the issue is indeed evaluating the 
programme in function of the objective defined at the start. But here is the whole problem 
of  ex ante defining a specific research objective given the degree of uncertainty linked to 
the programme itself. 
Three levels of research evaluation can be distinguished, namely : 
- the scientific quality of the results; 
1  Statement reported by Bob and Viala (1990). 
24 - the programme management rules; 
- the socio-economic impact 
Although the first two points can be dealt with in a fairly adequate way thanks to 
the peer review system and to qualitative measurements, it is largely admitted just as the 
critical analysis by Bobe and Viala (1990) of ten years' technological evaluation of the 
Community's R & D programmes, that those methods are not appropriate to tackle the 
economic impact issue. It is from this point of  view that an econometric quantitative study 
can prove useful. So, the research productivity indicators must be improved and the 
objectives of  the European Community's research and development programmes must be 
quantitatively defined in a more accurate way. 
The synthesis presented in table 1.1  clearly shows that both the qualitative and 
quantitative approaches are imperfect. Yet, some answer a particular question better than 
others. Some quantitative measurements are complex and costly, and none encompasses 
all outputs and inputs. Combining them remedies this shortcoming but that only increases 
the cost. Besides, some characteristics are "non-quantifiable" even though they are 
critically important (consequences on society, on the environment, product quality). That 
is why qualitative measurements are often used to palliate problems encountered when 
quantitative measuring instruments are used, but, as we have seen, these measurements 
are sometimes lacking in objectivity, and prove less appropriate to measure output or eco-
nomic impact 
A  study by Booz and Allen [Rockwell and Particelli, (1982)]  shows that in a 
sample of  700 US manufacturing enterprises, 65% use formal measures to evaluate the 
performance of new products. Schainblatt (1982), on his part, emphasizes that out of 34 
enterprises, 20 use qualitative measures, the others quantitative ones.  From an empirical 
investigation of the French industry, Danila ( 1985) observes that only 20 % of 80 listed 
methods are really used by firms. 
The most commonly studied aspects are : the technical output quality and the extent 
to which the objective has been attained. As no measurement is perfect, managers use se-
veral of them simultaneously. Besides, as they are not accurate, they use them as flexible 
planning or control tools in order to reduce uncertainty. As these measurements are 
costly, using them only makes sense if the benefits derived from them make up for the 
costs. For instance, when the quantities of resources used are less substantial and there is 
uncertainty as to the outputs, which is the case of fundamental research, qualitative me-
thods  are preferred.  In  this  case,  planning and control  will be  less emphasized. 
25 Conversely, when plenty of resources are used and there is more certainty as to the 
outputs, the measurements used are more quantitative and complex and blanning and 
control will  be laid more emphasis  on  as  well.  Quantitative methods,  and more 
particularly econometric ones, used together with techniques such as the Delphi method, 
relevance trees, decision-making analysis, can provide a useful evaluation tool. 
Introducing technical change into econometric models through incorporating R & D 
expenditures into production functions has so far given rise to much controversy. To 
Saint-Paul and Teniere-Buchot (1974), the production function approach results in a sta-
lemate. This statement seems, however, somewhat forced and ungrounded, as recent 
works in this field have shown. Indeed, the econometric approach is the only one that 
allows an actual interaction between economic variables and the economic impacts of 
technological evolutions. Examining the evaluation reports of the European Community's 
various programmes shows that the main problem is how to evaluate the impacts on the 
economic variables, or, simply, the modifications in the economic performance that are 
due to research and development expenditures. 
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 Chapter 2.  The  Economic  Analysis  of 
Technological  Change 
Before moving on to the analysis of the interdependences between technical pro-
gress and macroeconomic dimensions, i.e. in particular to the evaluation of the impact of 
R & D expenditure on the macroeconomic variables (i.e. production, growth, employ-
ment), it is useful to defme basic concepts such as technological change, technical pro-
gress and to see to what extent R & D expenses integrate into a general pattern. Such an 
exercise will clarify the subject of the study and will delineate some of the limits of the 
present formalization of  the links between macroeconomics and R & D. 
For a long time, economic theory has had some difficulty in dealing with techno-
logical change. The traditional growth theory emphasized the role of  capital accumulation 
rather than technological change as the major driving force of economic growth. In this 
view, technological change, to a large extent, failed to fit into any formalized theoretical 
framework because it essentially followed from the technical system and, therefore, 
depended on technical compatibilities. Like manna from heavens, technical change exo-
genously boosted economic growth at a constant growth rate. With the exception of a few 
theoretical major contributions, it was essentially on the side of applied economics that 
evidence accumulated showing that technological change was really· a major source of 
growth and was driven by economic forces.  In the last ten years, a radical theoretical 
breakthrough has been made with the development of a theory of growth which views 
innovation activities as an endogenous process. What is now known as the new growth 
theory legitimates, if need be, on the theoretical ground, forty years of  forerunner works 
on the applied economics of  technological change. While important and certainly a fruitful 
ferment for future econometric works, this approach is not tackled here because its empi-
rical fallouts remain limited. 
Another major contribution to the economic theory of technological change is the 
development of the evolutionary theory. More radical than but complementary to the new 
growth theory, the evolutionary approach views technological change as the main source 
of  economic growth and as, at the same time, an interactive, cumulative, institutional and 
disequilibrating process.  It departs from the neoclassical theory in the sense that 
producers adopt a satisficing behavior rather than an optimizing one due to bounded 
rationality. Yet, this behavioral approach has not so far prompted on a new generation of 
econometric studies. 
29 2.1.  Technological  Change and R  &  D 
To begin with, a difference has to be made between change of techniques and 
change of technology. The distinction between these two notions usually proves to be 
ambiguous and inaccurate, which is why authors often indifferently use either one or the 
other. 
The notion of technological change encompasses that of  change of  techniques. The 
technological change concept is thus more comprehensive, more analytical as well. 
Somehow it consists in penetrating the whole logic of the technical processes. It also 
implies the necessity of taking into account all·the socio-economic structures which ac-
company the change of  techniques. 
According to Mansfield (1968), technology is the whole set of (technical or mana-
gerial) knowledge which enables to launch new products or processes. Technique differs 
from technology in so far as the former is a production method at a given time which is 
defined by the equipments and management methods used while the latter encompasses 
the whole set of knowledge used in the production. The tenn "technique" can be reserved 
for productive equipments and the work organisation they involve. Technology is a more 
comprehensive concept which incorporates other functions such as management and 
control which are grafted on to the technique.  To Stoneman (1983), technical progress is 
a process through which economies evolve in time as a function of  the produced goods 
and of the means to produce them. 
Technological change is usually considered to count three stages : 
Invention - It is the starting point of a new product, process or system which can 
lead to a patent. So, Freeman (1982) defines it as "an idea, a sketch or model for a new 
improved device, product process or system.  Such inventions may often (not always) be 
patented but they do not necessarily lead to technical innovation". It is somehow a 
potential innovation 'Or a batch ·of potential innovations. Only when it practically opens on 
an innovation does the invention become economically meaningful. So, as Stoneman 
(1983) suggests, invention can be regarded either as a given ex-post resource, or as are-
source expected for the innovation process. 
To Kennedy and Thirwall(1972), inventing is actually imagining new ways of at-
taining the same objective. Hence, the inventing activity encompasses not only the crea-
tion (thanks to the use of  existent and "new" knowledge) of previously non-existent pro-
30 ducts, processes and systems but also an original exploitation of elements thaf have 
always existed (such as penicillin, for instance). Funher, one may  wonder whether 
invention is autonomous or whether it is induced by the economic environment. In this 
respect, it seems right to believe that it is a major factor in the economic activity and that it 
is, to some extent, subject to the supply and demand forces. So, an invention market is 
thought to exist Yet, the researches carried out in this field are mainly directed towards 
theoretical microeconomic developments and, so far, have not easily lent themselves to a 
macroeconomic globalisation. 
Innovation - It is the commercial stage of invention. Schumpeter distinguishes 
five main types of innovation : 
1.  product innovation : this is research and development expenditure aimed at improving 
on or creating new products; 
2.  process innovation : this is research and development expenditure directed towards 
perfecting the methods or obtaining new processes; 
3.  new markets and marketing methods; 
4.  legislation changes; 
5.  innovations with regard to organisation. 
Referring again to Freeman (1982), "an innovation, in the economic sense, is 
accomplished only with the first commercial transaction involving the new product, 
process, system or device although the word is used also to describe the whole process". 
Diffusion- It is the process through which innovation spreads out to the market. 
The notion of appropriation of the scientific discovery follows from here. Unless one is 
in a monopolistic situation, appropriation is never perfect, even if there is a patent or a 
licence. The interest of the innovator, who wants to protect his right to exploit the inno-
vation, clashes with the general interest which requires a more intensive and competitive 
exploitation of the innovations for these to be able to pass on to the whole economic 
structure as effectively as possible. So, it is through the diffusion process that innova-
tions have an impact on the economy as a whole. 
Innovation diffusion is not instantaneous over time and unifonn across space.  The 
timing and the magnitude of the diffusion process depend on the features of the new 
technologies, the behavior of economic agents, the characteristics of  the environment and 
the economic incentives.  The diffusion process is a learning process which takes place 
among users and producers and involves a reallocation of resources in favour of new 
31 products and processes.  After its introduction upon the market, the innovation can 
receive incremental improvements which affect the pace of  adoption.  Its diffusion is also 
often at the source of other successive innovations and leads to imitation.  To a large 
extent, diffusion is at the core of the process through which technical change boosts up 
the economy as a whole. 
Frascati's manual [OCDE (1976)] defmes experimental research and development 
as a creative work undertaken systematically in order to increase the knowledge stock and 
the use of  it so as to achieve new applications. Research and development expenditure is 
usually classified into three main categories: 
Fundamental  research  which consists in experimental or theoretical works 
mainly undertaken in order to acquire further knowledge of  the foundations of  observable 
phenomena and facts, without considering any particular application or utilisation. The 
expected result is mainly discovery. 
Applied  research  which,  like  fundamental  research,  also  consists  in 
experimental works aimed at acquiring further knowledge but it departs from it in so far 
as it is directed towards an objective or towards particular goals. So, it includes research 
into applications. The expected result is often invention. 
Fundamental and applied researches only have economic implications if  they have a 
cost or if, in the short or long term, they allow a commercial exploitation. 
Development which refers to systematic works based on existent knowledge ob-
tained through research and/or through practical experience, with a view to launching the 
manufacture of new materials, products or devices, establishing new processes, systems 
or services, or improving those that already exist. The expected result is information and 
innovation through investment and experience. 
It should, however, be noticed that the separation between the different stages of 
technological change and of the R & D process is not as clear-cut as it may look at first 
sight. Besides, in spite of the OECD's prescriptions, concepts are used so heteroge-
neously in international statistics that comparisons are rather hazardous. 
Another distinction can be made between the research and development expenditure 
funded privately or publicly, and between those made by enterprises or by other 
organisations (e.g. universities and research institutes). This is a distinction we are 
32 particularly interested in since the community R & D expenditure can be assimilated to 
public funding. 
After analyzing the different stages of technological change and the different com-
ponents of the research and development concept, it seems relevant to show how these 
two concepts can overlap. Investments in research and development can be assimilated to 
activities and the different stages of technological change to results or products of those 
investments. 
In this respect, as emphasized by Kennedy and Thirwall (1972), research and deve-
lopment are an input to invention; invention and development are inputs to innovation; in-
vention is an input to development. Hence, we have the following diagram with a 
retroaction effect between invention and development. 
Research  Development 
"""""'  Invention  ------11..,...~  Innovation 
As we have pointed out already, the innovation will only occur after it has been 
decided to commercialise the invention. The innovating frrm then makes the investments 
required to produce the new product, which goes together with a learning process mate-
rialised in the steady improvement of the performances, the result of a greater command 
of the innovation. 
Simultaneously, other potential users of the innovation get to know it and the dif-
fusion process engages. As the innovation is spreading around on the market, its eco-
nomic impacts are gradually being felt. 
2.2.  The Measurement of Technical  Progress 
The difficulty economists have in calculating to what extent technical progress con-
tributes to production growth has led them to construct what is called growth accounting, 
i.e. to evaluate the contribution of technical progress by means of the balance. The me-
33 thod has gone through considerable developments brought about by the identification of 
the effects of the intermediary inputs as education, R & D and infrastructure. I 
The contribution of technical progress to growth would thus be the part of product-
ivity growth rate that is not explained by the other factors, in other words, the residual 
factor, whose measure is nothing but the measure of our ignorance. In fact, ftrst works 
gave a residual of more than 80 percent, a challenging measure of  our misunderstanding 
of the real sources of growth.  As  Abramovitz  (1956)  pointed out "the indicated 
importance of this element may be taken as some measure of our ignorance about the 
causes of  economic growth in the United States and some sort of indication of  where we 
need to concentrate our attention". 
To allow an accurate and significant evaluation, this method implies from the outset 
two major hypotheses : 
1. all the other factors have to be exhaustively taken into account in the relation; 
2. the contribution of those factors has to be calculated without any mistake. 
Admittedly, meeting these two conditions is difficult. 
Because formalising technical progress is difficult, the assumption has been made 
that its growth rate was constant so that it has been represented by time. This approach is 
not satisfactory in so far as technical progress is not a godsend [Kennedy and Thirwall 
(1972)]. It results from actions directed towards creating new processes or products, and 
for which substantial financial resources have been engaged. The growth rate of technical 
progress is only constant in the process of time in so far as the technological innovations 
are constant too. 
Hence, to measure technical progress in a production function, it would better be 
represented as being the technological innovations actually achieved in the economy. Yet, 
as chronological series on innovations are hard to come by (indeed, how can innovations 
be accounted since they do not necessarily have the same value?), one will somehow 
work one's way up to the innovation so as to obtain indicators capable of  representing it. 
If one goes about it that way, one has to go back to the invention process since it 
leads to innovation. In quantitative models one usually envisages two different ways of 
grasping this process : 
1 See the works of Maddison (1987), Denison (1984) and Kendrick (1976). 
34 - through its inputs - i.e. the investments in research and development or the personnel 
allocated to R & D; 
- through its output - i.e. the number of  patents taken out. 
First of  all, let us note that while the latter are outputs for invention, they are inputs 
for innovation. 
In view of the criticism voiced about these measurement instruments, it might be 
more useful to regard them as complementary and non-substitutable sources of  informa-
tion. Yet, in this case, causality and multicollinearity problems will arise. 
The measurement of technical progress in terms of  output is subject to much criti-
cism. Indeed : 
- the quality of the patents can vary a great deal; 
- a patent is not taken out for all inventions; 
- the legislations regarding patents can vary a lot from one cmtntry to another and can be 
modified regularly; 
- patents do not always have a commercial value; 
- enterprises have different tendencies to take out patents, which evolve in the course of 
time, and differentiated protection strategies for their innovations. 
However this may be, as emphasized by the OECD [OCDE (1986)], the data about 
them can bel p assess the position of the different economies as technology producers. 
Besides, the fact that there are international patent systems and patents taken out by 
foreign companies in the national systems already provide indicators as to the place of the 
different economies within the process of  internatioilal diffusion of the techniques. 
In practice, even if a stream aimed at promoting studies based on patent statistics is 
developingl, input measures such as R & D expenditure or the personnel allocated toR & 
D (as production factor of invention) are more frequently used. This measure is incom-
plete and imperfect as well, though. Indeed, if  what is considered is the invention activi-
ty, the research and development expenditures exceed those made for invention since they 
cover part of the innovating activity. On the contrary, if  what is considered is the innova-
tion activity (and, hence, technical progress), the research and development expenditures 
are readily found to cover only part of innovation and technical progress (presumably not 
1 Cf., for example, the state-of-the-art written by Griliches (1990). 
35 even half of it [Griliches (1979)]). Indeed, isolated inventors and accidental progress 
have to be taken into account. In this respect, let us note that R & Dis increasingly a 
structured organisational process,  which implies that gradually this issue can be 
investigated more and more accurately. Besides, it is obvious that there is an important 
theoretical shift in moving from technical progress to growth induced by research and 
development expenditures since the concepts of  improvement of  the educational level and 
of  organisational progress (i.e. infrastructure) are made light of.  The technology transfer 
should also be taken into account. Its features can be direct investments from abroad, the 
purchase of foreign licences and patents or the importation of fixed high technology 
capital.  Technical progress is therefore not only a function of the nationwide R & D, but 
also of the worldwide R & D, of accidental technical progress, of training and of in-
frastructure. 
Boyer and Magrange (1989) have listed the various hypotheses made in the litera-
ture about the factors which can determine the innovation potential. The major factors 
innovation potential originates from are successively: 
-pressure on the profit rate  between the innovation dynamism (measured by the 
number of  patents) and the evolution of  profitability [Mensch (1979)] 
a  1 
INNOt =  1  (1tt-i ...  )  ~·  < 0 
t-1 
where  i is the average time lag 
INNO is the innovation 
This hypothesis, which was verified in several empirical studies, contrasts with the 
Shumpeterian theses which argue that high transaction costs and market power incite 
frrms to finance innovative efforts internally depending on how profitable their activities 
are. 
- growth  of the  markets  corresponding  to  innovations  [Schmookler  ( 1966), 
Mansfield (1972)] 
INNOt = n (Qt, Qt-1 ...  ) 
where Q is the output 
a n 
d"Qt>O 
This demand-pull hypothesis originally emphasized by Schmookler is challenged 
by the technology-push hypothesis. According to this alternative view, a reverse causality 
36 (4) 
is equally plausible.  But these hypotheses might not be mutually exclusive, demand and 
innovation might actually be mutually dependent. 
- public  and private  research  and development  expenditures  (among  others, 
Terleckyj (1980a), Griliches (1986), Scott (1984) and Mansfield (1984)). 
As pointed out earlier, innovations are seldom the fruits of  chance; they are more 
often engendered by a deliberate research process implying investments in know-how 
and equipments in the field of  R & D. 
INNOt =  h (R&Dgt-it R&DPt-it ... ) 
where  R&Dg 
R&Dp 
are the public R & D expenditures 
are the private R & D expenditures. 
0  ah  ah 
< CJRDgt-i  < CJRDpt-i 
Government increasingly plays a central role in the innovation system by directly 
investing or indirectly stimulating R & D. The effectiveness of  government intervention 
in the R & D process has been questioned and under scruting for a long time.  However 
this may be, privately-financed R & D and publicly-fmanced R & D are thought to exert a 
differentiated impact on the innovation system. 
-investment and learning. Innovation can be endogenised by comparison with the 
volume of  the production of  equipment goods [Kaldor (1957)  ].  Alternatively, the effects 
of training manpower are normally correlated with the total production volume [Arrow 
(1962)]: 
INN01 = m (SEt, SQt, ...  ) 
where  SEt"' J!  EQUIP ('t) d t 
SQt"' J!  Q ('t) d t 
In the Kaldorian thesis, technological progress is assumed to be infused into the 
economic system through the creation of new equipment.  In this case, technological 
change might be endogenized through the volume of  investment goods produced.  On the 
other hand, Arrow ( 1962) suggests that invention and innovation might be spurred by 
learning by doing.  As this form of skills is acquired by producing, this factor may be 
measured by the cumulated past production. 
37 -infrastructure and Training [Freeman, Clark and  Soe~e (1982)] 
The development and diffusion of the innovations to the whole productive system 
can only be envisaged through a minimum infrastructure conducive to the development of 
the innovating action and through the educational system (particularly the technical and 
scientific training). 
As further factors we can add : 
-components of R  &  D by character of use  [Even~on (1984)]  : 
where  B = basic research investment 
A = applied research investment 
D = development investment 
~>~>~>0  a  Dt-i  a  At-i  ()  Bt-i 
All the categories of R & D investment are not identically conducive to innovation. 
They do not have the same properties while they ultimately improve the knowledge state. 
Basic research serves as an essential input in applied research and applied research in 
development.  Although all three categories of  research evolve in close interaction, their 
innovation productivity is not the same, and the allocation of research resources will 
therefore affect the performance of  the innovation system. 
- science-push  and  technological  substitutability [Wyatt ( 1986)  and Mowery 
and Rosenberg (1979)]: 
a z  a z 
dTQ<O  m>O 
where  j =activity sector 
TQ = total output excluding sector j 
SB = technological base 
Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) disagree that market demand alone could influence 
the innovative process, innovative activity also depends on the underlying science and 
38 technology base on which the potential innovator can draw to develop new products and 
processes. 
This idea was implemented by Wyatt (1986) in a re-examination of Schmookler's 
analysis.  He also suggests that, if  the technological base is sufficiently wide and flexible, 
it can be used to create improvements in whatever area is desired and, therefore, there 
should be high substitutability on the supply side between invention outputs in different 
fields.  While Wyatt only considers the interaction  between sectoral patents, the 
technological base might include technology transfers as a potential source of innovation. 
Further, endogenising the volume of  research and development expenditures could 
be considered as well supposing the results are fairly homogeneous in terms of product-
ivity, demand, employment depending on the countries. In this case, the factors to be 
taken into account would be : 
- the profit rate : 
*  favourable effect : funding or access to credit means, 
*  unfavourable effect : firms innovate only when they are under pressure, under threat 
of going bankrupt in a negative conjuncture; 
- the estimate of  the expected return; 
- the past and anticipated growth rythms; 
- the taxation methods governing this type of expenditures. 
Several remarks can be made about this possibility of endogenising the research 
and development expenditures : frrst of  all, estimating such a complete equation is not an 
easy task; besides, research and development expenditures are concentrated in a small 
number of sectors, which can make the merely macroeconomic determinants i~sufficient. 
Yet, in a complete model, this type of  formalisation would have the advantage of  partially 
endogenising innovation and of examining what differentiates this formalisation from a 
purely exogenous treatment of technical change. 
Figure 2.1. summarizes the sequence of interactions between the components of 
technological change.  This diagram is an extension of a scheme originally suggested by 
Rosegger (1980) and emphasizes the main  factors  which  influence the innovation 
process.  Essentially, technological change is a dynamic process in which stocks of 
knowledge accumulated by R &  D  activities are inputs in the generation of new 
techniques and products which displace old techniques and products through adoption by 
utility-maximizing economic agents.  As technological change is a dynamic process of 
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 creative destruction, there are feedback effects due to the competitive strengths which 
permanently stimulate the search for new techniques and products. 
2.3.  The  Applied  Economics  of Technical  Change 
2.3.1.  The  Exogenous  Disembodied  Technical  Change 
The traditional neoclassical specification of  technical change considers an aggregate 
production function (Q) whose production factors are labor (L) and capital (K) and where 
time (t) is a proxy variable representing the state of  technology : 
Q =  F (K, L, t) 
From the analytical viewpoint, a less general but more functional form which 
considers how technical change can affect the efficiency of  production factors is largely 
used in the literature. Indeed, it allows to categorize technical change with respect to the 
way it alters the relative demands for inputs. Its formulation is : 
where At and Bt are measures of efficiency gains resulting from  technical 
improvements in the utilization of both factors, capital and labor. On the basis of this 
equation, a well-known set of results has been obtained about the different types of 
technical progress. A worthwhile question is to know if inventions are labour-saving, 
capital-saving or neutral. However, there is not a single definition of what is a neutral 
technical progress. The three most popular types of  neutrality are respectively : 
- Hicks-neutrality when the marginal rate of substitution is left unchanged at a constant 
capital-labor ratio (At =  Bt); 
- Harrod-neutrality when the capital-output ratio is left unchanged at a constant rate of 
return to capital (At =  1  ); 
- Solow-neutrality when the labour-output ratio is left unchanged at a constant wage rate 
<Bt =  1); 
Any deviations from these particular kinds of neutrality are classified as technical 
biases as shown in table 2.1. The analysis of the "biasedness" of technical change gives 
indications about the directions of the bias, these directions being specific for each factor. 
41 Table  2.1.  Classification  of Technical  Change 
Hicks-neutral technical progress = product-augmenting technical progress 
Q =At F (K, L) ::> KJL constant 
a  (FK K) 1 <FL  L> 
1  > 0  8 . k 
d t  K/L <:  ::>  lC  S  { 
labor-saving 
neutral 
capital-saving 
Harrod-neutral technical progress = labor-augmenting technical progress 
Q  = F (K, Bt, L) ==> KIQ constant 
a  (FK K)I(FL L)l  ?o  H  od  {  a t  KJQ<  ==>  arr 
labor-saving 
neutral 
capital-saving 
Solow-neutral technical progress = capital-augmenting technical progress 
Q  = F (At K, L) ==> UQ constant 
a  (FK K) 1 <FL L) 
1 
> 
0  s 
1  at  uQ<  ==>  o ow  { 
labor-saving 
neutral 
capital-saving 
While these definitions give a useful theoretical reference point, the empirical 
measurement of technical change and of its characteristics is like an inextricable puzzle 
due to the difficulty of  identifying parameters. 
The most used empirical production functions are defined by the following implicit 
relationship : 
where Q  =  output at time t 
<lit  =  input i at time t 
t  =  time variable as a proxy for technical change 
'Y  =  scale parameter denoting the efficiency of  the initially underlying techno-
logy 
go =  impact of technical change upon the efficiency of the initially underlying 
technology 
42 gi  = 
dj  = 
r  = 
m  = 
impact of  technical change upon the efficiency of  input i 
intensity degree in  the use  of factor i (0  < 8i <  1).  Without loss of 
generality, it can be assumed that l: 8i =  1 
substitutability degree between fa&tors (  -1  ::;; p < 00) 
homogeneity degree of the production function denoting the degree of 
returns to scale. 
Table 2.2. summarizes the main fixed form production functions on the basis of the 
hypothesis that technical progress grows exponentially over time : 
Xit = e (gO + gi) t <lit 
where  go  =  growth rate of Hicks-neutral technical change 
gi  = growth rate of factor i-augmenting technical change. 
In such functions, the polarization of technical progress will depend not only on the 
value of gi but also on the value of the elasticity of substitution. According to Solow 
(1957), the bias in technical change can be defined as : 
so that: 
if  a = 1 and/or gj = gj, 
if  a < 1 and gj > gi 
a > 1 and gj < gh 
if  a < 1 and gj < gi 
a > 1 and gj > gj, 
technical change is neutral 
)  technical change is factor j saving 
)  technical change is factor i saving 
This Hicksian definition of bias implies that, in the n-factor case, the analysis of the 
bias for each factor will  be measured by  (n  - 1) variables. Recently, an  alternative 
definition of bias has been suggested. This new definition expressed in terms of factor 
shares has the advantage that it is a single measure of bias for each factor : 
where Si stands for the ith factor cost share and a  Si I a  t refers to the share change 
while keeping factor combination constant. 
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 Abramovitz (1956), Solow (1957) and Fabricant (1954) were the first to develop 
growth accounting exercices. The fonnal theoretical framework for this type of analysis 
was provided by Solow along the line of the neoclassical model. Assuming a neutral 
technical change, constant returns to scale and a perfect competitive environment, the 
following expression : 
Q = AtF (K, L) 
can be rewritten by taking proportional changes with respect to time: 
•  •  •  •  Q  A  K  L 
Q=A+£kK+£IL 
where £k and £1 are respectively the output elasticities of capital and labor. Since 
under neoclassical assumptions these elasticities are equal to the share of factors  in 
output, we can write : 
•  •  •  •  Q  A  K  L 
Q = A + Sk  K + Sl  L 
where Sk and sz are respectively the share of capital in output and the share of labor in 
output. 
This equation provides the theoretical justification for growth accounting and hence 
a method of  measuring technical progress. The index value of technical change is nothing 
else that the indice of total-factor-productivity improvements : 
•  •  •  •  A  Q  K  L 
A = Q - Sk  K  - Sl  L 
An alternative way of measuring total factor productivity is the approach developed 
by Kendrick (  1961) who defines the level of total factor productivity as : 
A =  Q  I (Sk K + sz L) 
Solow's method. is referred to as the geometric method 1 of measuring technical 
progress and Kendrick's method as the arithmetic method. These two methods are easily 
generalized to  take  into account a higher number of production factors  and  were 
I  It is also largely called the Divisia index method. In this case, the total productivity index is defined 
as: 
45 extensively used in empirical studies to measure the weight of technical progress in 
productivity growth at the aggregate level. All the pioneer works in this field confirmed 
the existence of  a residual to growth 1. 
In a survey article, Maddison (1987) draws up a list of  the numerous variables that, 
besides technical change, can explain the residual : 
- changes in economic structure, 
- effects of  the process of  convergence or "catching-up" of  countries, 
- volume of foreign trade, 
- economies of scale at the national level, 
- energy price, 
- natural resource discovery, 
- use of  capacity effects, 
- regulation, 
- labor hoarding and dishoarding. 
Despite efforts to reduce the size of the residual by taking into account additional 
factors, an important residual remains. Furthermore, this approach has been criticized by 
Nelson (1981) on grounds that the sources of growth are strongly interdependent so that 
a growth of  one input augments the marginal contribution of  others and that if  the factors 
are highly complementary, it makes little sense to try to divide up the credit for growth. 
In other respects, this decomposition method is based on an accounting caveat which 
attributes to factor accumulation the causes of  economic growth without really identifying 
the propelling factors of growth. Finally, few of such studies attempted to directly 
measure the contribution of R & D to economic growth. Using a 30 percent rate of  return 
toR & D, Griliches (1973) and the US Department of  Labor (1989) found a contribution 
of R & D that amounts to 0.2 percent of the productivity growth for various years over 
the period 1960-1987 in the United States. Applying a higher rate of return to R & D, 
Kendrick (1981) gives an estimation ranging from 0.60 to 0.85 for various subperiods 
covering the years 1948-1978. In the last years, there ~as ~~a  large ~ba~e  about the 
~  •  '<  '  L  J  -"  •  •  \-
role of R & D expenditure in the productivity slowdown observed in the 1970's. How 
can the apparent paradox of declining productivity growth in a period of accelerated 
technological change be explained ? From the various attempts made at explaining this 
1  Among the oldest ones, we refer the reader to Solow (1957), Kendrick (1964) and Schmookler (1966) 
who estimated an average total factor productivity growth rate of about 1% from  1870 to 1950 in the 
United States. A similar value was found by Fraumeni and Jorgenson (1980) for the period 1948-1976. 
As reported by Kennedy and Thirwall (1972), other country studies about Finland, Norway and United 
Kingdom also emphasized the importance of the residual factor. On the other hand, Gaathon (1961.) 
estimated that the physical capital was the prominent factor in the case of Israel. 
46 slowdown, some of which have been summarized by Wolff (1984), it follows that 
advances in knowledge cannot be charged with causing the decline in growth. 
In the seventies, substantial advances in production theory were made with the 
development of  new functional forms providing a local approximation to any production 
frontier.  These functions are quite flexible in approximating arbitrary production 
technologies and, as a consequence, are less restrictive in the sense that they include the 
specific functional forms. These so-called transcendental production functions exploit the 
duality between prices and quantities in the theory of production. The two most 
commonly used flexible functional forms are the generalized Leontief and the translog 
whose main characteristics are given in table 2.3. 
All  these functions  have  been  largely  used  to  measure  the  contribution of 
technological change to economic growth. However, in such models the treatment of 
technical change is very rudimentary : 
- new technologies appear at a constant exponential rate; 
- technical change is like a public good; 
- technical change identically affects all inputs no matter how old they are; 
- technical change is an exogenous phenomenon acting in a totally independent manner 
upon the economic system. 
This hypothesis of exogenous immaterial technical progress has been discussed in 
Kennedy and Thirwall (1972)'s and Nadiri (1970)'s surveys. What is called technical 
progress is in fact the combination of several elements, among which : 
-the substitution between capital and labour, 
- the returns to scale, 
- the learning effects, 
- the improvements in education and on-the-job training, 
·- the changes in resources, 
- the improvements in organization, 
- the efficiency of production. 
As the Cobb-Douglas production function has· been largely used in analyses, it is 
useful to have a  look at its  limits and drawbacks compared with other alternative 
specifications. The constraints associated with this function are: 
47 Table  2.3.  Flexible-Form  Production Functions  with  Immaterial 
Technical  Progress 
Generalized Leontief fliDCtion 
1. Linear homogeneous dual functions 
2. Constraints Pji = Pij  v i, j 
3. Factor-demand functions 
q·  1 
p· = a· t + ~ P· ·  (!1.)-+  'Yi t2 
1  1  r  1J  Qi  2  1 
4 Partial elasticity of  substitution a·· = A.·  C Q  (Pi p· J 
•  lJ  P1J 2 Qi  Qj  ]r.l 
Translog fimction 
1. linear homogeneous dual functions 
1 
log C = log [h (Q) + <X() + ~ ai log Pi + 2l:  ~ Pij log Pi log Pj + 'Y t + l:  ~it t log Pi 
1  1  J  1 
+  !~tt  t2] 
log Q =  <X() + ~ ai log Qi + !  ~ ~ Pij log Qi log Qj + g t + ~  ~it t log Qi + !  ~tt t2 
1  1  J  1 
2. Constraints l:  ai = 1, l: Pij = 0, l: Pij = 0, l: ~it = 0  V i, j 
1  1  J  1 
3. Factor-demand functions 
Vr = 'Y + ~  ~it log Pi + au t =  'Y + ~  ~it log Qj +  ~tt t 
1  1 
4. Partial elasticity of substitution <Jij =  [Pij + Si (Sj - ~ij)] I Si Sj  Vi, j 
where  aij  Kronecker delta operator 
48 - neutral technical progress, 
- elasticity of substitution equal to unity, 
-constant returns to scale, 
- disembodied technical progress. 
Neutral technical progress- According to Salter (1966), it should be a reasonable 
hypothesis. Yet, David and van de Klundert ( 1965) gave clues that technical progress 
might not be neutral.  More striking is the impossibility theorem due to Diamond, 
McFadden and Rodriguez (1978) demonstrating that it is not possible to identify the 
nature of  technical change without a priori infonnation about the production function. As 
pointed out by Kennedy and Thirwall ( 1972), "while very considerable econometric 
ingenuity has been used in order to distinguish bias in technical progress from factor 
substitution, it remains doubtful whether the basic identification problem has been 
entirely overcome. Even if it is possible to identify parameters for the "degree of bias" 
and for the "elasticity of substitution" it is not clear that these parameters will necessarily 
correspond to those which from an analytical point of view one would ideally want to 
obtain". 
Constant elasticity of  substitution -An elasticity of substitution different from unity 
can induce a bias in the estimate of technical change if  capital and labor grow at different 
rates. If  !:1 K > A L and a < 1, there will be an over-estimate of  the contribution of  capital 
to growth and an under-estimate of that of  technical progress. The smaller the elasticity of 
substitution, the more difficult it is 'to achieve increased output simply by increasing one 
factor because diminishing returns set in strongly [Kennedy and Thirwall (1972)]. There 
were several attempts to remove the restrictive features of both Cobb-Douglas and CES 
production functions. This led to the development of the variable ·elasticity of substitution 
production function (VES) [Diwan (1970), Tsang and Yeung (1976)], of the multifactor 
generalized function [Muketji (1963)], of the nested-CES function [Sato (1967)] and of 
the "induced"-CES function [Yeung and Roe (1978)]. In order to isolate the effect of 
technical change from  the scale effect, Sato ( 1977)  has  suggested a  new type of 
functions, the non-homothetic CES  production functions.  But all these production 
functions only bring punctual improvements which impose stringent constraints on 
production patterns (among which, separability, homotheticity and substitutability). The 
flexible functional-form production functions which are able to approximate theoretically 
consistent production functions satisfactorily were a radical theoretical breakthrough. In 
essence, they allow interaction terms in the independent variables and represent second-
order approximation to any arbitrary function. The best known parametric forms are the 
generalized Leontieffunctional form originated by Diewert (1971) and the transcendental 
49 logarithmic functional form introduced by Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1973). They 
overcome the limitations of the fixed functional forms by using the duality relation 
between cost minimisation behavior and profit maximisation behavior to characterize the 
production function by means of demand and supply functions based on prices without 
imposing arbitrary constraints on production patterns.  In other words, it allows to test 
the validity of some restrictions such as separability, homotheticity, substitutability and 
biasness of technical change 1. Yet, White (  1980) rightly recalls that such functions have 
their own limitations. They are only local approximation functions of any production 
function and, as such, can induce erroneous intetpretations due to the inherent restrictions 
in these functions 2. 
Constant return to scale - If there are economies of scale and if the underlying 
production function is homothetic, the effect of  neutral technical change and the effects of 
economies of  scale cannot be detected empirically 3. H the linear homotheticity constraint 
is imposed when there are real economies of scale, the growth rate of technical change 
may be overestimated. Furthermore, a part of the economies of scale can be a result of 
technical change, and from this standpoint, it is very difficult to disentangle economies of 
scale due to technical progress from economies of scale resulting from the growth of 
inputs. Finally, if the returns to scale are not constant, there is no reasons for thinking 
that the production function is not of the Cobb-Doublas type [Griliches and Ringstad 
(1971)]. 
Disembodied technical progress- The disembodiment hypothesis considers that 
technological change affects all production factors in use identically, whatever their ages. 
On the other hand, if technical change implies incremental improvements which make 
new inputs more efficient than the old ones, it will be characterized by the implementation 
of  a more efficient production process for each generation of  inputs. 
Although the Cobb-Douglas function has its own limits, it is empirically very 
useful indeed.  The choice of  other specifications is largely motivated by the objectives 
pursued.  As pointed out by Griliches (1979), the choice of  a functional form is not very 
important unless we are interested in the specific interaction of  variables.  Furthermore, 
empirical studies seem to show that the complexity of the formulation rarely improves the 
1 For a survey, see Jorgenson (1986). 
2  According to Wales (1977), they are not necessarily representative of a cost minimisation-profit 
maximisation behavior applying to the full  sample. Furthermore, Anderson  (1979) challenges the 
usefulness of these parametric forms for forecasting purposes.  _ 
3  See the well-known Solow-Stigler controversy [Solow (1961), Stigler (1961)]. 
50 estimates significantly and that the form of the production function is of secondary 
significance [Nadiri ( 1970)]. 
Yet, it must be kept in mind that such a function is only a first-order approximation 
to any  arbitrary  function  which  imposes  strong restrictions  on  the  substitution 
possibilities and consequently, is not adapted for the analysis of interaction phenomena. 
It is now well-accepted that the criteria that must guide the selection of  functional form are 
[Lau (1986)] : 
- the theoretical consistency : the functional form should heed the restrictions im-
posed by theory; 
-the domain of applicability: the extent to which the functional form may be ex-
pected to perform satisfactorily should be well-known and satisfy the theoretical 
requirements; 
- the flexibility : the functional form should be able to satisfy the requirements of 
the analysis; 
- the computational facility : the choice of the functional form will be largely condi-
tioned by the following properties : linearity in parameters, explicit representabili-
ty, uniformity and parsimony; 
- the factual conformity : the functional form should be consistent with known em-
pirical facts. 
As, in practice, it is not possible to satisfy all these criteria simultaneously, some 
trade-offs have to be made.  According to Lau, the only area in which compromises may 
be made is the domain of  applicability. 
2.3.2.  The  Exogenous  Embodied  Technical  Change 
Models with embodied technical change rest upon  a distinction between the 
different generations of  investment intervening in the measure of  capital stock.  This way 
of looking at technical progress gives a more realistic view of the role of capital in the 
growth process.  The idea underlying such an approach can be summarized as follows : if 
technological knowledge can only be embodied in new capital goods, the more recent 
51 extensions in capital stock must be more subtantially weighted than the preceding ones 
with, as a consequence, higher sensitivity of growth to the changes in capital stock. 
According to Cette and Szpiro ( 1990), if investment induces productivity gains, 
that supposes the existence of a technical  progress embodied in  equipment.  Yet, 
investment will implement production technologies which perform better than the older 
ones because they embody new technological innovations.  As a result, costs will go 
down and competitiveness of  production processes will improve. 
So, considering that technical change is embodied implies identifying each vintage 
of  equipment, iJ, each new vintage corresponding to the starting-off of more efficient new 
machines, operating independently of older vintages.  This vintage approach with its 
concept of embodiment can be formalized by the following production function for any 
new vintage : 
where  Qat =  output on vintage iJ at time t 
Kat =  capital stock of  vintage iJ at time t 
LiJt =  labour allocated to vintage iJ at time t. 
The global production is then obtained by : 
) 
The different definitions of neutrality can also be applied to this approach but now 
they will be established with respect to the different vintages : 
-Hicks-neutrality 
-Harrod-neutrality 
- Solow-neutrality 
Oat =  AiJt F <Kat; Lot) 
Oat =  F <Kat; BiJt  LiJt) 
Oat =  F (Aat; KiJt  Lat) 
A summary of the main theoretical formulations of  vintage models is given in table 
2.4.  These basic models have been largely improved from a methodological point of 
view as well as to meet the needs.  The distinction between the three models rests on the 
substitutability characteristics of  capital vintages and labor before and after the installation 
of new equipment.  Their philosophy is as follows : 
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 -Putty-putty vintage model : substitution possibilities between capital and labor 
exist both ex ante and ex post.  Although the equipment of a vintage is fixed after the 
installation, the entrepreneur can always allocate labor to this equipment according to the 
rule of equalization of the real labor cost rate to its marginal product.  The least realistic 
characteristic of this model is certainly the hypothesis of  ex post substitutability between 
factors.  Furthermore, in this model, capital vintages are only scrapped because of 
technical obsolescence. 
- Putty-clay vintage model : substitution possibilities only exist before the installa-
tion of the new vintage, when the equip~ent  has been installed, labor requirements for 
this vintage are definitively fiXed for the whole lifetime of  the vintage.  The choice of  the 
appropriate capital-labor ratio is made on the basis of the maximization of the expected 
profits yielded by the equipment during its planned lifetime.  A capital vintage will remain 
in operation as long as its expected quasi-rent is positive. 
- Clay-clay vintage model : substitution possibilities are excluded both before and 
after the installation of the new capital vintage.  The equipment of each generation is 
characterized by a fixed capital-labor ratio that the entrepreneur cannot alter.  Given the 
labor productivity for each capital vintage, capital vintages whose real labor cost rates are 
not compensated by their productivity will be scrapped.  Consequently, the scrapping of 
old equipment is ruled by both technical and economic obsolescences. 
Among the numerous specifications of vintage models reported in the literature, 
two very simple models have been suggested by Nelson (1964) and Solow (1959).  The 
first one is nothing else but a putty-putty Cobb-Douglas production function with a 
Solow-neutral exogenous embodied technical change : 
where It is the number of machines weighted by their quality (the new machines 
having a more important weight) 
t 
Pt is the disembodied technical change which does not take into account the 
quality improvements of capital. 
If  technical development allows an increase in the quality of new machines of 100 
AK% per year, one can write : 
55 where Kat is the gross amount of  capital of  vintage a  which is still in use at time t. 
This equation shows that the growth of the effective capital stock is a function of 
0 
the growth of  the actual capital stock, Kt, the average rate of  its improvement, AK and the 
effect of changes in its average age, which is itself a function of changes in the rate of 
investment.  Consequently, the approximated form to be estimated can be written : 
0  0  0  0 
(4 =  Pt +a  4 + (1 -a) K + (1 - a) AK- (1 -a) AKA a 
- where  a  is the average age of  capital 
A a  is the change in the average age of  capital and is assumed to be a 
rough measure of  the change in the gap between the average level 
of  technology and the best practice technology 
AK  is the net growth per year of  the average quality of  capital. 
In fact vintage models are almost exclusively physical capital vintage models which 
ignore the improvements of labor in the use of the production potential.  Why should 
technical progress be  exclusively embodied in physical capital and not in labor ? 
Therefore, if the heterogeneity of  capital stock in taken into account by the embodiment 
hypothesis, the assumption of labor homogeneity certainly plays an important role in the 
underestimation of the relationship between technical progress and labor growth.  Labor 
is not more malleable than physical capital.  Not only does each physical capital vintage 
generate a demand for some specific employment but increasingly, the ou.tput itself is 
directly influenced by the level of labor qualification.  Consequently, technological 
progress will not happen if it is not materialized within physical capital and human 
capital.  So far, the vintage model approach has focussed the attention on the importance 
of qualitative changes in the stock of physical capital in explaining how technological 
change operates but it has largely neglected the real role of human capital vintages on 
productivity growth. 
An extended version of  the Nelson-Solow model integrating quality improvements 
in labour has been realized by Kennedy and Thirwall (1972) who suggest to rewrite their 
equation as : 
56 where Z represents the quality improvements in labour. 
By analogy with the equation only including physical capital improvements, the 
function adjusted for the change in both the quality of  capital and that of labour may be 
approximated by : 
0  0  0  0 
Qa: =  P" +a  L + (1  - a) K +a  AL- (1 - a) AK- a ALAe 
is the average rate per year of  quality improvement in labour 
A e  is the change in the average age of  labour. 
It is interesting to observe that improvements in, both, physical and human capital 
increase the output while an increase in the average age of these two categories of  factor 
has a negative impact on the output.  However, there is an interaction between the rate of 
improvements in factors and the average age of factors : the higher the rate of quality 
improvements in factors, the faster the rate of obsolescence of factors will be and, 
consequently, the lower the average age of  factors will be.  Otherwise, improvements in 
labour quality will increase the efficiency of physical capital and the implementation of 
new physical capital vintages will not be neutral with regard to  the structure of 
qualification required.  Besides, a large part of  improvements in labour quality is a result 
of  education which is intrinsically linked to technological progress.  By stressing only the 
role of generations of  physical capital stock in the implementation of  technical progress, 
the present vintage models adopt a reductionist view of  technological change. 
Some authors are,  skeptical about the ability of vintage models to capture 
embodiment effects.  So, Fellner (1970)  argues that "all progress is necessarily 
disembodied in the sense that new ideas must always be put into effect with reliance on 
the initially given resources.  This is an essential constraint under which all economies 
operate.  Improved production with the initially given resources then leads to more and 
better capital goods ... and it yields more and better consumer goods.  But all this 
represents forward, not backward embodiment".  Besides, he asks the following 
fundamental question : " Why should the possibilities with a period's capital goods - a 
given vintage - become exhausted during a specific period for which a specific level of 
technological knowledge is defined?".  Denison (1984) also sets out that "the gain in the 
average quality of the capital stock that vintage models imagine to be derived from 
57  . additional new investment is not realized because the change in average age automatically 
is  largely offset  by  a  reduction  in the  average  amount of quality improvement 
incorporated in new capital". 
2.3.3.  The Induced Technical  Change 
Models of induced technical change suggest that factor prices, goods prices and 
market expansion are sources of technical change.  This inducement hypothesis implies 
that technical change is endogenous to the economic system and is a result of  the interplay 
of economic forces.  Hence, the rate and direction of technical change would be 
determined essentially by economic variables.  According to Binswanger (1978) the term 
induced innovation can be used "for all theories that are concerned with explaining rate 
and biais of  technical change as endogenous to the economic system". 
Yet, at the basis of the inducement hypothesis, there is not necessarily a direct 
functional relationship but the idea that changes in factor prices induce biases which save 
the more expensive factor. Nevertheless, in some models, the biases of  technical change 
are endognized and depend on relative factors.  This theory is very controversial. 
According to Salter (1966), it must be rejected because "the enterpreneur is interested in 
reducing costs in total, not particular costs such as labor costs or capital costs ... There is 
no reason to assume that attention should be concentrated on labor-saving techniques, 
unless, because of some inherent characteristic of  technology, labor-saving knowledge is 
easier to acquire than capital-saving knowledge".  Nordhaus (1973) also shows himself 
skeptical about this theory because it lacks a microeconomic background and he considers 
that it must be at best considered to be a special case of  how technical change takes place. 
From the standpoint of the theoretical background of  this model, Ahmad (1966) has 
developed a model of price-induced technical change.  He uses the concept of innovation 
possibility curve which is nothing else than the envelope of all isoquants of the potential 
inno~tions :which the  .. producer may develop.  Hence, each ·potential innovatio·n is 
characterized by an isoquant whose elasticity of substitution is relatively small and 
requires the use of a given quantity of labor and capital.  He works by analogy with the 
production theory to show that if the shift of the innovation possibility curve is neutral 
over time, factor price movements will induce biased technical change. 
The most direct test of this theory was run by Yeung and Roe (1978) in an analysis 
of the development of  Japanese agriculture from 1880 to 1940.  They formulate a factor-
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rightly point out about the classical CES production function, " because the source of 
innovation is not specified, we cannot know whether a given technical change is induced 
or autonomous".  They, therefore, postulate that "the innovation is induced by relative 
input price changes that reflect changes in relative input scarcities".  In their production 
functions, the factor-augmenting terms are a function of  time and of ther relative factor 
prices.  Their estimates suggest that, during that period, technical change was biased in 
the direction of  saving labor and using land despite the fact that the price of labor declined 
compared to the price of land.  These results do not prove consistent with the Hicks-
Ahmad model of  induced innovation. 
Contrary to this direct approach, the measure of the bias of  technical change is often 
obtained as a residual from the estimation of a production function.  Alternatively, time is 
introduced into the production function to represent the level of technology.  This 
variable, specifically assigned to each input, measures the bias of productivity growth, 
i.e. its coefficient indicates the effect of  change in technology on the use of the concerned 
input.  This approach was adopted by Jorgenson (1984) in his analysis of the effect of 
technological change on the US  economy for the period 1958-1979.  His production 
model includes five inputs: capital, labor, electricity, non electrical energy and materials. 
His analysis of 35 industrial sectors shows that the pattern of bias of technical change that 
occurs most frequently is capital-using, labor-using, electricity-using, nonelectrical 
energy-using and materials-saving technical change.  Technical change proves to be 
labor-saving for only 9 of the 35 industries and materials-saving for 27 industries.  For 
all other inputs, technical change is predominantly input-using. 
These two illustrative studies provide evidence against the hypothesis of a labor-
saving technical change as suggested by models of  induced innovation.  If there is some 
plausibility in the inducement theory, it is only an explanatory element of  the innovation 
dynamic which underlies technical change.  This approach may certainly partly shed light 
on some technological bias in the development of process innovation but it is not well-
suited to deal with product innovation.  Hence, it may explain the development of  energy-
saving technologies after the oil shocks but it cannot explain why countries with low 
labor costs invest in capital-intensive techniques. 
1  This production function is reproduced in table 2.1. 
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To some extent, the preceding approach already assumes that technical change is 
endogenous to the economic process.  Yet, it remains silent about the process according 
to which the innovation production shifts over time depending on the resources allocated 
to the search for new and improved techniques and products.  The main characteristic of 
the innovation production is to create new knowledge which increases stocks of  basic and 
applied knowledge.  The latter are themselves inputs in the generation of production 
processes. 
These stocks of  basic and applied knowledge do not accumulate exogenously to the 
economic system.  The accumulation process of knowledge is ruled by economic forces 
and conditioned by technical contingencies.  As we have seen, the most widespread 
conception is based upon the postulate that technical change belongs to an autonomous 
sphere with its own rationality and advancing independently of the social· and economic 
environment  If we have a look at this thesis, a contradiction immediately appears when 
one looks into the problem of the effectiveness of a new technical system.  Indeed, one 
realizes that this apparaisal can only be made in economic tenns, the price system playing 
the role of comparison unit.  Moreover, technological innovation costs money, requires 
material supports and, therefore, consumes resources that could otherwise be used for 
other purposes.  Consequently, technical change is endogenous, it is directed within the 
economic system in accordance with the principle that economic agents behave rationally. 
Technical change is the  outcome of investment in  knowledge,  i.e.  R  &  D 
expenditures.  These investments are a main source of  improvements in the efficiency of 
production structures, i.e. a main source of  productivity growth.  To measure the impact 
of the stock of  knowledge on productivity growth, it is treated as a production factor and 
is introduced in production functions  besides other traditional inputs.  Hence,  the 
production function  approach  to the  study of the relationship between  knowledge 
accumulation and productivity gains proves to be a logical way of proceeding.  A major 
conceptual issue is what is really the stock of knowledge ?  The process of knowledge 
accumulation may  take several different forms including organized research,  non-
organized research, education and on-the-job training.  Another major issue is  the 
measurement problem.  The stock of knowledg~ as a whole cannot be calculated 
accurately, it can only be approximately valued through research activities.  The two main 
candidate variables  are patenting activities,  as  output measure of the  knowledge 
production process, and R & D investment as input measure of the innovation process. 
Yet,  both measures have their advantages and drawbacks.  Not all innovations are 
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invariant and are difficult to compare at international level.  Regarding R & D investment, 
besides the fact that it is only an input measure there are the problems of gestation lag, of 
effectiveness and efficiency.  Not all new prices of  knowledge are exclusively the results 
of organized research.  Despite the shortcomings of patent and R & D data, they are 
extensively used as a measure of the stock of knowledge.  From a production function 
viewpoint, the use of  R & D expenditures has the advantage of  reflection both imitation 
and innovation activity while patenting activity only reflects the innovation process. 
Although there is a large agreement on the use of R  &  D  data to study the 
relationship between technological knowledge and productivity, this input factor in 
production functions has some characteristics on its own which distinguish it from other 
inputs.  Contrary to other forms of capital accumulation, it is not subject to physical 
obsolescence.  Yet, as  "its earning capacity erodes over time, both because better 
products and processes become available and because its own knowledge begins to lose 
its specificity" it is thought to be faced with a high rate of obsolescence [Griliches 
(1979)].  In contradiction with that, it may be argued that R & D does not depreciate at all 
as a source of  productivity.  Another characteristic is the substantial uncertainty that R & 
D investment materializes by the creation or the improvement of  new or existing products 
and processes.  As already mentioned, there is also a gestation lag in R & D investment. 
A last prominent characteristic is that it is subject to large external economies.  Not-
withstanding these difficulties, large efforts have been devoted to measure the impact of 
R & D investment on productivity. 
At most, this approach must be considered as a first step towards the endogeniza-
tion of technological change.  A further step is to explain how economic mechanisms 
affect R & D investment behavior to really endogenize technological change in economic 
analysis.  Hence, R & D investment must be viewed as constrained by the profit maxi-
misation criterion just like other investments.  Profit opportunities for R & D investment 
are directed by market demand, factor prices and competitive strengths.  There is a long-
standing research tradition stressing the role of supply-side factors, market structure and 
technological opportunity on R & D along the lines initially traced by Schumpeter.  This 
industrial organization approach has been extensively reviewed by Cohen and Levin 
( 1988).  Another approach, which is more in the line of the macroeconomic thought, 
emphasizes the role of the demand side factors.  The underlying hypothesis of this ap-
proach is that R & D is an input in the production process and therefore is a decision 
variable for the producer who is assumed to select the R & D investment that minimizes 
costs given factor prices and output demand.  In the past few years, short-run disequi-
61 librium dynamic models of R & D investment demand incorporating spillover effects 
have been developed, which represent an important contribution for the endogenization of 
technological change in economic model. 
62 Chapter 3. The Applied Economics of R & D 
Over the past thirty years, evidence has been accumulated on the productivity 
effects of R & D investment As total factor productivity growth is considered to be the 
prime consequence of technological change, it is quite logical to investigate the impact of 
R & D investment on productivity growth. Furthermore, since R & D expenditures are 
investments aiming at the improvement of techniques and products, their most direct 
effects should be on total factor productivity growth. This approach can be regarded as 
the first step towards the endogenisation of  technological change in economic modelling. 
Most econometric studies dealing with this ftrst issue rely on the Cobb-Douglas 
production function and generally treat R & D expenditure as a whole without looking at 
how the shifts in the composition of  R & D expenditures affect productivity growth. 
In addition to this productivity approach, some recent researches have been devoted 
to R & D demand functions. The underlying hypothesis of  this demand approach is that 
R & D, like investment in plant and equipment and labor, is ~~ input in the production 
process and therefore is a decision variable for the producer. In these models, changes in 
output, input prices and production factors are shown to influence R &  D decisions. 
Besides, the demand for the other inputs is also affected by R & D investments. While 
the preceding approach assumes that all the inputs are given and measures the contribu-
tion of R & D to productivity growth, this approach investigates what are the determin-
ants of R &  D investment. Besides, a more financial approach suggests that resources 
devoted to R & D are faced with restrictions due to cash flow limitations and the potential 
alternative use of funds. The R & D investments are submitted to the constraints of the 
budgeting decision process of the firm and therefore, financial variables, like liquidity 
and profitability, also determine the magnitude and pattern of R & D expenditures. This 
second issue is a further step towards endogenisation of  R & D investment While we are 
here only concerned with these two issues, it is worth drawing attention to two other 
important issues. 
A third issue, largely examined in empirical works on industrial organisations bears 
on the relationship between market structures and innovative activity. This literature is 
focused on Schumpeter's hint that firm size and concentration influence the magnitude 
and the appropriability of innovative efforts. So far, the empirical tests performed to 
verify these hypotheses are at best inconclusive. 
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the effects of technological development on trade performance. The theoretical bases of 
empirical research in this field are technology gap and product life cycle theories which 
show that innovation tends to lead to trade advantages. Overall, empirical studies 
emphasize the important role of  technological activities on trade performance. 
3.1. The Economics of R  &  D 
The endogenisation of  technical progress is very recent and is generally limited to 
the search of some economic relationships without any attempt to integrate them into a 
global macroeconomic model. 
Griliches (1979) has suggested a general version of  production functions including 
R & D expenditure : 
Y =  F (K, L, C, u) 
where  K and L  are the traditional inputs, capital and labour 
Y,  the output 
C,  the current state of  technological knowledge 
and  u,  the error term 
The R & D expenditure is a component of knowledge stock which is an input in the 
production process. The current state of  knowledge is a result of the present and past R & 
D expenditure. So, there is a relationship between C and W(B)R : 
C=G [W(B) R, v] 
where W(B) is a polynomial function describing the contribution of  present and past R & 
D expenditure to the current state of technological knowledge C, B being the lag operator 
and v the non-measured influences of the accumulated knowledge level. 
So that we can write : 
W(B) Rt = (wo + w1 B + w2 B2 + ...  ) Rt 
=woRt+ WI  Rt-1  + w2 Rt-2 + · · · 
=  L  wi Rt-i 
i 
The arguments which underlie such a specification are : 
64 - the existence of a lag between the realisation of R & D investments made and the in-
ventions or innovations which result from them; 
- the existence of  a lag between product and process innovations and the development of 
new products and their diffusion across the market; 
- the depreciation of the knowledge stock currently used due to external factors and to 
the development of  new techniques and products. 
However, this specification does raise problems : 
- ~- ~  D investment is only a component of technical progress; 
- in production functions, the traditional inputs and the R & D investment are assumed to 
take the separability hypothesis into account; 
- the linear relationship for the measure of the R & D capital stock implies the absence of 
diminishing returns or rising costs at the annual R & D Ievell; 
- on the one hand, R & D data are often only available for a short period and on the other 
hand, there is a more or less important lag between the investment and its impact on 
output, which makes any macroeconomic estimation difficult; 
- such an approach remains silent about the diffusion process; 
- technical change not only has an impact on productivity but also on other macro-
economic aggregates, particularly employment 
Concerning the explicit form of the production function, many studies are based on 
the Cobb-Douglas type : 
The issue of the functional form is not very crucial except if a specific interaction 
between the factors  is  suspected [Griliches (1979)].  In  a study of the US  telecom-
munications and computer industries, Levy and Terleckyj (1989) test both Cobb-Douglas 
and CES production functions and conclude that the hypothesis of a unitary elasticity of 
substitution cannot be rejected. 
In this function, we have the choice of assuming constant returns to scale or not, A. 
is the rate of disembodied technical change and a, (} and y are the elasticities of output 
with respect to each of the inputs. 
1  According to Berndt and Christensen (1973), this hypothesis cannot really be tested. 
65 An alternative approach to this model has been suggested by Griliches (1973) and 
Terleckyj (1974). Instead of  estimating the R & D elasticity, we can directly estimate the 
rate of  return toR & D. To do that, the initial equation need to be expressed in terms of 
growth rate : 
•  •  •  • 
Y1=A.+aC+ PL+yK 
In this equation, we have : 
•  dY  K  IlK 
yK=n·v·l{ 
so that we can write : 
•  IlK 
yK=p y 
where p is the rate of  return of  R & D capital. 
If  we assume that the rate of  depreciation of  R & ti  capital is zero or close to it, one 
may write: 
This assumption is often considered a reasonable one because new knowledge 
resulting from R & D investment builds on and adds to old knowledge. Unlike physical 
investment, which faces technical and economic obsolescence, knowledge investment is 
incremental and cumulative, new knowledge upgrading the existing knowledge stock. If 
such an argument is right at the level of the general stock of know  ledge, it is less right 
when one considers the appropriable revenues of knowledge. At the firm level, the 
marketable knowledge ensuing from its R & D investment decreases over time because 
upgraded products and processes reduce its market valuation and because the privately 
acquired knowledge leaks out to competitors. Quoting Pakes and Schankerman (1984), 
the rate of obsolescence of R & D capital is higher than that of physical capital as new 
knowledge diffuses. From patent renewal data, Bosworth (1978) has estimated that the 
rate of obsolescence of knowledge capital is about 10% in the United Kingdom. Pakes 
and Schankerman (1984) have provided clues that allow us to say that the decay rate in 
appropriable revenues from knowledge activities should be 25%. His patent renewal 
model was based on  ~ata for France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland. In the case of  the United States, Griliches (1980a) puts forward an estimate 
of 0.31.  In a  study on the effect of R  &  D  on productivity growth  in Japanese 
manufacturing industries, Goto and Suzuki (1989) have measured the rate of obso-
lescence of R & D capital by taking the reverse of the average life span of patents. Their 
66 estimates range from 6%  for low-technology industries to 25% for high-technology 
industries. Schankerman and Pakes (1986) and Schankerman (1991) have provided 
further evidence that the rate of  decay in the returns from patents differ across countries 
and sectors. So, the rates are estimated to be 0.17 for the United Kingdom, 0.11  for 
Germany and 0.10 for France in the 70's and there is statistical evidence that between the 
50's and the 70's they declined. At the industrial level, the estimates obtained for patents 
granted in France were 3% for the pharmaceutical industry, 4% in the chemical industry, 
10% for the mechanical industry and 15% in the electronics. Yet, there are other ways of 
appropriating the benefits of R & D and it is very hazardous to assimilate the patent 
protection decay to the R & D obsolescence rate. Several authors have tried to estimate 
the R & D capital stock by means of sensitivity analyses for different depreciation rates. 
So, Griliches and Mairesse (  1984) have made an experiment based on the measure of the 
output elasticity of R & D. They have unsuccessfully experimented alternative R & D 
capital stock measures without rejecting the hypothesis of no depreciation of  R & D. As 
quoted by Mairesse (1991), the estimates of the R &  D elasticity are rather robust 
regarding the rate of  obsolescence. Indeed, the use of  R & D investment instead of  R & D 
capital can be expected to affect the measure of elasticity only slightly. To demonstrate 
this statement, one can consider that the R & D capital stock is evaluated by using the 
perpetual inventory method: 
Supposing that the R & D investment grows at a constant rate g, one can write : 
00  1 - a i 
Ct = .L ( 1 + g)  Rt 
1=0 
so that: 
This relationship indicates that, ceteris paribus, the use of R & D capital stock and 
R & D investment will give a similar measure of the elasticity. In the logarithmic model, 
the constant will slip out of the expression to the constant term of the regression and in 
the growth rate model, it will disappear. 
Griliches and Lichtenberg ( 1984)  have experimented alternative depreciation 
schemes for the measure of the rate of  return which have also led to accept the hypothesis 
of no depreciation of R & D in terms of its effects on productivity at the industry level. 
Conversely, Goto and Suzuki (1989)'s study emphasizes the distinction between gross R 
& D investment (R & D expenditure) and net R & D investment (R & D capital) when one 
67 measures the rate of  return toR & D. By contrast with the elasticity approach, the rate-of-
return approach is characterized by the lack of robustness.  In  such a  model, the 
hypothesis about the rate of  obsolescence of R & D is very important. To show that, let 
us consider the numerator of  the R & D capital intensity : 
Ct- Ct-1 = Rt-8 Ct-1 
Assuming that the R & D investment grows at constant rate g, one can write : 
So, according to this relationship, using R & D investment instead of  R & D capital 
leads to an underestimate of  the return. The higher the rate of  obsolescence, the higher the 
underestimate will be. Furthermore, if  g is negative, the rate of  return will be negative if o 
> I  g I. Ceteris paribus, an overestimate will be obtained when g < 0 and o  < I  g I  . 
Although one can indifferently use the growth rate of R & D capital or the R & D 
intensity to estimate the effects of R  &  D  on productivity growth, each of these 
specifications implies some hypotheses. So, when the output elasticity of  R & D capital is 
viewed as the parameter, it does not vary over time. As this elasticity is equal to the 
product of  the marginal productivity of  R & D capital by the R & D capital intensity, this 
means that if the R & D capital intensity increases, the marginal product of R & D will 
decrease. On the other hand, if the marginal productivity of R  &  D  capital is the 
parameter, this means that the rate of return on R & D  capital is invariable across 
observations. Yet, quoting Nelson (1988), in dynamic equilibrium, the rate of techno-
logical progress is insensitive toR & D intensity for any firm or industry. Firms in the 
same line of business will experience the same rate of technical progress, regardless of 
their R &  D intensity. However, the levels of productivity should differ among firms 
reflecting differences in R & D intensity. Such an argument, casts doubts on the advis-
ability of strictly interpreting the estimated cross sectional coefficient of  R & D intensity 
as measuring the private or social rate of  return on R & D. 
Another problem raised by this alternative model concerns the interpretation of the 
coefficient p.  First,  both  labour and physical capital data often already  include 
respectively R & D labour and R & D physical capital, so that these data are counted 
twice since they are also the basic components of R &  D capital stock. This double 
counting causes downward biases in the measure of both the rate of  return on R & D and 
the R & D elasticity. Schankennan ( 1981) and Cuneo and Mairesse ( 1984) have shown 
that the resulting biases could be very large. Consequently, when data are not corrected 
68 (6) 
with respect to the R & D double counting, p is interpreted as being the excess rate of 
return to R & D investment. 
Consider  that  LK and CK  are  respectively  the  labour and  physical  capital 
components included in the measure of  the R & D capital. An approximation of the rate of 
return on R & D can be obtained by calculating a corrected value of p, PK· Assuming that 
the variables are defined in value units, the time regression can be specified to measure 
directly the rate of  return of  each production factor : 
The estimated equation is : 
Y •  "  ll C + ll CK  ll L + ll LK  ll K  =  A  + PC  y  + PL  y  + p y 
This adapted interpretation has been forcefully argued as being conceptually 
incorrect by Schankerman (1981). He also points out the bias from R & D expensing out 
when a value added measure is used for output. Material consumption components of R 
&  D investment are intermediate inputs and, consequently, are not accounted in the 
measure of  value added. 
Taking the difference between these two equations, we obtain : 
where PK, the rate of return on R & D capital is equal to the rate of return on R & D 
capital in excess of the normal remuneration of  its labour and physical capital components 
plus the sum of the rates of return on labour and physical capital weighted by  the 
contribution of these factors to the net R & D investment. 
Alternatively, as many studies combine the measure of the elasticities of labour and 
physical capital with a measure of the excess rate of return on R & D physical capital, we 
can adapt the preceding correction by combining these estimates : 
A third correction can also be given for the measurement of R & D elasticity : 
69 Besides these theoretical correction formulas, one cannot ignore that returns on invest-
ment and elasticities are the result of  estimates and that, consequently, the correction will 
be more or less important as the variation of  the relative components is less or more stable 
across observations. The effects of double counting cannot be expected to be identical 
whatever the level of the data analysis may be, i.e., a fmn cross-section analysis, an 
industry cross-section analysis or  a time series analysis. 
In a study on French data at the finn level, Cuneo and Mairesse (1984) have shown 
that the overall biases in the estimates caused by double counting and expensing could ~ 
quite sizeable. Their results emphasize biases in the estimates of the R & D elasticity 
going from 25% to 50%. 
Be X and XK, the disaggregation of a variable between its R & D and "output" 
components. Its growth rate is equal to : 
(Xt + XKt) I (Xt-1 + XKt-1) =  (Xt I Xt-1) . [1 + (XKt I Xt)] I [1 + (XKt-11 Xt-1)] 
If  the relative part (XKt I Xt) does not vary very much over time compared to <Xt I Xt-1), 
its impact on the measure of  the elasticity should be small. 
A second problem is raised by the interpretation of  the rate of  return on R & D. By 
investing in R & D, entrepreneurs will earn a return through net appropriable revenues 
from the business utilization of  created new knowledge. The internal private rate of return 
toR & D depends on the present value of the revenues accruing to this activity. Under 
competitive assumptions, the marginal product of  R & D represents the rate of  return on 
R & D so that the internal private rate of  return on R & D during the life span of a unit 
investment in R & D is : 
which gives : 
1 =  Joo p e-(r+a)t d t = _p-
r+~ 
r=p-~ 
where r is the implicit discount rate or the net internal private rate of return. In this 
equation, one supposes that there is no gestation lag of  R & D investment 
This equation shows that p is defined as the gross internal private rate of  return and 
that, if one·wants to compare the return of alternative forms of investment, particularly 
the returns to R & D and physical capital, one cannot escape the measure of the rate of 
70 obsolescence of R & D capital. This interpretation is valid as long as the data analysed are 
about firms. At the industry and the nationwide level, the coefficient p can no longer be 
assimilated to a private rate of  return because of the spillover effects of a frrm's private R 
&  D investment within and outside the industry. Before discussing this new issue, it 
seems important to clarify the real need of taking into account the rate of  obsolescence of 
R & D investment in the analysis of  its impact on productivity. 
In order to clarify the issue of depreciation of R  &  D, Terleckyj (1984) has 
suggested to draw sharp distinctions between the different economic effects of R & D 
among which : 
1)  R & D as private capital asset : as a source of  profit, R & D depreciates very rapidly 
due to the intensity of domestic and foreign competition regardless of its impact on 
productivity; 
2)  R & D as determinant of the level of  productivity : as a source of productivity, R & D 
does not depreciate at all because the level of productivity reached in an economy as a 
result of technological improvements based on past R  &  D  can be maintained 
indefinitely by replacing factors of  the same kind wjthout need for any additional R & 
D conducted to maintain it; 
3)  R & D as social capital asset determining the rate of growth: as a source of  growth in 
income and output, the social R & D capital does depreciate but less rapidly than the 
private R & D capital because it is affected only by foreign competition. 
This distinction emphasizes three important items which certainly call for further 
investigations. It is particularly worth pointing out that the empirical analysis of the 
relation between R &  D  and competition is  still at an early stage of development. 
However this may be, the R & D investment only depreciates as a consequence of the 
alteration of its competitive impact while the productivity gains resulting from this 
investment remain acquired. An important logical conclusion of this reasoning is that 
equations leaving out the term - S K I Q  in the rate of  return approach are not misspecified 
and do not underestimate the rate of return of R & D investment. 
A third cause for concern is the interpretation of the rate of return regarding the 
level of data aggregation for the regression analysis. The level of productivity achieved 
by one firm or industry or nationwide depends on its own R & D investment and on the 
set of  knowledge capital available. 
71 For a given fmn i, the model taking into account the within-industry spillover effect 
is given by: 
Yi =A GaLr  ~.,  K~  eAt 
where  Ki  is the specific knowledge capital of the finn i 
K1  is the aggregate knowledge capital of the industry in which the fmn i carries 
on its activity 
and where y is the own R & D elasticity while 5 is the within-industry R & D elasticity or 
the within-fmn spillover elasticity. 
If, with Griliches (1979), we assume that the within-industry aggregate knowledge 
capital is the sum of all firm R & D capital levels and resources are allocated optimally 
and all finns face the same relative factor prices we can write : 
where Pc, PL and Px are the prices of C, L and K respectively. Assuming constant 
returns to scale (a + P  + y =  1) the individual production functions can be aggregated : 
Since the ratios  ~  and  ~  are equal tor and l respectively, so also are l: Ki I 
I  ~  1  l:  Ci and l:  Ki I~  Lj, we can write: 
1  t  1  I, Ci  I, Li 
( i  )a ( i  )p  ~ 
y  =  A  l:  K i  l: K  i  KI  KI 
1  1 
=A caLP ~8+y 
The industry production function has a higher elasticity of aggregate knowledge 
capital (8 + y) than at the micro level (y). The coefficient 8 cannot be estimated when we 
are looking at a finn panel within a specific industry and could only be evaluated from an 
industry sample. By extension to the preceding development, we can write : 
72 •  •  •  A K 
Y=A.+aC+PL+PI ~ 
where p measures the private rate of return to R & D while PI represents the social (in-
cluding private) rate of return. Compared to the elasticity approach which assumes a 
common elasticity of output with respect to R & D stock when the relationship is 
estimated across industries, which is not very likely given the large divergences in R & D 
intensity, this alternative approach turns out to be more consistent with the optimal R & D 
choice  behavior  1.  Given  that R & D inputs are often  already included into the 
conventional factors, under the hypothesis that the discrepancy between social and private 
returns is distributed randomly across industries, one can argue that the estimated 
coefficient will be a consistent estimate of the average excess of social over private 
returns [Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984)]. Generally, the estimated rates of return are a 
mixture of private and social rates of  return. For data at the fmn level, there is no doubt 
that a variable like own R & D investment can only explore the magnitude of private 
returns. At the industry level, only the private and within industry returns can be seized, 
and hence only a part of  the social rate of  return. A complete measure of the social rate of 
return on R & D conducted in a firm must cover the private rate of  return, the social rate 
of return on the within industry productivity and the social rate of return on the outside 
industry productivity 2. The latter category of  spillover effects is much more complicated 
to evaluate. The extent to which an industry gains from the available pool of  knowledge 
of other industries depends on the economic and technological proximity of these 
industries. In other words, for each industry, the spillover will be a weighted sum of the 
R & D capital stocks of  the other industries. 
From a practical viewpoint, it is difficult to separate private and social return. The 
extent of the gap between the social and the private rate of return on R & D is highly 
dependent on the competitive environment, the orientation of the research and the nature 
of the results. If the innovator is in a monopoly or oligopoly position, he will be able to 
appropriate a proportion of the social benefits. When the competitive forces are stringent 
the innovator will be in a less secure position to collect the social benefits. The degree of 
appropriability will also differ according to whether the innovation deals with new 
1  If  the inputs are used at their competitive equilibrium levels, industries are unlikely to have the same 
output elasticities. The production  technology  being  specific for  each  industry,  industries will use 
different factor shares. A consequence of this is that a total productivity approach will be more relevant. 
2conversely, for a firm the social rate of return on R & D will be equal to the private (or internal) rate of 
return (on own R & D) plus the external rate of return from the R & D conducted by other finns within 
both its own industry and other industries. It is worth noting that the external effects are not limited in 
space (e.g. a country) since a fmn also profits by the R & D conducted outside the country. 
73 products  or processes.  Product  innovations  are  likely  to  be  under more  intense 
competitive pressures than process innovations. So, the discrepancy between social and 
private returns could be larger for products than for processes. A last characteristic of the 
discrepancy between social and private returns rests on the distinction between generic 
and derived innovations. A radical innovation is more likely to be imitated quickly than 
incremental innovations and, consequently, it will be very difficult for the originator of a 
radical innovation to keep the benefits of  his technological breakthrough. 
On the other hand,  when  a  new innovation comes onto the market place, 
numerous  economic  variables  come  into  action,  which  raises  the  issue of the 
measurement of the social return on R & D and its distinction from private return. As 
Griliches (1980a) points out : "Assuming that, on average, the outside world pays for 
[new processes and] products what they are worth to it, using sales or value added as our 
dependent variable does in fact capture the private returns to such research endeavors. 
However, the observed private returns may underestimate the social returns because, 
given the competitive structure of the particular industry, the market price of the new 
product or process will be significantly below what consumers might have been willing 
to pay for it. On the other hand, part of the increase in sales of an individual firm may 
come at the expense of  other firms and not as the result of the expansion of the market as 
a whole. Also, some of the increase in prices paid for a particular new product may come 
from changes in the market power of a particular firm induced by the success of the 
research program. Moreover, some of the gains in productivity or in the sales of new 
products may be based on the research results of  other firms in the same or some other 
industry. Such factors could result in the observed private returns overestimating the 
social returns significantly. We cannot say much about the net impact of such forces on 
the basis of [firm data]. It requires a detailed comparison of the individual firm results 
with estimates based on industry and economy-wide returns to research[  ...  ]. But since 
expected private returns are presumably a determinant of private investment flows into 
this activity, the estimates presented [on the basis of firm data] may be of some interest 
even if  they cannot answer the social-returns question unequivocally". 
A  last issue is  which output variable should be introduced in the production 
function : value added, sales or total factor productivity based on gross output or net 
output. Conceptually, these alternative solutions rest on different hypotheses regarding 
the  production  process and  the  optimality conditions.  Their main  impact on the 
measurement of the rate of return, which is alternatively estimated by comparison with 
net output or gross output, is that the latter provides higher estimates. This apparent 
overestimate is understandable since the n1arginal product of R & D in terms of gross 
74 output is logically higher than the marginal product of  R & D in terms of net output. On 
the other hand, the use of a value-added measure of  output instead of sales will not result 
in biased estimates. Yet, any measure based on gross output will be mispecified as long 
as intermediate inputs are not taken into account besides primary inputs while any net 
output measure must be connected with primary inputs only 1. 
3.2.  Econometric  Studies  in  Retrospect 
After discussing the main issues concerning the measurement of the impact of R 
& D on productivity, we turn to the most significant studies investigating the relationship 
between R & D and productivity.  The literature in this field can be classified according to 
the level of  data aggregation.  So, we can consider successively : 
-studies at the micro level which are based on firm data (also called panal data) whose 
main advantage is that they substantially increase the degrees of  freedom.  Further-
more, they provide evidence on the private rate of return on R & D investment; 
- studies at the meso level whicQ  use industry data and whose estimates can be 
associated with the social rate of  return on R & D.  Yet, estimates will give at best a 
partial measure of this social rate of return, i.e. an evaluation of the intra-industry 
return; 
- studies at the macro level which analyze economy-wide time series data in order to 
measure the social rate of return on R & D.  While such an approach can give an idea 
of the domestic social return, we must keep in mind that, incomplete appropriability 
property of R & D returns, which causes the social return to differ from the private 
return, is not restricted by the existence of  frontiers. 
Besides, econometric analyses can also be classified according to : 
- the dimensional extent : findings can be grounded on cross-sectorial or time-series 
data or both; 
- the econometric specification : th~ measure of  the impact of  R & D can be expressed 
in terms of R & D elasticity or rate of  return on R & D; 
1  All variables having been beforehand corrected for double counting and expensing out 
75 - the data measurement issue : sales, value-added or partial or total productivity can be 
referred to as the explained variable, data can be corrected or not for R & D double 
counting and expensing or R & D intensity can be defined with respect to sales or 
value added. 
This review is based on the classification of  studies according to the level of  data 
aggregation and their econometric specification. 
3.2.1.  Micro  Level  Studies 
Table 3.1. summarizes the main estimates of  the R & D elasticity from finn panel 
data.  These estimates are performed within the framework of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function except for Jaffe (1986)'s results which arise from the adjustment of a 
profit function. 
One of the fll'St studies to use finn data to estimate R & D elasticity was that by 
Minasian (1969) performed on a small sample of  chemical US ftrms.  With the average 
growth rate of value added as a dependent variable he experimented without firm 
dummies and with firm dummies.  These alternative approaches are respectively called 
total regressions and within regressions.  The latter can also be obtained by using the 
deviations of  variables from the individual fum means or by performing on growth rates. 
Minasian finds R &  D  to have a positive and significant effect in the first case, an 
observation which is not confumed by his second estimate.  This result shows that biased 
estimates can be obtained if not all finn-specific variables are included, which effect can 
be picked up with finn dummies. 
It is in the 1980's that the analyses at the firm level multiply.  The first study of a 
large number of fmns was realized by Griliches (1980a) who investigated 883 large US 
manufacturing companies accounting for more than 90 % of all industrial R &  D. 
Working on both cross-section and time series, he obtains similar results for the two 
types of  regressions.  Yet, estimates by industry give very different values ranging from 
0.03 in aircraft to 0.14 in motor vehicles. 
As already pointed out, Schankerman (1981) has forcefully argued that the 
measured contribution of R & D to productivity improvements is often largely biased 
downwards by failing to correct traditional inputs Oabor and physical capital) for double 
counting as well as net output for R & D expensing (subtracted from value added as an 
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 intermediate input).  His estimates show that the downward bias varies from 50 percent 
for chemicals and petroleum and motor vehicles to 800 percent for electric equipment and 
aircraft.  It is worth noting that the downward biases are largest in the two industries that 
are most R  & D  intensive and most reliant on government funding,  i.e. electrical 
equipment and aircraft. 
Cuneo and Mairesse (1984) arrive at a similar observation in their analysis of 
French data.  For scientific sectors, the downward bias amounts to 50%.  From their 
study it also appears that the hypothesis of constant returns to scale is not without 
consequences on the estimates.  When this assumption is relaxed, estimates of R &  D 
elasticities are lower and returns to scale appear to be decteasing.  Large divergences are 
also observed between estimates from total regressions and within regressions.  The 
within estimate under the hypothesis of  free returns to scale gives a non-significant R & 
D  elasticity (except for scientific sectors).  The order of magnitude of coefficients 
obtained in this analysis is quite comparable to that reported by Griliches and Mairesse 
(1984)  for the  United· States.  Yet,  in  this  study,  within  regressions  give higher 
coefficients than total regressions (except for the scientific sector).  In a simultaneous 
analysis of  both American and French data, Griliches and Mairesse (1983) fail to find any 
significant relationships between output growth rate and R & D investment. 
In fact, we observe that time-series estimates of R & D elasticity provide more 
controversial results than cross-section ones.  In a large number of time series studies, 
the estimated coefficient appears non-significant.  But it is not the case for Griliches 
(1980b, 1986)'s studies in which the estimated coefficients are close for the two types of 
estimates.  In the second study, a partial correction of data gives a higher estimate of R & 
D coefficient while two additional variables about the share of  R & D investment devoted 
to basic research and privately financed research are introduced into the model, the latter 
showing a high premium effect for these categories of  research.  The results obtained by 
Jaffe (1986) from a  profit equation are congruent with  the observations made by 
Griliches.  A similar conclusion emerges from the estimates reported by Sassenou ( 1988) 
for Japan.  On the one hand, his coefficients are significant for the cross-section analysis, 
but, on the other hand, these results are not confmned by the time series analysis. 
According to  Mairesse and  Sassenou  (1991)  the  high  disparities  between 
estimates arising from the cross-section and the time-series analyses are likely to be due 
to various causes.  High collinearity of R & D capital with time, random measurement 
errors in variables, inadequate specification of lags in the effects of R &  D capital, 
omission of variables reflecting short-term adjustments and the simultaneity of the 
81 decision process regarding employment and production are all phenomena which may 
explain why time-series estimates give poorer results than cross-sectional ones. 
Models estimating the rate of return on R &  D  have been developed as an 
alternative method to. the hypothesis of  a constant R & D elasticiy.  In this approach, the 
marginal productivity of R & D capital, in other words, the rate of return on R & D, is 
assumed to be constant.  This hywthesis of  a same rate of  return on R & D for all firms 
and industries is compatible with the competitive equilibrium conjecture all the more as 
the measure bears on the private return and not on the social return.  Although estimates 
based on fmn data are generally seen as measuring the private return, the results may 
also, to some extent, represent the social return depending on the analytical context.  So, 
it is the case when industry dummies are not included into the regression.  Other practical 
problems raised by this approach will be discussed throughout the review of the most 
prominent studies whose results are gathered in table 3.2. 
In their respective studies, Minasian (1962) and Mansfield (1980) provide some 
clues to a very high rate of return on R & Din the chemical industry for the United 
States.  This result is not confirmed by Link (1981) for the shorter period covering the 
beginning of the 70's.  Yet, the rate of return for the chemical industry is significant 
which is not the case for other industries, particularly those related to mechanical 
manufacturing and transport equipment  An estimate based on a sample of 302 firms for 
the end of the 70's no longer provides any strong evidence of  the rate of  return on R & D 
[Link (1983)]. 
As opposed to these disappointing experiments, Griliches and Mairesse (1983) 
produce estimates of a significant rate of return in the United States and France with a 
larger return for the latter.  The use of  industry dummies appreciably reduces the order of 
magnitude of  the estimated return.  So, more attention should be paid to the construction 
of variables in the measurement of  the rate of  return.  The relationship between changes 
in productivity and levels of R & D intensity can be evaluated by using alternatively sales 
or value added as reference output.  Generally, the measurements of the productivity 
variable and the R & D intensity indicator are consistent with each other.  Nevertheless, 
one needs to be careful when comparing the returns on R & D provided by different 
studies because estimates may sensitively diverge depending upon whether R &  D 
intensity is measured with respect to value added or sales.  Consequently, the estimates 
obtained by Minasian (1962),  Mansfield (1980)  and Link (1981) are not directly 
comparable to those reported by Link (1983) and Griliches and Mairesse (1983), the 
former being based on value added and the latter on sales.  As the amount of sales is 
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 largely higher than the value added, the ratio of R & D to sales is expected to give higher 
estimates than the R &  D-value added ratio.  The ratio of sales to value added being 
superior to two, the estimates of Minasian and Mansfield appear very high when 
compared to those obtained by Griliches and Mairesse. 
The results reported by Clark and Griliches (1984) and Griliches (1986) are 
roughly comparable to those obtained by Griliches and Mairesse.  It is worth noting that 
the introduction of industry dummies in their sample does not modify the estimates 
obtained by Clark and Griliches and that the authors estimate a product-process mix 
effect.  Their mix coefficient indicates that the rate of  productivity growth is lower when 
the increase in R &  D  is product-oriented than when it is process-oriented.  This is 
explained by the fact that new products tend to be disruptive to established production 
processes because their introduction involves a start-up and debugging phase.  Moreover, 
when new products are an important aspect of competition, businesses may sacrifice a 
part of  productivity to gain flexibility to avoid too rigid equipments and processes which 
reduce the possibilities of  adaptation. 
If we tum to other estimates, we see that some studies show negative results.  So, 
Odagiri (1983) reports a positive and statistically significant return coefficient for the 
scientific sector in Japan, but for other sectors, the coefficient is negative.  This finding is 
not isolated in the sense that detailed results published by other authors, like Link ( 1981) 
for the United States and Fecher (1989) for Belgium, also yield negative estimates.  Yet, 
these astonishing findings are often only at most marginally significant. 
Other studies of Japanese data by Odagiri and Iwata (1986), Sassenou (1988) and 
Goto and Suzuki (1989) give more credible estimates. The estimates reported by 
Sassenou ( 1988) show how different the return can be depending on whether the R & D 
intensity is measured with respect to sales or value added as well as how the introduction 
of industry dummies can affect the coefficients.  The originality of Goto and Suzuki 
(1989)'s study mainly lies in the fact that they emphasize the implications of disregarding 
R &  D depreciation in the measurement of R &  D intensity.  In some sectors, such as 
pharmaceuticals, machinery, and chemicals, the corrected intensity measures give notice-
ably different estimates compared to those obtained with the uncorrected measure. 
As pointed out by Mairesse and Sassenou (1991), the interpretation of dis-
crepancies between the estimates from corrected and uncorrected measures in terms of a 
net rate of return versus a gross rate of return does not hold.  What has to be· ~nderlined 
87 from the estimates reported by Griliches and Mairesse (1990) is the fall in estimates when 
both industry effects and free returns to scale are taken into account in the regressions. 
Finally, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1989) and Klette (1991) carried out very large-
scale experiments for the United States and Norway respectively and their estimates of 
the rate of  return on R & Dare astonishingly very close. 
3.2.2.  Meso  Level  Studies 
Besides these estimates obtained at the finn level, there are several studies which 
have measured the rate of  return on R & D at the industry level.  The interpretation of  the 
rate of  return estimated through such studies is different from that given for coefficients 
estimated on the basis of panel data.  What is measured through such an approach is the 
excess gross social rate of return on R & D.  It is an "excess" measure because data are 
rarely corrected for double counting and expensing.  The "gross" adjective results from 
the fact that the R & D intensity measure used is based on gross R & D investment and 
not net R &  D investment.  These two restrictions are not specific to industry level 
analyses, they are also used in panel data analyses.  The social characteristic of this rate 
of return arises from the aggregation across fmns of R & D expenditures which causes 
the coefficient to represent the return on industry R & D for the industry as a whole.  Yet, 
it does not give a full estimate of the social return because it is restricted to the R & D 
performed inside the concerned industry.  In other words, it is an internal rate of  return or 
a rate of return internal to the industry.  Consequently, the meaning of the return at the 
industry level is not clearer than at the fmn Ievell.  Table 3.3 presents a synthesis of the 
main estimates of the rate of return at the industry level.  As in the case of firm level 
analyses, the R & D intensity indicator is alternatively measured with respect to sales or 
value added.  Anticipating the following chapter, we have also summarized in this table 
the studies measuring both the internal and the external rates of  return.  This external rate 
of  return measures what are for a given industry the external effects of the R & D realized 
in the other industries. 
1For recall, Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984) defme it as the average excess of the social gross rate of 
retwn.  There is no reason to expect the social return to be equalized across industries but under the 
hypothesis that the discrepancy between social and private returns  is distributed randomly across 
industries, the coefficient will give a consistent estimate of the average excess of social over private 
returns.  It is a  social return  because it is  based on output in  constant prices rather than profit 
calculations.  It is gross because it also includes a possible allowance for depreciation~ And it is excess 
because R & D expenditures are already included in conventional inputs at normal factor prices. 
88 Table 3.3.  Estimates of the Rate of Return at the Industry Level 
Study  Sample  Data and  Rate of return 
weighting matrix  Internal  External 
Terleckyj  United States  Total factor productivity  0.37  -
(1974)  20 industries  Value added  (0.11) 
1948-1966  Transaction flow and  0.29  0.78 
capital flow matrices  (0.08)  (0.21) 
Terleckyj  United States  Total factor productivity 
(1980a)  20 industries  Value added  0.20  1.83 
1948-1966  Transaction flow and  (0.31)  (0.72) 
capital flow matrices 
Scherer  United States  Labor productivity 
(1982)1  87 industries  Sales 
1964-1969  Patent flow matrix  0.13  0.64 
(0.13)  (0.35) 
1973-1978  0.29  0.74 
(0.14)  (0.39) 
Griliches- France  Total factor productivity 
Mairesse  15 industries  Sales 
(1983)  1964-1968,  0.33  -
1969-1973  (0.14) 
United States 
15 industries 
1964-1968,  0.23  -
1969-1973  (0.12) 
Griliches- United States  Total factor productivity 
Lichtenberg  27 industries  Sales 
(1984a)  1959-1968  0.09  -
1964-1973 
(0.05) 
0.20  -
(0.06) 
1969-1976  0.34  -
(0.08) 
Griliches- United States  Total factor productivity 
Lichtenberg  193 industries  Interindustry transactions 
"(1984b)1  1964-1969  Sales  0.15  0.74 
(0.08)  (0.19) 
1973-1978  Sales  0.28  0.50 
(0.11)  (0.25) 
1964-1969  Value added  0.08  0.40 
Value added 
(0.05)  (0.10) 
1973-1978  0.16  0.26 
(0.06)  (0.14) 
Goto-Suzuki  Japan  Total factor productivity 
(1989)  50 industries  Value added  0.26  0.80 
1978-1983  Transaction flow and  (0.14)  (0.42) 
capital flow matrices 
Leonard (1971)  United States  Sales  0.09  -
16 industries 
1957-1968 
(0.04) 
Griliches  United States  Total factor productivity  0.32  -
(1973)  85 industries  Value added  (0.10) 
1958-1963 
Note: Estimated standard errors in parentheses.  , 
1.  In these studies, the analyses are not based on a distinction between own and purchased R & D but between 
own product R & D and own process and embodied R & D. 
89 A frrst estimate made by Leonard (  1971) gives a very weak rate of  return on R & 
D in the US industry.  This result strongly contrasts with that obtained by Griliches 
(1973) and is all the more disappointing as the frrst author makes use of sales and the 
second one of value added.  The estimates by Terleckyj (1974,1980a) are of the same 
order of  magnitude as the value reported by Griliches.  The two types of  results presented 
by Terleckyj are based on alternative measurement methods of total factor productivity. 
While the first measurement is derived from net output and net input, the second one uses 
gross values and accounts for quality characteristics of  inputs.  This explains why in the 
second case, the estimate of  the rate of  return on R & D is lower and non significant 
Except for the first subperiod studied, Scherer (1982)'s results are comparable to 
those obtained by Terleckyj.  It is the same for results reported by Griliches and Mairesse 
(1983) who provide evidence of a higher rate of return in France.  Griliches and 
Lichtenberg ( 1984a, 1984b) show how different the estimates may be depending on the 
reference period and the R & D intensity indicator.  The rate of  return on R & D appears 
to have increased over time.  The estimates obtained by Goto and Suzuki (1989) are 
comparable to those reported for the United States. 
3.2.3.  Macro  Level  Studies 
Finally, let us close this review by having a glance at some studies estimating the 
elasticity of R & D at the economy-wide level except for Capron (1990,1992b) who uses 
total R & D expenditure. These studies only consider industrial R & D expenditure.  All 
the results gathered in table 3.4. show that there also exists a relationship between 
productivity and R & D at the aggregate level. 
The estimated elasticities are noticeably higher than the elasticities resulting from 
panel experiments.  Except for Italy, the private industrial R & D elasticity is lower than 
the total industrial R & D elasticity.  In the equations with total industrial R & D, the 
elasticity of  each type of R & D (private versus public) is equal to the estimated elasticity 
weighted by the relative part of the corresponding type of R  &  D  in total R  &  D. 
Consequently, the lower level of  private industrial R & D elasticities indicates that public 
industrial R & D  expenditure contributes to productivity growth.  This finding is 
particularly obvious for the United States, France and the United Kingdom where the 
public contribution to industrial R & D expenditure is very high.  It is worth noting that a 
large part of this public intervention is not directed towards civil projects but is part of 
defense objectives.  By running the regression for two subperiods, Patel and Soete 
90 (1988) tested whether the coefficients were significantly different in the two periods. 
They find evidence that there was a break in the relationship between productivity and R 
& Din the mid seventies in Canada, the UK, Sweden and Japan.  While the impact of R 
& D decreased in Canada and Sweden, it increased in the UK and Japan. 
Table 3.4.  Estimates of the  Elasticity of R  &  D at the  Aggregate Level 
Study  Sample  Data characteristics  Total  Private  Public 
R&D  R&D  R&D 
Levy-Terleckyj  United States  Sales  - 0.27  0.05 
(1983)  1949-1981  No depreciation rate  (0.07)  (0.03) 
Suzuki (1985)  Japan  Value added 
1965-1982  Depreciation rate (0.10)  0.12  - -
imported technology  (0.05) 
included 
Patel-Soete  United States  Total factor productivity  0.61  0.34  -
(1988)  1967-1985  Depreciation rate (0.15)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Canada  0.26  0.25  -
1967-1985  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Japan  0.41  0.41  -
1967-1985  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Germany  0.38  0.38  -
1967-1985  (0.01)  (0.01) 
United Kingdom  0.82  0.62  -
1967-1985  (0.06)  (0.07) 
France  0.43  0.37  -
1967-1985  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Italy  0.56  0.61  -
1967-1985  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Sweden  0.40  0.31  -
1967-1985  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Capron ( 1990)  Belgium  Value added  0.76  - -
1965-1985  Depreciation rate (0.15)  (0.12) 
A 
Capron  Belgium  Value added  - 0.58  0.24 
(1992b)  1965-1985  Depreciation rate (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.04) 
Note : Estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
3.3.  An  Assessment  of Econometric  Studies 
What can we conclude from this survey of  econometric studies ?  Like Mairesse 
and Sassenou ( 1991 ), we think that the real issue is whether or not econometric studies 
can characterise the relationship between productivity and R & D in a satisfactory and 
useful manner.  Studies are rarely con1parable with each  other and there are large 
91 disparities between parameters.  The differences between estimates may be due to data 
peculiarities : periods, industries, countries, data transformation and quality, estimation 
methods and specification of models may, to some extent, explain the large range of 
estimates reported in the literature.  With a view to completing this qualitative evaluation, 
a regression analysis has been conducted on the coefficients gathered in the preceding 
tables.  The objective of this regression analysis is to evaluate to what extent the main 
data and regression characteristics play a prominent role in the explanation of the 
observed disparities in estimates.  The characteristics taken into account are the number of 
enterprises covered by the sample, the periods considered, the industry sectors, reference 
countries, regression methods and the nature of  the output. 
The regression analyses have  been performed on the estimated coefficients 
gathered in tables 3.1., 3.2. and 3.3. so that the samples of  experiments are respectively : 
- the estimates of the output elasticity of R & D capital at the frrm level : the regressions 
are run on the total sample of 46 coefficients and alternatively on a subsample of 32 
coefficients which does not include the estimates obtained for each industry 
separately (i.e. by excluding Minasian's and Schankerman's studies). 
- the estimates of the rate of return on R & D  at the firm level : the number of 
observations in this sample is of 47 coefficients in which the "abnormally" negative 
coefficient reported by  Odagiri  as  well  as  the result of Klette's  study are not 
included.  Alternative results are also presented for a subsample of 28 coefficients 
which does not include the estimates obtained for each industry separately (i.e. by 
excluding Minasian's, Mansfield's, Link's and Goto and Suzuki's studies). 
- the estimates of the internal rate of return on R & D at the industry level whose 
sample is composed of 17 observations. 
Two alternative estin1ation methods have been applied on these three samples of 
coefficients.  First, the explanatory power of data and regression characteristics have 
been evaluated by running the ordinary least square method.  Yet, this method is not 
appropriate to obtain an unbiased estimate of the mean value of  coefficients.  The quality 
of adjustment varies considerably from one experiment to the other and the ability to 
measure the impact of R & D on productivity for each experiment is monitored by the 
standard deviation of  estimates.  Consequently, an unbiased estimate of the mean value of 
coefficients will be obtained by  running a weighted least square regression on the 
distribution of coefficients whose weights are the inverted variance of the estimated 
92 coefficients.  However, as the number of observations used in the studies may also have 
something  to  do with  the estimated coefficients,  a  second  weighted  least  square 
regression has been performed by  using the number of firms or industries taken into 
account in each experiment.  By doing so, we give a higher weight to coefficients based 
on a large sample whilst in the first weighted least square, it is the quality of adjustment 
which sets the weight given to the coefficients. 
The data and regression characteristics from which the explanatory variables have 
been constructed are : 
- the inverse of the number of observations taken into account in each experiment 
(number of firms or industries) (lOBS); 
- the average period of estimation defined as the average year covered by the sample 
(mean year less 1950) (PER); 
- a dummy variable taking the value one for the within industries estimation in cross-
section analyses and zero otherwise (Industry dummies); 
-a  dummy variable taking the value one for data corrected for double counting and 
expensing and zero otherwise (corrected); 
- a dummy variable taking the value one for cross-section analyses and zero otherwise 
(cross-section); 
- a dummy variable taking the value one for analyses based on sales as output variable 
and zero otherwise (Sales); 
-a dummy variable taking the value one for analyses bringing on Japanese data and 
zero otherwise (Japan dummy); 
- a dummy variable taking the value one for analyses bringing on scientific sectors and 
zero otherwise (Scientific sector); 
-a  dummy variable taking the value one for studies bringing on the profit equation and 
zero otherwise (7t); 
93 - a dummy variable taking the value one for studies bringing on the total factor 
productivity measured from sales and zero otherwise (TFPs); 
- a dummy variable taking the value one for studies bringing on the total factor 
productivity measured from value added and zero otherwise (TFPav); 
- a dummy variable taking the value one for studies bringing on a production function 
with value added as output measure (A  V); 
- a dummy variable taking the value one for studies whose the R &  D  intensity 
indicator is based upon a measure of the R & D capital stock and zero otherwise 
(STK); 
- a dummy variable taking the value one for studies which measure both internal and 
external rates of  return on R & D and zero otherwise (External). 
The regression results are listed in tables 3.5., 3.6. and 3.  7.  The wideness in the 
range of  estimates is explained for about two third by data and regression characteristics. 
About one third of disparities in  the results is a consequence of data measurement 
problems.  As it could be thought, the output measurement issue is of  prime importance. 
The use of  either sales or value added as dependent variable or as a basis for computing 
productivity has significant effect on the regression results.  The lack of  corrections for R 
& D double counting and expensing as well as for depreciation in the measure of R & D 
intensity significantly affects the final result. 
Another crucial issue in the lack of robustness between the estimates obtained 
from time-series and cross-sections.  Time-series estimates are generally very poor and 
non significant, which is not the case for cross-sectional ones.  Differences in the 
specification of regressions are also at the source of significant deviations in the 
estimates.  So, the introduction of industry dummies reduces the estimated return on R & 
D (but does not seem to affect the estimated elasticity significantly). 
More specifically, the main results can be summarized as follows: 
- frrstly, regarding the estimates of the output elasticities of R & D 
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 - all things being otherwise equal, the mean value of output elasticity of R &  D is 
about .08 for sales and zero for value added when data have not been corrected for 
double-counting and expensing; 
- cross-section analyses show a measure of  elasticity superior to .05 to that obtained 
from time-series analyses; 
- corrections for double-counting and expensing give a positive differential of  elasticity 
which amounts to .08; 
- scientific sectors have a higher elasticity than other sectors, the differential being of 
.07; 
- estimates obtained from the profit equation give mitigated results (there is a positive 
differential from OLS which becomes non significant when variances-based WLS is 
used); 
- the number of observations, the average period of  estimation, the hypothesis of  free 
return to scale, the reference countty and the industty dummies do not significantly 
influence the estimated elasticity of  R & D; 
- secondly, turning to the estimates of the rate of  return on R & D at the fmn level : 
- all things being otherwise equal, the mean value of  the gross excess rate of  return on 
R & D is 0.20 when the return is measured with respect to sales and 0.13 when the 
total factor productivity with respect to sales is used as dependent variable.  Yet, 
when the dependent variable is value added or total factor productivity with respect 
to value added, the estimated return is not significantly different from zero; 
- the use of  R & D capital stock instead of  R & D expenditure in the measure of  R & D 
intensity does not provide a significantly different return from that obtained in the 
second case.  The extra relative return of 40 percent emphasized by OLS results is 
not conftrmed by WLS.  This apparent discrepancy in the results may be explained 
by  the  lack  of statistical  representativity of this  approach  in  our  sample. 
Consequently, the approach calls for further investigations; 
- the introduction of  industty dummies significantly affects the estimates of  the rate of 
return (in opposition to the output elasticity of R & D) but without giving better 
98 estimates of the rate of  return as it seems to be suggested by the non significance of 
this variable in the WLS with respect to variances; 
- there is a significant premium to the Japanese R & D which amounts to 0.14; 
- scientific sectors benefit by a  significant premium on R &  D of 0.11  (the non 
significant result obtained for the subsample is explained by the fact that these 
sectors are to a large extent excluded); 
- the number of observations, the a~erage period of estimation and the hypothesis of 
free return to scale do not significantly influence the estimated rate of  return on R & 
D; 
-thirdly, concerning the estimates of  the rate of  return on R & D at the industry level: 
- all things being otherwise equal, the mean value of the gross excess internal rate of 
return on R & D is 0.22 when it is estimated with respect to sales and it is 0.10 when 
estimates are run on the basis of value added, but these estimates are downward 
biased due to the fall in the rates of  return during the sixties. 
- when this phenomenon is taken into account the mean values go up to 0.38 and 0.28 
respectively.  To grasp the decrease in the rate of return during the sixties, we 
introduced as an explanatory variable into the model a quadratic function of the 
average period of  estimation (represented in the results by PER and PER2).  Yet, as 
such a function has infinite values at its extremes, we alternatively adjusted a Beta 
distribution whose optimal values of the exponents were estimated by a search 
procedure.  According to these two approaches, the lowest rate of return was 
attained in 1959-1960 with values equal to 0.18 and 0.08 respectively.  The mean 
values referred above are hit at the beginning of  the seventies; 
- taking value added instead of sales to measure R & D intensity shows a decrease in 
the estimated rate of  return of  about 10 percent; 
- the joint estimation of  both internal and external rates of  return decreases the estimate 
of the internal rate of about 10 percent.  Yet, as shown by the combined variable 
External *BET  A, this effect is less pronounced when the internal rate of return is 
weak. 
99 In a nutshell, the econometric evaluation of the impact of R & D on economic 
growth allows to conclude that R & D investment is a significantly important source of 
productivity gains.  A large part of discrepancies between the coefficients estimated may 
be explained by data and regression characteristics.  To some extent, the discrepancies 
explained by our regression analysis show that econometric studies of R & D are not so 
imprecise and  unreliable  as it might be  thought at first  glance.  Yet,  plentiful 
methodological and conceptual problems remain.  In the last years, some very significant 
improvements have been brought to the modelling of  R & D and its spillover effects. 
3.4.  Adjustment  Cost  Models 
So far, we have only considered static equilibrium models in which production 
factors are always at ·their expected long-term level. These models can be made dynamic 
in two ways: 
- frrst, by considering that all or some factors only adjust partially to their short-run 
equilibrium level; 
- second, by envisaging a cost of adjustment model with a short-run disequilibrium 
situation whose dynamic perspective presupposes the realisation of a long-term equili-
brium. 
The adjustment cost models are based upon the hypothesis that firms face  a 
technology which uses variable factors (e.g., labor, energy and intermediary inputs) and 
quasi-fixed factors (like physical capital and R & D capital). Some of the quasi-fixed fac-
tors cannot vary at short-term with respect to the equilibrium level and any change in the 
level of these factors implies costs of adjustment 
Mohnen and Nadiri (  1985) developed cost of  adjustment models including R & D 
investments. They are assimilated to a production factor because they are at the origin of 
new products and/or processes generating new sales and/or a reduction of production 
costs. Both physical capital and R & D stock face costs of adjustment when their level 
changes. These costs are caused by the instalment of new machines, the reorganisation of 
production tasks and the familiarization with new working circumstances in the case of 
capital; they also result from the difficulty in implementing and working out a research 
project, and in marketing new products and processes.  In this model, labor and 
intermediary inputs are variable factors. 
100 (8) 
The objective of  the finn is to select both physical and R & D profiles that minimize 
the discounted value of  costs at given prices : 
00 
with  Ct+p = c (PLt' Kt+p-t, Rt+p-t, A Kt+P' A Rt+P' Qt) 
IKt+p = Kt+p - (1 -OK) Kt+p-t 
IRt+p = Rt+p- (1- ~)  Rt+p-t 
under the production constraint 
where  PRt' PKt' PLt  are respectively the acquisition price of  R & D and physical 
capital and the real wage rate 
ut  is the corporate tax rate 
OK, OR  are respectively the depreciation rate of  capital and R & D 
A Kt = Kt - Kt-t 
ARt= Rt- Rt-t 
t 
r 
is a proxy for exogenous technical change 
is a constant actualisation rate. 
C, the cost variable has been normalized with respect to the price of materials. 
From the following functional form of the normalized restricted cost function : 
1  2  1  2 
Ct  =  Ot [<Xo +at PLt + 2 a2 PL11  + a3 Kt-t + <X4 Rt-t + 2 as Kt-tl Ot 
1  2  1  2  1  2 
+ 2 Cl6 Rt-l Ot + a7 Kt-t Rt-tl Ot + 2 as A Ktl at+ 2 a9 ARt/ at 
+ ato PLt Kt-t +au PLt Rt-t 
for which restrictions on parameters are imposed 1 so that the marginal adjustment costs 
are zero in the steady state. The resolution of the optimization problem yields : 
Kt- Kt-t =  ~t Ot + P2 PLt Ot + ~3 PK1 Qt + ~4  PR1 Qt + Ps Kt-t + ~6  Rt~t 
Rt- Rt-t = 'Yt Qt + Yl PL1 Ot + 'Y3 PKt Qt + 'Y4 PR1 Qt + 'Y5  Kt-t + ~6  Rt-t 
Lt =[at+ a2 PLt] Ot +a  to Kt-t +au Rt-t 
Mt = Ct - PLt Lt 
1i.e. as =  a9 =  0. 
101 in which the ~i and 'Yi coefficients are linked to the ai by different constraints 1• 
It is a similar model which was successfully estimated by Cardini and Mohnen 
(1984), Mohnen and Nadiri (1985) and Mohnen, Nadiri and Prucha (1986) for the 
Italian,  American,  Japanese,  German  and  French cases.  They observed that  the 
adjustment lags of R & D are noticeably more important than for physical capital2. While 
the adjustment speed of capital is relatively identical among countries, the adjustment 
speed of R & Dis faster in the United States. Furthermore, the internal rate of return 
appears higher for R & D than for physical capital. The main results are summarized in 
table 3.8. 
Table 3.8.  Impact of R  &  D in  the Manufacturing Sector (1965-1978) 
Dependent variable  Parameter  us  Japan  Genna- France  Italy 
ny 
Gross output  Adjustment speed in fli'St  .17  .11  .09  .02  - period 
Short-run elasticity  .16  .23  .20  .13  -
Internal rate of  return  .11  .15  .13  - -
Contribution to labor  .03  .03  .02  .04  productivity  -
Value added  Adjustment speed in fli'St  .15  .26  .26  .07  .13  period 
Short-run elasticity  .18  .36  .35  .16  .18 
Internal rate of  return  - - - .11  .12 
Sources: Cardani and Mohnen (1984),Mohnen and Nadiri (1985) and Mohnen, Nadiri 
and Prucha ( 1986). 
While the labor factor is still considered in a traditional way in this model, the in-
corporation of R & D expenditure as a quasi-fixed factor submitted to adjustment costs 
makes this model an important step towards the endogenisation of technical change. It 
could easily be extended to take into account human capital by distinguishing the skill 
levels some of which are not readily malleable in the short run and face adjustment costs 
resulting from the learning process inherent in the acquiring skills. 
1For more details, cf. Mohnen and Nadiri (1985) and Mohnen, Nadiri and Prucha (1986) whose studies 
have inspired the simplified model developed here. 
2  The mean lag for physical capital is about 3 years against five years and more for R & D capital. 
102 This dual formulation based on the producer theory, which represents the techno-
logy of production by means of the cost function, is an important methodological step in 
modelling producer behavior. The measurement of the rate of return on R & D in models 
noticeably differs from the method used in Cobb-Douglas functions. 
In the framework of the adjustment-cost model, it is assumed that the firm mini-
mizes the present value of expected production costs. This problem can be written as : 
00 
Min  J e-Pt [c (pL, K, R, IK, IR, Q) + PK (p +OK) K + PR (p +OR) R] dt 
IK, IR  0 
where the prices Pi (p + Oi) are the relative rental rates of the capital stocks, Oi, the rate of 
depreciation and p, the real discount rate. 
The internal gross rate of  return on R & D is equal to : 
•  a  c  a c 
(p +OK) =  (- aR + dJR) I PR 
This equation shows that the internal net rate of  return on R & D is nothing else that 
the diminution of the production cost due to a marginal increase of R & D stock, net of 
marginal adjustment cost and net of depreciation. 
If the producer can immediately adapt his inputs to his level of production, the cost 
minimisation problem amounts to minimizing the costs at each period : 
Min  [c (pL, K, R, Q) + PK (p +OK) K + PR (p +OR) R] 
IK, IR 
so that in the static case, the internal gross rate of  return on R & D is given by : 
from which, compared to the dynamic case, the marginal adjustment cost has disap-
peared. So, the existence of costs of adjustment affects the rate of  return on R & D. 
103 Chapter 4.  The Spillovers from  R & D Investment 
The effects of R & D go beyong the fmn, the industry and the country that perform 
the R &  D.  The main feature of such an investment is that fmns which do it cannot 
exclude others from obtaining a part of the benefits free in charge.  In other words, spill-
overs arise because the returns of R & Dare not entirely appropriable.  Only a perfectly 
discriminant monopolist can appropriate quasi-rents from technical change and so escape 
the diffusion of technological know-how to other enterprises.  Von Rippel (1982) indica-
ted that, in the case where there is no monopoles and even if there exists a patent or 
licence, there will not be perfect appropriability of the scientific discovery.  There is to 
some extent a contradiction between the social interest which suggests that the diffusion 
of innovations should rapidly spread out throughout the economy and so boost the eco-
nomic growth and the private interest which checks the diffusion process in order to 
maximise the private rent.  Coming back to the seminal contribution of Arrow (1962), 
technology is equivalent to information and as such characterized by indivisibilities.  It 
can be transmitted and rented without cost.  Once produced, a new technology is like a 
public good because it is available to everybody free of  charge.  At the two extremities of 
the spectrum of appropriability opportunities, there is on one side the perfect monopolist 
who can grab all the benefits from an innovation, and, on the other side, the producer 
facing a perfect competititve market is not in a position to grab the welfare benefits from 
the innovation.  Along the spectrum, there are lots of situations which depend on the 
market structures.  This appropriability phenomenon corresponds to a first kind of spill-
overs emphasized by Griliches (1979).  There are characterized by R & D intensive in-
puts purchased from other industries at less than their full quality price.  Their produc-
tivity effects are not fully measured by official prices indexes because all quality im-
provements are not totally appropriated by the senders and are rarely incorporated into 
official statistics.  The second kind of spillovers deals with the real know  ledge transmis-
sion.  They result from discoveries and innovations in an industry whose some ideas of 
which can be fruitfully borrowed in other industries to generate technological improve-
ments of products and processes in these industries.  All these industries need not buy 
from each other to benefit from this new knowledge and consequently, such spillovers 
cannot adequately be trailed through the conventional interindustry relationships such as 
input-output matrices. 
So, these "knowledge" spillovers are more difficult to trace than the "economic" 
spillovers because we do not have any grounded a priori information about the potential 
beneficiaries of these researches.  At the very most, it seems reasonable to assume that 
105 for a given firm the major knowledge spillovers come from inside its own industry.  For 
the knowledge spillovers coming from outside its own industry, it is the concept of 
technological proximity which must guide the search of source industries.  The confusion 
in the literature between these two kinds of spillovers is due to the fact that, in empirical 
analyses, it is not an easy task to measure their effects separately.  Regarding the 
methods, the measure of any type of spillovers will be conveniently approximated but 
one should bear in mind that, to some extent, the measure will also represent the effects 
of the second type of spillovers. 
While case studies are less general than econometric studies, they enable a more 
acute measure of the real performance of specific innovations.  However, their results 
cannot be generalized and these studies often focus on successful innovations.  They 
usefully supplement the more aggregated approaches which deal with the full research 
system at firm, industry or economy wide level.  In order to have a larger view of the 
extent of inter-industry spillovers, several approaches have been investigated in the 
literature.  A first method is to take into account the proximity between industries by 
giving weights to R & D stocks according to how close to each other industries are.  The 
question here is to know what proximity measure to use to construct the weights.  The 
different proximity measures reponed in the literature are successively  : weights 
proportional to the flows of intermediate input purchases by using the input-output 
coefficients, to the flows of patents or innovations by constructing a technology flow 
matrix or to the firm's position in a technology space as measured by the uncentered 
correlation of the patent distribution across technological areas.  A second approach is to 
consider the outside pool of R & D knowledge globally by adding up the R & D stocks of 
other firms or industries.  A strong assumption at the basis of this method is that the R & 
D knowledge of other firms or industries is equally useful for the studied industry 
whatever its characteristics.  A last method is to enter separately into the production 
function the R & D stock of each potential source of R & D spillover which constitutes an 
extension of the preceding one. 
4.1.  About  some  Case  Studies 
In a case-study of 17 industrial innovations, Mansfield and al. (1977) calculated 
both the private and the social rates of return from the investments in these innovations. 
Their results indicate that the private rates have been much lower than the social ones. 
The medium social rate of return was about 56 percent against a median private rate of 
about 25 percent.  Yet," there are very high variations in the private rates of return : six 
106 innovations had a return inferior to 10 percent and five innovations a return superior to 40 
percent.  In this study, private benefits are measured by the net profits from the innovator 
to the innovation.  Social benefits are obtained by adding to the private benefits the 
benefits derived by households and other ftrms from price reducing and imitation and 
substracting the private costs, the unsuccessful R & D costs incurred by other ftrms and 
environmental costs.  Information was obtained from interviews with the relevant firms 
and from published reports.  The median values are consistent with the main estimates 
obtained from econometric studies.  Yet, this case-study shows that there can be very 
wide differences between private and social rates of return, a result also consistent with 
new econometric studies. 
In a study of the spillovers from advances in general purpose computers to the 
financial services, Bresnahan ( 1986) showed that the demand for high-speed computers 
implied a very large social gain.  The welfare gain that he measured is the reduction in the 
price-performance ratio of  computers not taken into account in real output indexes.  The 
basic idea is that, if an innovation only lowers the price of a consumption good, the area 
under its demand curve measures the sum of the increased producer's surplus in the 
downstream sectors plus the consumer's surplus of final demanders.  Purchases of 
computers by the financial services are treated as if this sector acted as an agent for its 
customers and under this assumption, the welfare gains to the customers from service's 
derived demand for computers are evaluated.  From the calculations covering years 1958 
and 1972, it appears that the spillover to adopters of computers and their customers has 
been large comparatively to expenditures on computers.  The size of the downstream 
welfare gains resulting from the fall in the price-performance ratio of computers in the US 
was at least five times the size of  computer expenditures in 1972. 
A method of constructing quality-adjusted price indices capturing the impact of 
product innovations has been suggested by Trajtenberg (1989).  This approach is based 
on a two-stage estimate.  First, discrete choice models are used to model the consumer 
preference system and to derive the surplus function in order to measure the benefits from 
innovation.  Second, quality-adjusted price indices are constructed by using the estimates 
of the social surplus function.  The author applies the method to the case of Computed 
Tomography Scanners, a  highly  sophisticated medical diagnostic technology first 
introduced in the US in 1973.  The evolution of this market was characterized by a fierce 
competition between firms which brought about a breathtaking pace of technical advance. 
The pace of innovation in CT scanners subsided in the mid-eighties as the technology 
matured and new technological developments took over.  His main finding is that the 
quality-adjusted price of this product -went down from 10 000 to 7 from 1973 to 1982 
107 (implying an average price reduction of 55 percent per year) while the unadjusted price 
went up from 10 000 to about 26 000, (i.e. 2.6 times more expensive in 1982).  The rate 
of decline particularly staggered during the frrst years following the introduction of the 
innovation.  This example illustrates how inadequate conventional economic indicators 
are to deal with the welfare consequences of technical advance. 
4.2.  The Inter-Industry Technology  Flow  Matrix Approaches 
The frrst to propose the construction of an input-output matrix of invention flows 
was Schmookler (1966) but it was only ten years later than his advice materialized with 
the first attempt made by Terleckyj (1974).  In a first analysis, Terleckyj combined R & D 
data with conventional input-ouput tables to estimate the R & D borrowed by an industry 
under the hypothesis that the higher the purchase of intermediate inputs of an industry 
from an other industty is, the more knowledge the purchasing industry borrows from the 
sending industry.  He then regresses the total factor productivity growth rates of 
manufacturing industries  I on R & D performed in the industry and the R & D embodied 
in inputs purchased from other industries.  He also operates a  distinction between 
privately and publicly-fmanced R & D.  The estimated excess rate of  return for embodied 
R & D was almost triple the rate of return on own R & D for private R & D while the 
indirect effects from federally-financed R & D were not significant.  His result as well as 
the main ones of studies ·discussed below are reproduced in table 3.3. of the preceding 
chapter  ..  :in a second study, Terleckyj (1980a) re-examines his results by exploiting new 
data on total factor productivity growth  which  attempted to  account for quality 
improvements of inputs.  The coefficient for privately-financed purchased R &  D was 
statistically significant and more than twice the estimate obtained with unadjusted data. 
Griliches  and  Lichtenberg  (1984b)  reexamined  this  relationship  between 
productivity growth and R &  D  intensity using detailed data for US manufacturing 
industries over various subperiods and breaking down R & D into own and purchased 
product- and process-improvement-oriented components.  According to  them, the 
productivity growth rate of an industry is affected by the R  &  D  performance of 
industries which supply it with intermediate inputs because of errors in the output 
deflators of these supplying industries-errors which cause the materials deflators not to 
accurately reflect changes in the user value of intermediate inputs.  They add that the 
extent of mismeasurement of the growth in a deflator depends on the extent of product-
oriented R & D activity in the supplying indusny and argue that "since process-oriented R 
1  For non-manufacturing industries, only indirect returns are significant with a coefficient of 1.87. 
108 & D does not alter the characteristics of products sold in inter-industry transactions, it 
should not contribute to errors in the measurement of deflators corresponding to these 
transactions".  In their subsequent empirical analysis, these measurement errors are 
assumed to be proportional to the product-oriented R &  D  intensity of supplying 
industries.  Their results are consistent with the assumption that the product-oriented R & 
D of the origin industry has a lesser effect than own process-oriented and embodied 
product-oriented R &  D.  This study is a re-assessment of Scherer (1982)'s study in 
which the author gave "evidence of substantial returns on used R & D, i.e. from internal 
process work and the purchase of R  &  D  embodying products, but not . . .  to the 
performance of product R & D".  In their study, Griliches and Lichtenberg showed that 
the significance of  the combined process and embodied R & D variable was largely due to 
the process component 
A similar study using an input-output table of transaction flows was realized by 
Goto and Suzuki (1989) to examine the effects of R & Don the productivity growth of 
Japanese manufacturing industries.  They obtain comparable results to these obtained by 
preceding analyses : the coefficient of the embodied R & D intensity is much larger than 
that of own R & D intensity.  They complete their study by an attempt to measure the 
effect of electronics technology upon the productivity growth in industry through the 
electronics-related embodied R  &  D  and through  the diffusion of technological 
knowledge created by the electronics-related industries.  The knowledge spillover 
variable is a weighted sum of R & D by electronics-related industries where the weights 
are the uncentered correlation coefficients between the R & D expenditures by product 
areas realized by each industry and by the electronics-related industries.  The results 
suggest that the impact of  electronics technology on the productivity growth of industries 
is mainly achieved through the diffusion of technological knowledge rather than through 
the electronics-related embodied R & D.  This finding may be explained by the public 
goods characteristics which permit industries to acquire these technologies through other 
channels than through the transactions of intermediate or investment goods and exploit 
them to develop new products and to improve their production processes. 
The second way of  constructing an inter-industry technology flow matrix, initiated 
by Scherer (1982), is by classifying patent data according to industry of origin and 
industries of use.  The patent flow matrix is then used to attribute R & D data by industry 
of origin to the industry of use.  Patents with multiple or general uses were flowed out to 
multiple using industries proportionally to their purchases from the origin industry.  In 
his matrix, row sums measure R &  D by industry of origin, column sums R &  D by 
industry of use and the diagonal represents pure process R &  D.  Then, he uses these 
new data to analyse the links between R & D and productivity growth by distinguishing 
109 between the effects of origin and user industry R & D.  Origin industry R & D concerns 
own product R & D while user industry R & D combines own process and embodied R 
& D.  He finds little positive effect of origin industry R & D and a high positive effect of 
user R &  D  and concludes that user R &  D is the more appropriate measure.  Yet, 
whereas Scherer's results indicate an increase in both the size and the significance of  the 
coefficient on user R & D from 1964-69 to 1973-78, Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984b) 
in their re-examination of Scherer's findings on the basis of a more disaggregated and 
superior data set observe a secular decline in the effect of user R & D on productivity 
growth.  In contrast to Scherer, they also find own-product of R & D to be a significant 
determinant of  productivity growth except for the period from 1964-68 to 1969-73. 
A more extensive similar study was realized by Englander, Evenson and Hanazaki 
(1988) by pooling country data for the period 1970-1983.  Their country sample includes 
France, the United-States, the United-Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Canada and Italy.  To 
construct the user industry R & D stocks, their use the Canadian patent-based technology 
flow matrix by assuming that the proximity between industries is the same for all the 
countries.  Then, they separately regress total factor productivity levels on user industry 
R & D intensities and on origin industry R & D intensities for both manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing industries.  From their estimates, they conclude that productivity 
levels are linked to user industry R & D, even more so in manufacturing than in non-
manufacturing, and that the extent of these links varies a lot across industries.  The 
effects are higher in the R & D intensive industries and the equation using user industry R 
& D stocks instead of  origin industry R & D stocks gives better results.  In order to see if 
the R &  D potential had really changed over the period, alternative regressions were 
realized in which the influence of  R & D could modify after the period 1970-1973.  Their 
results give evidence that the R & D seems to be becoming less productive after this 
period in a lot of industries.  However, such an observation may be discussed because of 
the weak significance of the estimated coefficients.  It will also be noted that only seven 
coefficients are significant and have the right sign in their analysis, four coefficients are 
non-significant, the remaining ones are generally significantly negative.  The authors do 
not offer clear explanation for such divergences in results.  The omission of important 
explanatory variables for the non-manufacturing industries, the low user industry R & D 
stocks for some industries and the distortions in the measure of  the explanatory variable 
may be at the origin of the mitigated results obtained. 
On the one hand, the transaction approach assumes that the user industries of R & 
D output originated in another industry are distributed proportionally to the purchases of 
110 Table 4.1.  Inter-Industry Proximity  and  Spillovers 
1.  Intermediate input flows 
Flow of technology embodied in intermediate goods from origin industry i to user 
industry j: 
1 
Tij =  aij Ri: 
where  aij =  share of  the output of  industry i sold to industry j as intermediate goods 
Ri =  R & D expenditure or stock of  industry i 
Flow of technology embodied in the investment goods purchased by user industry j to 
origin industry i : 
Tij =  Ci.j Ri : 
where Cij =  share of  the output of  industry i sold to industry j as investment goods 
Total in flow of  technology from industry i to industry j : 
Til =T~- +~ 
~  1J  1J 
Total in flow of  technology to industry j : 
2.  Proximity  in  the  technology  space 
Proximity between the firms i and j : 
P· · - (f· f·') [(f· f·') (f· f·')]-l/2 
~  - 1  J  1  1  J J 
where fk =  technological position vector of  firm i measured by the fraction of the 
firm's research effort devoted to the N diverse technological areas 
[fk =  (fkl······fkn)1 
R & D potential spillover pool to firm i : 
s·- L  P··  R·  1-. .  1J  J 
j:¢:1 
Firms are clustered into groups according to their technological position to partition the 
total .pool into the part coming from inside the cluster for a firm belonging to a cluster 
(SC) and a part coming from outside the cluster (SO). 
0  0  0 
P·  R·  ~  so 
~  = a + 13  ~  +  'Y  sc  +  'Y A.  ( sc ) 
111 intermediate inputs and capital goods to this industry and, on the other hand, the patent 
approach assumes that each industry has a same propensity to patent, all patents have a 
same value inside an industry and patent data are representative of the innovative activity. 
Each of these approaches has its own advantages and drawbacks.  To overcome some 
limits of the patent approach, it could directly be made use of the flows of innovations 
from origin industries to user industries.  It is the way adopted by Robson, Townsend 
and Pavitt (1988) in a descriptive analysis of the sectoral patterns of production and use 
of technology in the UK during the period 1945-1983.  Unfortunately, this innovation-
based intersectoral technology flow analysis has not been continued by an econometric 
estimation of the social rate of return of these innovations.  In this descriptive study, the 
information was collected through a survey of significant innovations commercialised in 
the UK.  Their sample covers more than 4 000 innovations which are identified with 
respect to the innovating industry and the first user industry.  Five "core  ..  sectors appear 
to be at the origin of about two  third of the innovations : chemicals, machinery, 
mechanical engineering, instruments and electronics.  The ratio of products to process 
innovations is about four in the core sectors against two for the full sample.  From a 
comparison of their data  with  Scherer's,  they observe  that  sectoral  structures of 
production and use of technology are very similar in the UK and US.  A trend analysis in 
the production and  use of technology shows that there has been an increase in the 
proportion of product innovations used outside manufacturing and considerable shifts in 
the distribution of production within manufacturing where innovations increase in 
instruments and electronics and decrease in chemicals and steel. 
4.3.  The  Spillovers  in  the Technology  Space 
Alternatively, as summarized in table 4.1. one can also measure the technological 
proximity between frrms by characterizing their positions in the technological space. It is 
possible, for example, to use the distribution of the firm's patents over patent classes to 
characterize their technological position. This approach was developed by Jaffe (1986). 
He quantifies the effects of  exogenous variations in the state of technology (technological 
opportunities) and of the R &  D spillovers on the R &  D  productivity of firms. He 
observes that the R & D productivity is increased by  the R &  D of technologically 
proximate firms though their R &  D lowers the profits and market value of low-R & D-
in  tensity firms. Firms appear to adjust the technological composition of their R &  D in 
response to technological opportunity. He defines the technological opportunity as the 
exogenous variations in the cost and the difficulty of innovation in different technological 
areas. 
112 To look for the effects of technological opportunities and spillovers, he identifies 
the technological areas of  firms. The technological position of  firms is captured through 
the distribution of the fmns' patents over patent classes.  Assuming that the existence of 
technological spillovers implies that a finn's R & D success is affected by the research 
activity of its neighbors in technology space, a potential spillover pool, which is the 
weighted sum of  other fmns' R & D, is measured. On the basis of position vectors, firms 
are classified into technological groups. Firms whose technological focus is sufficiently 
similar are assumed to face the same state of  technological opportunity. In a second stage, 
he relates the finn's patent applications, profits and market value to its R & D, the poten-
tial spillover pool, dummies for the technological opportunity, its capital stock, its market 
share and the concentration ratio. The main results are presented in table 4.2. The patent 
elasticity of  R & D is .88 for the average fmn and increases with the value of  the average 
pool. The patent elasticity with respect to the R & D pool is about 1.1. This result shows 
that more than one-half of  R & D impact on patents comes from the spillover effect. The 
results from the profit equation convey a gross rate of return on R &  D of 27 percent 
against 15 percent for physical capital. The profit elasticity of R &  D is .18 and is in-
creased by the spillovers. Yet the direct effect of the pool is to lower profits. About one-
third of  the net increase of  profits due to R & D comes from the spillovers. 
For firms with largely less R & D than the mean, the net effect of the pool is nega-
tive. While from a purely technological standpoint R & D spillovers constitute an unam-
biguous positive externality, they are potentially blurred with a negative competitive effect 
of  competitors' R & D. This competitive effect of the pool comes into play when we turn 
to the economic return on R & D. Finally, the average elasticity of  the ftrrn's market value 
to the pool is about .05 and the pool effect is negative for firms with a low R & D-capital 
ratio. 
In a complementary study, Jaffe (1988) quantifies the effect of  technological oppor-
tunity, market demand and R & D spillovers on R & D effort and productivity growth. 
The elasticity of own R & D with respect to the research pool is statistically significant 
and equal to .27. This result indicates that the technology position is an explanatory factor 
of R & D investments. The fraction of cluster pool in total pool is also included to 
estimate if there is a premium for the within-cluster firms. The absence of a cluster pre-
mium effect gives evidence that there is no further differential to the in-cluster firms. In 
order to distinguish between demand-pull and technological opportunity effects, he intro-
duces in his model the fractions of sales going to distinct markets as indicators of market 
position. This variable proves significant, which allows us to say that innovative activity 
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 is the result of both the pull of market forces and the push of exogenous technological 
factors on the supply side of innovation. 
In his productivity function, both technological position and market position are not 
significant. The measure of the growth excess return on R & D (data not having been 
corrected for double counting) is significant and implies an annual rate of return of 27 
percent (the initial coefficient being calculated over 5 years). The elasticity of the cluster 
pool stock says that a 10 percent increase of the R & D pool yields 1 percent more output 
of the fmn. The coefficient of the relative value of the out-of-cluster pool stock with 
respect to the cluster pool stock is very small, which gives evidence of an apparently 
localized effect of spillovers.  So,  R  &  D  generated outside the cluster seems to 
considerably influence the R & D of the firms belonging to a cluster but not directly their 
productivity. 
4.4.  The Econometric  Measurement of Total  Spillovers  by  Industry 
The measure of the spillover effects by considering the unweighted outside pool of 
R & D knowledge was essentially initiated by Bernstein (1988) and Bernstein and Nadiri 
(1989) in their analysis of both intra-industry and inter-industry spillovers in seven 
Canadian industries and of intra-industry spillovers in four US industries.  In the study 
of the spillovers between Canadian industries the production technology is characterized 
by a cost function with labour, materials, physical capital and R & D capital as variable 
inputs and the R &D capital of all rival firms in the same industry and the R & D capital 
of other industries as intra-industry and inter-industry spillover variables respectively. 
From the estimates of a translog cost function and of cost share equations, the author 
derived the elasticities on unit costs of production and factor demands with respect to the 
spillover variables and the rates of return on R & D.  His main findings are that : 
-the estimates related to the spillover variables are generally significant; 
- the inter-industry spillovers exert greater downward pressure on average production 
costs compared to intra-industry spillovers; 
- unit costs decrease more in response to an increase in the intra-industry spillover in 
industries with relatively larger R & D cost shares and in the inter-industry spillover 
in industries with relatively smaller R & D cost shares; 
115 - for all industries, the inter-industry spillover acts as a substitute for the own R & D 
capital input; 
- for fmns operating in industries with relatively smaller propensities to spend on R & 
D, the intra-industry spillover acts as a substitute for their own R & D while for 
industries with relatively larger R & D propensities, it acts as a complement to their 
own R&D; 
- there is a substantial difference between the social and private rates of return, and R 
& D-intensive industries show higher social rates of  return than other industries; 
- the intra-industry spillovers exceed the inter-industry ones, the latter being similar 
across all industries. 
Consequently,  from  the  results  summarized in  table  4.3.,  we  observe  that 
spillovers create an incentive for firms to free ride on the efforts of other firms by 
substituting for their own R & D capital demand, except regarding the intra-industry 
spillovers to R & D intensive fmns.  On the other hand, the differential between the social 
and private rates of return are due to the intra-industry spillovers, the R & D-intensive 
fmns being the most important sources of R & D spillovers. 
The analysis of intra-industry spillovers in US industries is an application of the 
theory of dynamic duality in which physical and R & D capital stocks face internal 
adjustment costs and the operating costs are the variable factor.  In this approach, the net 
rates of return are calculated as net of depreciation as well as net of marginal adjustment 
cost.  The main findings obtained from the estimates are reported in Table 4.4.  The 
speed of adjustment for R & D capital corresponds to a mean lag in the adjustment of R & 
D to its desired level of about three to four years.  For each industry, the long-run R & D 
elasticity with respect to the intra-industry spillover is negative which implies that the 
spillover is a substitute for own R & D capital.  So, on the one hand, a firm's R & D 
investment reduces the production costs of rival firms  and,  on the other hand,  its 
spillovers generate free-riding as they diminish a firm's incentive to invest in R & D.  For 
all industries, the net social rate of  return greatly exceeds the net private return and varies 
significantly across industries. 
These two case studies give some support to Spencer (1984)'s theoritical finding 
that an increase in intra-industry spillovers reduces the incentive to invest in R & D. 
However, contrary to the argument that the disincentive effect impringes most strongly in 
116 (9) 
R & D-intensive industries, the Canadian study provides a counter-evidence.  A similar 
observation is emphasized by Levin ( 1988) from an industrial survey on the nature of 
appropriability and technological opportunity. 
Table 4.3.  Intra and Inter-Industry R  & D Spillovers between Canadian 
Firms  (1978-81) 
Spillover elasticities on  Net Social rate of return on R & D 
R & Dcapital  capital 
Industries  Intta- Inter- Private  Intra- Inter-
industry  industry  industry  industry 
spillover  spjllover 
Food and coverage  -.67  -5.77  .12  .06  .02 
Pulp and paper  -.34  -6.50  .12  .07  .02 
Metal fabricating  -.86  -5.10  .12  .16  .02 
Non-electrical machinery  -1.29  -3.65  .12  .16  .02 
Aircraft and parts  .54  -3.87  .12  .09  .02 
Electrical products  .54  -3.64  .12  .12  .02 
Chemical products  .37  -3.54  .12  .13  .02 
Source: Bernstein (1988). 
Table 4.4.  Intra-Industry R  &  D Spillovers  between  US  Firms (1965-78) 
Long-run spill- Net social rate of return 
Industries 
Speed of  over elasticities 
Private  Intra-industry  adjustment  on R&D 
capital  spillover 
Chemicals  .36  -.08  .07  .05 
Petroleum  .32  -.16  .07  .09 
Machinery  .26  -.11  .07  .02 
Instruments  .22  -.07  .07  .07 
Source : Bernstein and Nadiri (1989). 
4.5.  Tracing  the  Sources of Spillovers 
In the preceding methods, the R & D spillover was approached through a single 
aggregate. Yet, each industry generates specific spillover effects on other industries. For 
the policy maker, it is important to correctly identify the industries which generate the 
highest social rate of  return on R & D. By entering separately the stock of each potential 
source of R & D spillover in the production cost function of each industry, Bernstein 
117 (1989) and Bernstein and Nadiri (1988, 1991) have empirically demonstrated that tracing 
the sources and beneficiaries of each inter-industry spillover is econometrically feasible. 
Contrary to other approaches, this one does not rely on any arbitrary technology flow 
matrix. Each producer is treated as a distinct spillover source and the direction and magni-
tude of the interindustry spillovers can vary across receiving industries so that the spill-
over network of senders and receivers can be traced. 
As knowledge benefits generated in one industry cannot be completely appro-
priable,  they  spill over to other industries which incorporate  the freely obtained 
knowledge into their production process, thereby, causing autonomous technological 
change to these receiving industries. These spillovers can be captured through the cost 
function as illustrated in table 4.5. This table describes the theoretical model and the 
empirical specification used by Bernstein ( 1989). Factor demands are derived from the 
cost function  by using Shephard's lemma. These equations define the production 
equilibrium. The gross private rate of  return on R & D capital is equal to the real value of 
marginal cost reduction. The social rate of return differs from the private rate by the 
spillover effects from one's own industry to other industries. These spillovers are the 
inter-industry cost effects associated with own R & D capital. So, the social rate of return 
is equal to the private rate plus the sum of  the marginal inter-industry cost reductions. 
Bernstein estimated this model on data for nine Canadian industries for the period 
1963-1983. R & D capital stock is measured by assuming a depreciation rate of 10 per-
cent. Production cost was defined as the sum of the costs of labor, materials and physical 
capital and data corrected for double counting and normalized with respect to materials. 
The estimation results give for each industry some statistically significant R & D spillover 
coefficients. Both gross private and social rates of  return to R & D capital calculated from 
estimation results are summarized in table 4.6. All industries were influenced by spill-
overs but not all were sender industries. All industries show very high private rates of 
return. These values are higher than the rates of  return on physical capital whose average 
value is about 10 percent. Extra-private returns vary a great deal among industries. 
Nonelectrical machinery, rubber and plastics, petroleum products and chemical products 
industries are the main spillover sources. Primary metals, nonelectrical machinery, 
electrical products and petroleum products industries are the main spillover receivers. 
Metal fabricating, transportation equipment and gas and oil wells industries play a minor 
role as generators and receivers of spillovers. 
Bernstein and Nadiri (1988) estimated a similar model on data for five US in-
dustries for the period 1958-81. In this analysis, all industries appear to be spillover 
118 senders but the  spillover effects and social rates of return highlight a great deal of 
interindustry variation. In the transportation equipment industry, the social rate of return 
is 16 percent against 130 percent in the scientific instruments industry.  Globally, their 
results are very similar to those found in their most ~ent  extensive study. 
Table 4.5.  A Static Model  of Inter-Industry Spillovers 
1.  Theoretical  model 
.  Cost function C =  C (Q, Kr, Sr, W) 
.  Factor demand function Fi = j  ..2i  (Q, Kr. Sr. W) 
.  Private rate of  retmn on R & D capital p = -l ir I Pr 
.  Social rate of  return on R & D capital 'Y =  p - I,  ~  KCh  I Pr 
h;f:i  r 
2.  Operational  model 
Source : Bernstein (1989). 
R & D spillovers do not only affect production characteristics but both output sup-
ply and input demand decisions. There are economic and technological externalities as-
sociated with spillovers which influence product price and production costs. Moreover, 
spillovers are intertemporal externalities because they result from present and past deci-
sions about R & D investment process. Such features were taken into account by Bern-
stein and Nadiri (1991) in their analysis of six US  industries for the period 1957-86. 
They assume that producers maximize the expected present value of the flow of funds by 
selecting output supply and input demands. Market incentives are a determinant of  R & D 
capital demand and producers exhibit market power which makes them able to influence 
product prices through output and R & D capital decisions. On the other hand, the exist-
119 ence of spillovers affects the decision-making process of  receiving producers. R & D in-
vestment undertaken by other producers can generate both positive and negative effects 
on one's own profitability by reducing production costs, improving product quality, 
eroding market power and enhancing competition. 
Table 4.6.  Structure of Canadian Inter-Industry R  & D Spillovers 
Private  Social  Receiving industries of  Source industry  rate of  rate of  spillovers  return  return 
Primary metals  .26  .42  Metal fabricating  0.16 
Metal fabricating  .29  .29  -
Nonelectrical machinery  .24  .94  Metal fabricating  0.39 
Transportation equipment  0.07 
Electrical products  0.23 
Chemical products  0.01 
Transportation equipment  .28  .29  Rubber and plastics  0.0 
Gas and oil wells  0.01 
Electrical products  .38  .38  -
Rubber and plastics  .47  .89  Nonelectrical machinery  0.42 
Gas and oil wells  0.0 
Petroleum products  .40  .87  Primary metals  0.03 
Nonelectrical machinery  0.10 
Electrical products  0.34 
Chemical products  .25  .81  Primary metals  0.03 
Petroleum products  0.53 
Gas and oil wells  .33  .37  Nonelectrical machinery  0.04 
Source : Bernstein (1989). 
Bernstein and Nadiri's model is a cost of adjustment one based on the theory of 
dynamic duality in which capital stocks are defined as quasi-fixed factors of production. 
Costs of adjustment are associated with these quasi-ftxed inputs and what distinguishes R 
& D capital stocks from other forms of capital accumulation is the existence of R & D 
spillovers. They give a specific form to both cost and product demand functions from 
which they derive the intertemporal profit maximization conditions. The key equations of 
their model are given in table 4.  7. The cost effect of R  &  D cannot be beforehand 
determined. Actually, R & D capital affects variable cost in three ways : 
120 Table 4.7.  A Dynamic Model  of Inter-Industry R  &  D Spillovers 
1.  Theoretical  model 
Normalized variable cost function: cv = C (W, Q, K, ll  K, S) 
Product demand function: P =  D (Q, Kr, Z, S) 
Expected present value of the flow of funds : 
E =  E {a [D (Q, Kr, Z, S). Q- C (W, Q, K, ll K, S)- PI( (ll K + o  K_t)]} 
For the sake of convenience time subscripts have been left out. 
w 
Q 
K 
IlK 
s 
Kr 
z 
a 
PK 
v 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
relative variable factor prices (i.e., normalized by ith variable factor price) 
output quantity 
capital inputs 
net investments 
R & D capital for each of the other producers 
own R & D capital <Kr e  K) 
exogenous variables 
discount factor 
normalized capital purchase prices 
variable factor quantities 
Production decision rule :  Max  E 
(Q,V,K) 
2.  Operational  model 
Variable cost function net of adjustment cost : 
CV =  J3o + ~q  q + ~  (~i Wi + ~iq Wiq + ~  ~ij Wi kj) + ~  (~j kj + {3jq q kj 
1  J  J 
+  L  .  {3jg kj kg) + (~ f3is  Wi + ~qs q + ~ f3js kj)  L  f3h  Sh 
g,g;i:J  1  J  h 
Adjustment cost function : 
Product demand function : 
ca =  .5 I, I, lljg ll  Kj ll Kg 
j  g 
121 + (<Xqs q +<Xes kr) L  <Xh  Sh 
h 
Pool of borrowed R & D capital affecting variable cost : L  f3h  Sh 
h 
Pool of borrowed R & D capital affecting product demand : L  <Xh  Sh 
h 
Applying Shephard's lemma to the maximization function, the equilibrium conditions 
are: 
.  Variable factor cost shares : 
'V  i, t 
.  Revenue to cost ratio : 
P Ql  cv = ((3q +  L  f3iq Wi +  L  Pjq kJ· + f3qs  L  f3h  Sh) I 
i  j  h 
(1 + <Xq + <Xqr kr +  L  <Xqf Zf + CXqs  L  <Xh  Sh)  'V t 
f  h 
.  Non-R & D capital inputs : 
wj Kj I cv + pj +  ~ Pij Wi + pqj q +  L  0  (3jg kg 
1  g,g¢J 
+ L  Jljg (L\ Kg- (1 + p)-1 L1 K:1 g) Kj I cv + f3js  L  f3h  Sh = 0  'V j:;t:r, t 
g  '  h 
.  R & D capital input : 
w; Kr I CV + Pr +  ~  f3i  Wi + Pq q +  L  Prg kg 
1  _  g,g;tr 
+ L  Jlrg (d Kg- (1 + p)-1 A K~ 1 ,g) Kr I CV + f3rs  L  f3h  Sh 
g  h 
- (P Q  I CV) [  <Xr + <Xqr q +  L  <Xrf Zf + <Xrh  L  <Xh  Sh] =  0  'V t 
f  h 
where  wj =  Pj [  (1  - ( 1 + p  )-1  ( 1 - 8j) P~  1  j  I Pj]  "V  j  is the relative rental rate 
on the ith capital input 
p is the discount rate 
the superscript C denotes the conditional expectation of the corresponding 
variable 
122 Notational conventions for subscripts : 
- they are specific to the corresponding variables 
- i refers to the (n- 1) relative variable factor prices 
- j and g refer to them capital inputs (r e  (j, g)) 
- h refers to the I other producers investing in R & D 
- f refers to the x exogenous variables 
Small letters are for the logarithm of  variables. 
Spillover effect on product price and production cost : 
~aa I  =  (aqs q + ars kr) ah 
Sh  Q,K 
a  cV I  a  Sh  = (~ Pis Wi + Pqs q +  ~ Pjs kj) Ph 
Q,K  I  J 
Equilibrium effects of R & D spillovers : 
.  Output supply elasticity: 
:  s~  =  [y1 (Tth- Eh) + ~qs  ~h (1 + Eq)-l- !Xqs Uh llq (1 + Eq)-2]/ 
.  Product price elasticity : 
.  Variable cost elasticity : 
a  CV  _  +  ~ 
ash  -Tlh  Tlq  ash 
Variable factor demand elasticity : 
a  Vi  A  )  -1  ~ 
a -- =  eih + (piq + Yi Tlq  'Y·  a  Sh  1  Sh 
where  y  =  cv /PQ 
Tlh  =  cost reduction effect 
Eh  =  price effect 
fq  =  inverse price elasticity of product demand 
Tlq  =  output elasticity of variable cost 
123 
'v'h 
'v'h 
'v'h 
'v'h 
'v'h 
'v'h eih  =  spillover elasticity on conditional demand of  ith variable factor 
'Yi  =  cost share of ith variable factor 
Net private rate of  return on capital stocks : 
Pj =  P + L,  lljg ~Kg  (1 + p) I Pj 
g 
Joint industry expected discounted flow of funds : 
<I>=  L,  Eh 
h 
where the superscript identifies each producer 
Additional profit accruing from internalizing R & D spillovers : 
Social rate of  return on R & D capital stock : 
f.=p~+(l-p) del>l/p~ 
a  Kr 
Source: Bernstein and Nadiri (1991). 
V'j 
V'j 
V'j 
- if R & Dis process-oriented, an increase in own R & D capital stock will reduce vari-
able costs. Yet, if R & Dis product-oriented, quality improvements will induce higher 
costs; 
- producers face adjustment costs when they divert variable factors to R & D investment 
so that variable cost will increase; 
- spillovers lead to cost reductions for the receiving producer. 
Regarding product demand, R &  D capital is a product quality indicator which 
generally implies product price increases. However, spillovers can either generate posi-
tive or negative price effects. As R & D capital is not separated into process R & D and 
product R & D, the product and process influences of R & D are measured through both 
the variable cost and product demand functions. 
In the production den1and  function, spillovers affect output and R &  D capital 
through due parameters (  Clqs and <Xrs)  and each spillover source generates a distinct effect 
124 on product price (ah). Moreover, interaction terms are introduced between the spillovers 
and factor prices, capital inputs and output quantity  (~is, ~qs and ~js). Each borrowed R 
& D generates a distinct effect on these variables (~h) and so one can test whether a given 
producer is a source of spillover. 
From the maximization of the expected present value of profits the equilibrium 
conditions for the variable inputs, each variable factor cost share being directly affected 
by the pool of borrowed R & D  (~is). In equilibrium, the revenue to cost ratio is also in-
fluenced by spillovers through their impact on product price elasticity (<Xqs) and on vari-
able cost elasticity (~qs). Conditions for the non-R & D capital inputs imply that the mar-
ginal cost of a non-R & D capital input is offset by the expected marginal benefit at the 
equilibrium and that R & D spillovers affect these equilibrium conditions  (~js). A last 
equilibrium condition concerns the R & D capital input which is influenced by conditions 
ruling both variable cost and product price (i.e.  both~  and a  coefficients) and by the ex-
tent of spillovers (~hand  <Xh).  Under this condition, the marginal benefit from R & D 
capital input is equal to the increase in marginal revenue net of changes in variable cost 
and in adjustment cost. 
As not all producers are a source of spillovers, the search of spillover sources is 
based upon the idea that spillovers must generate a negative impact effect on variable 
costs. This acceptance condition is compatible with some established facts : 
- consistency with the assumption of free disposability in production :producers can 
costlessly benefit from spillovers and avert them if they are cost increasing; 
- capability to promote R & D investment : increasing total cost can result from supple-
mentary R & D investment engaged to absorb the spillovers; 
- alteration of competitive strengths: R & D spillovers can freely affect product demand 
and thereby generate various economic externalities. 
From this model, we are able to evaluate the distinct influence of spillovers on pro-
duct price and production cost for receiving industries. Any increase in the product price 
as a result of R & D spillovers will increase the revenue of the recipient industry and con-
versely. As a result of the acceptance condition, an increase of R & D spillovers will re-
duce variable factor cost. Furthermore, the measurement of the spillover elasticities of 
output supply, product price, variable cost and variable factor demands emphasizes the 
direct impact of spillovers on each of these variables and their indirect impact through 
changes in output supply. In these elasticities, output expansion can cause variable cost to 
increase, output growth effect outweighing the initial cost reduction due to spillovers. A 
similar effect can be detected for product price and variable factor demands. 
125 If we tum to the rate of  return on R & D, private rate of  return can differ from other 
types of capital because th~'ipclude marginal adjustment costs which differ from one 
type of  capital to the other. In, equilibrium, the rate of  return equals the discount rate plus 
the capitalized value of  marginal adjustment cost. The social rates of  return are calculated 
by considering that industries internalize the R & D spillovers. To do that, the joint indus-
try expected discounted flow of funds is maximized, so that the solution will take into ac-
count the additional profits earned by industries through their spillover effects. This addi-
tional profit equals the difference between the product price effect and the cost production 
effect arising from the R & D spillovers. The social rate of return will differ from the net 
private rate to the extent that an industry's R & D capital reduces both the product price 
and the costs of other industries. 
In their application of this model to six US industries, the authors consider as vari-
able factors, labor and intermediate inputs and as quasi-fixed factors, physical capital and 
R & D capital. The depreciation rate of  R & D capital is considered to be 10 percent. The 
exogenous variable affecting product demands is the real gross domestic product net of 
the industry output per capita. 
The estimate of the model emphasizes the existence of adjustment costs. All the 
own adjustment cost parameters are significant. The cost parameters are also significant 
and positive, except for electrical products, which indicates that an increase in physical 
capital increases adjustment cost of R & D capital. These adjustment costs imply the 
existence of an intertemporal trade-off in the investment decisions. 
The results, summarized in table 4.8., show that each industry is a receiver of R & 
D spillovers and that only the fabricated metal industry is not a spillover source. For each 
receiving industry, the spillover sources are concentrated in a few industries. This ob-
servation emphasizes the limits of  more aggregated approaches. The sender-receiver net-
work is relatively narrow, links some enterprises through cross spillover effects and 
points out the key role of scientific instruments, chemical products and nonelectrical 
machinery industries as the main sources of spillovers. The cost reduction effect of spill-
over is generally higher than the product price effect and it is only in the case of  chemical 
products and scientific instruments that spillovers increase their product price. On the cost 
reduction side, fabricated metal appears to be the main beneficiary of spillovers and 
chemical products the one that benefits least. The output effect of spillovers is to expand 
output. For the two industries where spillovers increase product price, the expansion 
effect overcomes the price effect, causing product prices to fall. 
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 Figure 4.1.  Traces of External Returns on  R  &  D 
1.  Canada 
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Note :  The data between parentheses are the private rates of return and the others are the 
social rates of return per receiver. 
Source: Bernstein (1989) and Bernstein and Nadiri (1991). 
128 Figure 4.1.  summarizes the distribution of spillovers  between the different 
industries for both the Canadian and American studies. In both cases, fabricated metals, 
transport equipment and electrical products are  not major sources of spillovers. 
Chemicals, nonelectrical machinery and scientific instruments concentrate a large part of 
external returns arising from spillovers. There is no important closed loop of R & D 
externalities between industries. In the United States, there is a slight give and take 
relationship between chemical products, scientific instruments and electrical products, on 
the one hand, and between nonelectrical machinery and transport equipment, on the other 
hand. 
4.6.  More on  the Input-Output Approach  1 
4.6.1.  Decomposition  of Growth  in  Real  Output 
The focus question is to decompose output growth into portions attributable to 
changes in technology (represented by the changes in coefficients of the Leontief inverse 
matrix) and to changes in final demand. 
Induced output, X, is expressed by multiplying production technology, B, and 
final demand, F. Therefore, any increment in induced output, dX, is expressed as fol-
lows: 
dX =  Xt- Xo =  Bt pt- BO p0 =  (BO +dB) (fO + dF)- BO p0 
=  BO p0 + p0 dB + BO dF + dB dF - BO pO 
=  B0dF + fOdB + dBdF 
Thus, output growth can be decomposed into different components : 
- first, the part of growth due to changes in final demand; 
- second, the part resulting from technological change; 
- third, the cross product term measuring the interdependencies between demand and 
technology. 
The increment in final demand, DF, can also be decomposed into three elements: 
- the aggregate demand; 
- its distribution into final demand components such as consumption and investment; 
1  This section has largely been inspired by Uno (1989). 
129 - the technical coefficients describing the industrial composition of a particular demand 
item. 
Consequently : 
F=cef 
where  f  =  aggregate final demand 
c  =  technical coefficients (n x n) 
e  =  composition ratios of  final demand items (1 x n) 
e =  diagonal matrix of  e. 
Any increment in final demand, dF, is equal to: 
dF = Fl - pO  = ct et fl - cO eO fO 
=(cO+ de) (eO+ de) (fO + dt)- cO eO f{) 
= c0 eO df + cO de f{) + de eO fO + cO de df + de eO df + de de f{) 
+dcdedf 
where  cO eO df  is attributable to changes in the aggregate level of  final demand 
cO de fO  is attributable to changes in the components of  final demand 
de eo fO  is attributable to changes in the technical coefficients 
the cross product terms can be ignored because their impact is very weak. 
(1) 
The usefulness of input-output tables is strongly impaired by the fact that they are 
rarely available annually and for a sufficiently long period. Furthermore, they are based 
on very stringent hypotheses about the nature of production relationships : 
- each industry produces only one good (no joint products or by-products); 
- the production technology is identical for all the production levels of a good; 
- the returns to scale are constant. 
For the year of  construction of the matrix, the data are supposed to give a satisfying 
representation of the reality. It is hardly credible, though, that the technical coefficients 
calculated for a specific year do not move over time. Several elements can influence the 
matrix of technical coefficients : 
- any change in the relative price of factors will entail to a reaction from fmns which will 
tum to alternative production processes, thereby inducing a reallocation in the use of 
factors. 
130 - in some industries, short-term decreasing returns to scale may seem to be due to the 
fact that the production capacity limits have been reached; in other sectors, increasing 
returns to scale can result from an expansion of the production. 
- technical change permanently affects technical coefficients. 
In order to update and forecast input-output coefficients, one makes use of the RAS 
method which is based on the following philosophy : 
- the flow matrix is corrected for price changes between the two periods in order to ex-
press the technology of  the initial period in the prices of  the new period. 
- in a second stage, a new correction of the matrix is operated in order to take into ac-
count the substitution effects between intermediate products which are due to technical 
progress. This effect is supposed to materialize in the same way for all the sectors 
using a same intermediary good. Furthermore, this effect will be greater than unity for 
expanding products and less than unity for declining products. 
- a last correction is applied to take into account that the manufacturing degree is liable to 
change. The fabrication effect measures the extent to which the production makes use 
of  intermediary inputs. This effect will be greater than unity if  the degree of  fabrication 
has decreased and less than unity if  it has increased. 
The new matrix so estimated can be written : 
where  Po  is the diagonal matrix of prices in the initial period 
p,  the diagonal matrix of  prices in the new period relatively to those of the initial 
period 
r,  the diagonal matrix of substitution effects 
s ,  the diagonal matrix of fabrication effects. 
The matrices rands are iteratively estimated on the basis of the known sectoral 
values of output, intermediate demand and intermediate input 
This method has some drawbacks I: 
- if an element of the matrix of coefficients is zero, its estimate in a future period will be 
zero, which makes it difficult to take into account new products and processes which 
combine inputs which are very different from those used in the preceding period. 
1  Alternative methods of actualisation have been developed, they are surveyed by d'Alcantara (1986). 
131 - due to the hypothesis of  identical substitution effects, the rate of substitution of  factors 
is supposed the same in each production branch, which is not always very realistic. 
- as there is an additivity constraint (total of both intermediate demand and intermediate 
input being known), if an element is underestimated, an other will be overestimated. 
- this method is unable to indicate if  changes in the elements of the flow matrix are due to 
a modification of the price structure or to technological change. 
- when the results are used to analyse· further years, it is automatically assumed that 
future periods face the same changes in the economic and technical environment than 
the reference periods. 
4.6.2. The Treatment of R  &  D in Input-Output Tables 
Business services are production factors linked to economic activities which deal 
with goods production. From this standpoint, research is a form of  current service but it 
cannot be assimilated to a current business service because it is the originator of know-
ledge production. Part of R & D expenditure is oriented towards the acquisition of basic 
knowledge in science and technology and the operational implementation of new know-
ledge. As such, R & Dis an activity which extends the spectrum of  production possibili-
ties, which distinguishes it from labor and capital factors. 
According to Uno (1989), input-output tables do not adequately deal with R & D. 
While European input-output tables do not takeR & D into account, the Japanese ones 
include it. On the one hand, R & D conducted by the private sector for their own internal 
use is integrated through the creation of a dummy sector where only the intermediate 
inputs are accounted for.  On the other hand, R  &  D  by research institutions and 
universities is fully endogenized. While for the private sector labor cost and the purchase 
of tangible fixed assets are excluded, only the latter is excluded for research institutions 
and universities. So, the treatment of R & D appears not to be homogenous within the 
input-output framework. Furthermore, R & D expenditure is only partially accounted for. 
Finally, as R &  D activities are treated as an endogenous sector, any analysis of inter-
industry relationships of R & D activities is unfeasible. 
Furthermore, such a treatment does not record the output of R & D activities. The 
economy-wide impact of R & D escapes the analysis except for the indirect effect which 
can be grasped by measuring the increase in production efficiency (i.e., through changes 
in technical coefficients) or in the sales of a  branch of production (i.e., increased 
marketability of  output). Consequently, the outcome of R & D may not be reflected in the 
132 (10) 
output of the industry in a pecuniary sense, as the output of this activity is the scientific 
and technological knowledge. A specific method for recording the output of this activity 
needs to be devised. 
Another important aspect is that R & D activities are listed within the production 
expenditures and not as an independent activity in the input-output structure so that any 
increase in R & D activities would increase production cost. Yet, since R & D produces 
scientific and technological knowledge, which increases the future production potential, 
and not principally the production of the current period, it should be treated as final 
demand. The input structure should include the costs in production and external R & D 
changes should be treated separately. R & D investment is a strategic policy variable for 
business firms  and  government whose level does  not passively react to current 
production but is determined by the decision to invest in production knowledge. Thus, R 
& D activities cannot merely be regarded as an appendage to current directly productive 
activities or as a technological adaptation cost (of adopting new technologies or of 
imitating new technologies), they are a component of  final demand as long as they are not 
exclusively used in the production process. 
In order to make up for the fact that the conventional input-output tables do not take 
R & D into account, we can seek what would be the ideal treatment of such an activity. 
This conceptual framework is considered without questioning the availability of empirical 
statistics. The proposed scheme consists of nine layers as shown in figure 4.2 : 
1 .  a financing account which records the financial flows from financing sources to R 
& D execution sectors. This would permit to highlight the role of public and private 
organizations in the resource allocation. 
2.  an R  & D expenditure account which records, for each execution sector, the R 
& D expenditure by field or product. The expenditure items would be broken down 
into tangible fixed assets, wages and salaries and material consumption in order to 
identify the components of value-added, investment and consumption. 
3.  an R  &  D interindustry flow matrix which corresponds to an extended input-
output table including an R & D expenditure disaggregated account. The associated R 
& D matrix would serve to establish the linkage with interindustry relations. In this 
framework, R & D investment represents the expenditure on tangible fixed assets and 
R & D consumption is defined as expenditure of materials and assimilated. The 
wages and salaries and the depreciation of tangible fixed assets are components of 
value-added. The R & D input consists of R & D labor cost, R & D capital depre-
133 ciation, user cost of existing knowledge and intermediate input, this last item being 
treated as input to industry. The R & D output is recorded among the final demand 
items, it is composed of  R & D capital formation and R & D consumption. As current 
expenditure for R & D is not an input to produce goods and services as defined in the 
input-output framework, it would be more logical to treat it as fmal demand and not 
as intermediate input. R & D spending is directed toward the knowledge acquisition 
for future use and not toward immediate physical production. In order to distinguish 
R & D components from other components of final demand, both R & D consump-
tion and investment are separated as an independent final demand item. The R & D 
input-output table would be a disaggregation of R & D final demand be~ween  con-
sumer sectors and producer sectors. 
4.  an R & D employment matrix which gives the industry-occupation employment 
patterns and would help to analyze the impact of  the changing industrial structure of 
the varying levels of  R & D expenditures on R & D employment. 
5.  an R  & D capital stock account which gives information on the stock of fixed 
tangible assets for R & D purposes in each sector and corresponds to the R & D capi-
tal formation. This correction departs from the defmition of R & D capital stock used 
in econometric studies. To recall, in the latter, all R & D expenditures are taken into 
account in the measure of  R & D capital stock. 
6.  an R  &  D performance account which deals with the outcome of the research 
activities. While the preceding table was concerned with the measurement of the R & 
D capital stock, this account brings on the evaluation of the end results of R & D in 
terms of R & D benefits, patents or publications. The appreciation of  the performance 
concept can highly vary accross research fields and so far there does not exist any 
well-established standard indicator to appreciate performances inside a research field. 
Consequently, the measurement of  performances remains a tricky issue. 
7.  a knowledge capital stock account \vhich brings on the stock of scientific and 
'  \ 
technological knowledge. Although there are a variety of forms of knowledge stock, 
this aggregate is alternatively approximated by the accumulated total R &  D ex-
penditures, as is the case in econometric works or by the number of patent applica-
tions or patents granted. The main criticism against these approximations is that, on 
the one hand, R & D expenditure is an input measure of the knowledge production 
process and that, on the other hand, patents are only a rough measure because not all 
knowledge is patented and not all patents are valuable. 
134 8.  an R & D benefit flow matrix which  traces the interindustry repercussion of R 
& D activities. In the case of product innovation, the benefits of  R & D activities spill 
over to sectors using the goods as intermediate input or as investment goods or to 
consumers who consume the improved or new products. In the case of process in-
novation, higher efficiency attained by the purchasing sectors induces lower prices 
and a better quality of their products. This technol'?gy flow matrix should take into 
account not only technology benefits resulting from domestic R & D expenditures but 
also technology imports. Furthermore, due consideration should be given to the ges-
tation period of both domestic technology and imported technology. 
9.  evaluation indicators which are calculated according to specific concerns as the 
performance and the improvements in a particular vital field, the levels of industrial 
productivity achieved and the international technological position. 
Figure 4.1.  R  &  D Accounts 
Scheme 1 • R  & D Financing Account 
Financing sectors  Private sector  Public sector  Foreign  Total 
Real activity sectors  countries 
Industry (establishment) 
Research institution 
University 
Foreign countries 
Total 
Scheme 2 • R  & D Expenditure Account 
Financing sectors 
Product fields  Total 
Real activity sectors 
Industry (establishment)  R&D  R & D capital 
consumption  formation 
Total 
135 Scheme 3 - R  &  D Interindustry Flow Matrix 
Output  Intenncdiate 
R&D  c  IP  G  E  M 
Input  Industry 
R&D 
con-
In~ediate  Industry  Intennediate  sumption 
transactions  & invest-
ment 
R&D benefit 
R&D  Output  Own R&D  (b)  R&D 
benefit 
R&D in 
other sectors 
Labor  L  R&DL 
Value added  Capital  K  R&DK 
Scheme 4 - R  &  D Employment Matrix 
Occupation 
Industry  Total by industry 
Total by occupation  Total 
Scheme 5 - R  &  D Capital Stock Account 
Technology fields 
Industry  Total by industry 
Total by technology fields  Total 
136 Scheme 6  - Knowledge  Capital  Stock  Account 
Technology fields 
Industry  Total by industry 
Total by technology fields  Total 
Scheme 7  - R  &  D  Benefit Flow Matrix 
Final  demand 
c  G  IP  E 
Industry engaged 
inR& D 
Total benefit  Benefit to industry  Benefit  to F-D  accruing 
Source: Uno (1989). 
Uno investigated the empirical feasibility of this analytical schema in the case of 
Japan. The linkage to the input-output framework is done using the aggregate data for R 
& D consumption and investment. As converters are not available to transform these data 
into demand for individual sectors, the intermediate input structure is used as an ap-
proximation. For R & D investment, the converters are assumed to be identical to those 
calculated for private investment in  plant and equipment. It is on  this  basis that he 
estimates the input-output structure of the R & D activities. The stock of knowledge is 
measured by combining the number of applications for both patents and utility models 
and the average life expectancy of  patents. The life expectancy of patents is defined as the 
period during which a patent yielded returns from outside the firms or when the products 
incorporating such patents yielded profits. Assuming that the economic value of patents 
declines proportionally over time, the rate of depreciation of patents is given by the reci-
procal of the average life. To trace the technological flows among industries, R & D ex-
penditure is used rather than patent data. After estimating the time lag between R & D ex-
penditure and the implementation of new knowledge so created- in actual production on 
the basis of  information on gestation period, the flow of R & D benefits received by other 
sectors through intermediate inputs is measured by the ratio of sales to intermediate 
demand multiplied by the R & D expenditure in the producing sector. For the flow of R 
& D benefits received by other sectors through purchase of investment gopds, a similar 
procedure is applied by using the fixed capital formation matrix instead of intermediate 
137 demand. Flow of R & D benefits to consumption and exports are estimated by the ratios 
of sales to these final demand items respectively. A same measurement method is applied 
for technology flows from new contracts of technology imports. 
138 Chapter 5.  The impact of Government-financed 
R&D 
Assessing economic impacts of policy intervention by public authorities is a very 
difficult task because a variety of  effects as well as other causes may contribute to specific 
outcomes. From this standpoint, the use of  econometric models to evaluate the potential 
impact of  altemati~e sets of economic policy is now a current practice in economics. 
Econometric models have asserted themselves as a tool of  great value for improving our 
understanding of the intricacies of economic phenomena. They play a role in the design 
of economic policy both as a tool in the impact analysis in order to assess the global 
economic fallouts of policy measures and as a tool in the decision making processes. 
Yet, these methods are only very marginally used for the design of science and 
technology policy. The exogenous status of technical change in macromodelling, the 
scarcity of data in this field and the skepticism of experts regarding the usefulness of 
econometric methods are certainly the three main reasons why econometric methods are 
not regarded as a sufficiently efficient impact evaluation technique. Nevertheless, the 
recent availability of  better data, the multiplication of  empirical and theoretical researches 
on the interdependencies between economic growth and technological change and the 
difficulty in appraising the economic impacts of science and technology policies when 
only qualitative methods are used should lead to an increasing use of econometric 
methods. 
Most efforts in the econometrics of R & D have been devoted to measuring the impact 
of  overall and industrial R & D. The public R & D investment is often included in models 
as an explanatory variable without the measure of its impact being the actual objective of 
the undertaken analysis. Moreover, these estimates are only pinpoint approaches which 
evaluate the impact of public R & D on an economic variable and not on the economic 
system as a whole.  In this field, the main evidence comes from U.S.  case-studies. 
Regarding this country, the apparent high variability of results can, to a large extent, be 
explained by the data characteristics. Unfortunately, for other countries, the experiments 
reported in the literature are not sufficient to draw clear conclusions. 
139 5.1.  Why  to evaluate the Economic  Impact of Publicly-Funded  R  &  D ? 
So, how science and technology resources should be allocated so as to have a maxi-
mum impact on economic growth has become an important focus for technology assess-
ment. The answer to such a question should be based on both qualitative criteria of eva-
luation and formalized quantitative methods. Although qualitative methods of  evaluation 
produce useful guidelines for the organization and implementation of  R & D policy, they 
are not suited to measure the economic impacts of public R & D programmes quantita-
tively. As pointed out by Roessner (1989), "efforts to evaluate government programs 
intended to stimulate industrial innovation through various types of R & D subsidies are 
confronted immediately with serious design and measurement challenges". 
Although the need for more information about the economic effects of public support 
of R &  D activities has long been debated, the credibility of econometric methods as 
evaluation tool is often questioned. The American Office of Technology Assessment 
(1986) considers that quantitative methods "does not provide a useful practical guide to 
improving Federal research decision making" and that the influential factors are too 
complex and subjective "to allow quantitative models to take the place of mature, 
informed judgement". 
The mastery of technological change, and particularly technological innovation, is 
increasingly viewed as a major driving force of  economic growth and competitiveness. If 
we glance at the normative literature on the economic analysis of technological change, it 
appears that, in the present state of the art, although it provides a good understanding of 
some basic factors, so far it has given practitioners little ground to build on.  Hence, 
some economists argue that governmental funding of  R & D is likely to reduce private R 
& D expenditure because firms may receive support from the public sector for projects 
they would otherwise finance themselves. Taking an opposite stance, others say that 
publicly-funded R & Dis complementary to and stimulates privately-funded R &  D. 
Futhermore, little is known about the efficiency of alternative forms of public inter-
vention. As a consequence, innovation policy may be said to be today more a matter of 
faith than of understanding [Rothwell and Zegveld (1988)]. 
The R & D policy must rest on an appropriate set of actions aimed at influencing or 
controlling factors which restrain the technological performances of finns. The fuzzy and 
uncertain nature of R & D policy makes the assessment of the ~mpacts of the instruments 
used a major analytical issue. Hence, if governmental action induces only small additional 
140 private R & D expenditure, then, to justify public intervention the social return must be 
relatively high. Conversely, if  public subsidization results in high additionality and high 
private return, but with weak positive externalities (the subsidized fmn appropriates most 
of the benefits of the research), then the government must wonder whether its interven-
tion is meant to compensate for market failure and whether the overall economic benefits 
outweigh the costs.  Hence, the design of appropriate policy instruments should be based 
on the following economic rationale : 
- the support should be additional in the sense that the generated activity would not have 
occurred in a similar form or at all without public intervention. 
- the support should result in greater social benefits than otherwise. 
- the support should provide higher extra benefits than its opportunity cost. 
Given that these outcomes cannot be a priori guaranteed, the economic effects of R & 
D policy actions have to be evaluated ex post.  In case of ex ante impact assessment, 
since the changes in the exogenous circumstances are unknown, it is difficult to define 
the reference situation. 
Science and technology policy is not implemented in order to achieve intrinsically 
technological goals, or at least should not be viewed as such, but as a mean of action 
aiming at improving the economic and social welfare. Its objective is not the search of 
scientific and technological achievements for its own sake. This policy is ultimately 
concerned with wealth creation and should be seen as part of economic policy dealing 
with short-term and long-term economic growth. 
The relevant questions for the design of a science and technology policy are : 
What is the ultimate goal of a science and technology policy ? 
What are the objectives to achieve ? 
What are the targets aimed at ? 
What instruments have been designed ? 
How efficient have the policies implemented been ? 
In accordance with the usual functions recognized to public policy, the goal should 
primarily be to promote an efficient allocation of  resources t. In order to attain this goal, 
several objectives are fixed, among which fostering R &  D activities, promoting the 
1  It does not mean that science and technology policy is not concerned with other goals, i.e. stabilisa-
tion and equity. For example, a science and technology policy aiming at fostering technological cap-
abilities in lagging regions is, primarily, designed to satisfy the equity principle. 
141 diffusion of new technologies and ensuring the access to technological opportunities as 
well as to economic opportunities offered by the developments in science and technology. 
Then, specific targets are chosen for each objective. For example, R & D activities can be 
fostered by acting on private R & D investments. The instruments, which are the action 
means, are under the control of public authorities. They can be general or selective and 
principally bear on tax deductions, grants, loans, guarantees, purchases and investments. 
Each of these components is vital for the design of an efficient policy. Besides, policy 
assessment is also vital as it gives grounded recommendations to adapt the existing policy 
or to implement future policies. In the process of policy assessment, ex post impact 
assessment will give information on the changes in the targets caused by the implementa-
tion of  instruments. 
The purpose of impact assessment is to have information about the costs, the benefits 
and the effectiveness of  the implemented policy.  The impact analysis may cover different 
and complementary objectives : 
- quantitative and qualitative effects on firms' R & D activities (spin-off effect). 
- impact on the economic performance(s) of  firms (productivity effect) 
- impact on the economic performance(s) of  industries (spillover effect). 
- impact on the economy as a whole (global effect). 
To date, only a few empirical studies have endeavoured to estimate the economic im-
pact of R & D policy. Three different types of economic assessment methods are used. 
The first is the case study. Case studies always leave open the question of how repre-
sentative they are. Their results are often only valuable for a specific context and any 
generalisation is a highly risky experiment. The second method consists in surveys con-
ducted among those who have been concerned by the policy. Surveys may provide de-
tailed information on factors influencing decision-making processes and on perceptions 
of a subsidization policy. However, this method often suffers from lack of accuracy in 
the way questionnaires are built and measurement errors, which may cause perceived 
effects to be mistaken for actual ones. An other limitation of the frrst two methods is that 
they usually cannot provide information about the effects on variables in a causal chain, 
they are very costly and time consuming. The third method is the use of  econometrics to 
emphasize the relationship between subsidization and R & D intensity across firms as 
well as between publicly-financed R & D and productivity performances of firms. This 
method allows to estimate only direct effects of  policy instruments on an impact variable. 
All these methods belong to the class of  micro-studies, they are complementary and they 
are able, within their own limits, to add some pieces of information to our present puzzl~ 
142 of  knowledge about the intricate interdependences between innovative activities and eco-
nomic performances. 
The third method can also be used for two other types of studies : mesostudies and 
macrostudies. Hence, it is useful to cluster the third method in micro-econometrics, 
meso-econometrics and macro-econometrics. As far as mesostudies are concerned, input-
output models can be used to calculate the effects of technical change on production and 
demand. Although input-output analysis is a very useful method of  recording the effects 
of public R & D policy, its usefulness is seriously limited by its rigid structure and the 
scarcity of data. Conversely, macromodelling as a tool for macrostudies is not restricted 
to recording transactions between industrial sectors. The causal chain of interdependen-
cies can be reproduced by introducing causal variables among the explanatory variables. 
Only with such an approach can one measure the direct and indirect effects of public 
policy, provided, however, data are available on a large number of variables. An alterna-
tive approach is to combine input-output analysis and macromodels, which is now largely 
used in the existing macromodels. So far, there does not exist any macromodel that has 
been designed to deal with public R & D policy. Developing such a model will imply 
endogenizing private R & D investments and identifying their relationship with publicly-
funded R & D investments and the other economic variables. Despite many bottlenecks, 
macromodels can be adapted so as to be used as a tool for ·the ex post assessment of R & 
D public programmes. The outcomes of the econometric pin-point approaches can cer-
tainly be very helpful in the implementation of extended macromodels 1• 
The efficiency of  direct subsidization of private R & D by government and tax-credit 
public policies is a very controversial subject. In a survey of the production function 
approach, Griliches (1979) asked different questions concerning the real contribution of 
publicly-funded R & D to productivity growth: are the returns to government-financed R 
& D similar to those of  company-financed R & D? Does Federal R & D substitute for or 
complement private R & D investment? What are the spillover effects of government-
financed R & D ? As the rationale for government funding industrial R & D is more and 
more questioned, it is of  major importance that we should improve  our knowledge of  the 
interaction between public and corporate funding of  R & D and the contribution of public 
funding of R & D to econon1ic growth. To date, a number of analyses give some pieces 
of  information on this issue. 
The recent literature has essentially focussed on two direct approaches: 
1  A taxonomy identifying the areas to be investigated for an extensive policy assessment is suggested 
by Capron (1992a). 
143 - The productivity approach which measures the respective effects of privately-funded 
and publicly-funded R & D expenses on the growth rate of  output, so giving an evalua-
tion of the output elasticity of  public R & D or of the rate of  return on public R & D. 
- The investment approach which measures to what extent public R & D allocations in-
fluence privately-funded R & D expenditures, the idea being to look at whether, by do-
ing its own R & D and funding private R & D, a government affects (positively, nega-
tively or not at all) the privately-funded R & D and the magnitude of  the effect 
Besides, econometric methods have also been used outside these two conceptual 
approaches. It is the case of probabilistic models, which are required when data are not 
quantitative but qualitative. On the other hand, a supply approach has been suggested as 
an alternative to the productivity approach. Its advantage is to allow an indirect measure 
of the internal rate of  return on R & D as well as the marginal internal rate of  return on R 
&D. 
5.2.  How  Productive is  the Publicly-Financed R  &  D ? 
In successive studies using alternative measures of total factor productivity growth, 
Terleckyj (1974, 1980a, 1980b) found that privately-funded R &  D was significantly 
associated with industrial productivity growth but that government-financed R & D was 
not.  Besides the own sectoral R & D variables, he introduced a measure of borrowed R 
& D investment obtained by crossing the own R & D expenditure and an input-output 
matrix.  His results show that the spillover effects of privately-financed R & D are very 
important whereas the indirect effects from publicly-financed R & D are not significant. 
In his analyses, he uses different measures of total factor productivity growth, i.e. based 
on net and gross measures of output and inputs and taking into account or not quality 
characteristics of inputs.  For these different sets of productivity data, both direct and 
indirect productivity effects of government-fmanced R & D are captured.  In a comment 
accompanying the paper, Globerman criticizes Terckelyj's observation of an apparent 
inefficiency of government R &  D by pointing out that, "to the extent that federally 
financed R  &  D  is primarily directed towards improvements in product quality as 
opposed to cost reduction, the methodology used in deriving industry productivity 
estimates could contribute to the finding that government-financed R  & D  is not 
significantly related to productivity change.  Furthermore, ... the time lag ... might be too 
short to fully incorporate the effects of federally financed R & D which is presumably 
aimed at effecting greater changes in underlying production conditions". 
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 Contrary to Terleckyj, from a more extensive study, Griliches ( 1980a) concludes 
that he was unable to discover any direct evidence of the superiority of  company-financed 
R & D as against federally-financed R & Din affecting the productivity growth.  This 
observation results from a comparison of estimates obtained by using alternatively total R 
& D growth rate and company R & D growth rate by industry at the firm level.  Yet, from 
the relationship between company profitability and R &  D investment and from the 
elasticities obtained by estimating the production function, he derives the rate of  return on 
R & D and so observes that the two industries with the largest federal involvement in the 
financing of R & D (electrical equipment and aircraft) yield the lowest rates of return. 
His explanation is that in these industries the large federal support to R &  D creates 
externalities and restricts the appropriability opportunities, which drive down the private 
rates of  return below the prevailing rate in other industries. 
A problem already emphasized by Leonard (1971) in a preceding study in which he 
looks at the relationship between various measures of industry growth rates, company R 
& D intensity and federal R & D fund intensity for sixteen US industries over the period 
1957-63. He reports a highly positive correlation between industry growth rates and 
company R & D intensity.  For federal R & D intensity, the relationship with industry 
growth rates only becomes significantly positive when aircraft and missiles and electrical 
equipment industries are excluded.  Yet, productivity reveals a poor association with 
federal R & D intensity, a result which the author does not find surprising since federal R 
& D is not aimed at discovering and applying productive processes which result in lower 
unit costs.  So, it is the disproportionate allocation of federal  R & D funds to two 
industries that impairs the contribution of these funds to growth.  A possible explanation 
is that the high concentration of federal funds in these industries may diminish returns on 
R & D.  A second hypothesis, i.e. that the low growth yield of federal R & D results 
from its noncommercial objectives, does not seem verified as the contribution of federal 
R & D to industrial growth is significant except for two industries.  Concerning a third 
hypothesis advanced by the author, i.e. that defense and space industries suffer from lack 
orientation towards commercial markets and are less fit to exploit sales opportunities of 
federal R & D than market-oriented industries, the results provide some support to the 
idea that the extreme concentration of federal R & D resources in defense and space 
industries yields excessive wastes. 
In a more recent study, Griliches ( 1986) tested the hypothesis of a differentiated 
impact of private and public R & D expenditure more directly.  He found that privately-
financed R & D expenditure has a significantly larger effect on private productivity than 
federally-financed  R &  D.  This finding is  based on estirrie;ites  of both  production 
147 functions and gross profit rate regressions at the fmn level for several years.  Amongst 
the topics explored, he asks whether federal R & D and private R & D are equally patent 
in generating productivity growth.  To do that he introduces in his equation besides total 
R & D capital stock the ratio of  company-financed R & D stock on total R & D stock to 
measure to what extent there is a premium on privately financed R & Dl.  The results 
indicate that there is a positive premium on privately financed R & D which amounts to 
180 percent for the most older established firms.  Yet, this variable does not appear 
significant for the most extensive recent sample.  He also estimates the existence of a 
premium on the basis of growth rate of  partial productivity.  Here too the premium effect 
is significantly positive but more cumbersome to calculate.  In the gross profit rate 
equations, the premium effect turns out to be insignificant once industry differences are 
allowed for.  Although he concludes that privately fmanced R & D expenditures are more 
effective at the firm level than federally financed ones, his results are actually very 
mitigated and unstable. 
Wondering about the change in the relationship between the total factor productivity 
growth and R & D stock observed by Griliches ( 1980b) during the 1970's, Griliches and 
Lichtenberg (1984a) used new data to show that the relationship between productivity 
intensity and R  &  D  intensity did not really disappear but was obscured by the 
productivity slowdown.  They estimated a model of total factor productivity growth with 
R &  D intensity as the explanatory variable for several subperiods under alternative 
assumptions about the rate of depreciation of R & D capital.  They also considered two 
variants of  the model : one with total R & D and one with a distinction between privately-
financed R & D and federally-financed R & D.  The best results were obtained for the 
assumption of a rate of  depreciation of zero percent and when the coefficients on the two 
types of R & D are not constrained to be equal.  For all the subperiods, the coefficients 
on private R & D intensity are significant and do not give any evidence of a decline in the 
potency of R & D.  On the contrary, its value increases over time, so indicating that the 
rates of return on R & D go up.  Yet, if the intensity of private R & D expenditure was 
found to be highly significant, there appeared to be no significant relationship between 
the intensity of  federal R & D expenditure and subsequent growth in productivity. 
In a methodological paper about the search for outliers, Reiss ( 1990) reviewed 
Griliches and Lichtenberg's results and provided clues as to why federal R & D has been 
found non-significant.  Furthermore, he argued that low estimates of the return to R & D 
was principally due to the presence of outliers.  From a selective analysis of outlier 
1  He approximates the premium by the relation a log R + a a  s where R is the total R & D stock, s is 
the company-financed R& D stock as a ratio to the total R & D stock, a the R & D elasticity and a 
the premium rate. 
148 (llJ 
diagnoses, he identified four outliers out of a  sample covering 27 manufacturing 
industries.  These four outliers are respectively the industries of  missiles and spacecraft, 
engines and turbines, farm machinery and equipment and computers.  Among these four 
industries, the first one is the most highly federal  R &  D-intensive industry.  The 
regression results for the nonoutlying sample show how much the exclusion of these 
anomalous observations dramatically affects parameter estimates.  Indeed, his results 
report a significant estimate of the social excess rate of  return on private R & D equal to 
26 percent (against 35 percent for the full sample) and a significant estimate of the social 
excess rate of return on federal R & D equal to 18 percent (against a nonsignificant 1 
percent for the full sample).  For the four outlying industries, no coefficient is significant 
This study illustrates how cautious one must be when one analyzes such flawed data as 
total factor productivity growth.  In the measurement of productivity, a better status is 
allowed to traditional production factors than to knowledge investments.  What the R & D 
data are asked to do is explaining residuals, a real challenge. 
In a recent paper, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991) re-examined the relationship 
between productivity growth and R & D using a large sample of firm-level data for three 
subperiods covering the years 1973-1985.  In their model, the R & D intensity is the 
explanatory variable of productivity growth.  Besides testing the returns by research 
orientation (basic research, applied research and development), they discriminate R & D 
by source of funds,  i.e.  company-funded versus federally-funded  R  &  D.  Their 
estimates of the private rate of  return on R & D are globally in accordance with Griliches 
and Lichtenberg (1984a)'s findings.  During the slowdown in productivity growth 
observed in the 70's, the rate of return on R & D increased.  Basic research appears to 
provide higher rates of  return than other types of  research.  The federally-funded R & D 
does  not  appear to  influence  productivity  growth  significantly.  As  a  possible 
explanation, they point out the measurement problem: "In industries with relatively high 
level of publicly-financed R & D, such as defense and space sectors, output is poorly 
measured and price indices do not accurately reflect improvements in quality.  A related 
concern is that federal R & D may have an indirect positive impact on productivity which 
is difficult to capture in our econometric framework.  For example, federal R & D may 
improve economic welfare as a result of a) stimulation of  additional privately-financed R 
& D or b) "spillovers" or benefits that accrue to industries or firms from R & D that is 
performed outside a given firm or industry . . .  At the present time, it is difficult to know 
whether the standard econometric framework underestimates the impact of federal R & D 
on economic growth".  Yet, in their analysis, they examine how sensitive the full sample 
regression results are to influential outliers.  When the latter are discarded, th~ parameter 
for private R & D declines and the one for federal R & D triples and becomes slightly 
149 significant.  The variation of the private R &  D coefficient is of the same order of 
magnitude as the alteration reported by Reiss.  Although it is not the case for the federal R 
& D coefficient, the direction of the modification is the same. 
While studies discussed so far were based on cross-sectional data, the Levy-
Terleckyj (1983, 1989)'s analyses use a time series approach.  The first study examines 
the effects of R  &  D  capital  stock on output in  the  US  business  sector at  the 
macroeconomic level.  The authors make a distinction between private and government R 
& D and explore the effects of different types of government R & D, i.e.  on the one 
hand, government-financed R & D performed in industry and overhead allowances for 
private R & D of the Defense and Space procurement contractors and, on the other hand, 
government R  &  D outlays other than contract R &  D on private R &  D  spending. 
Assuming a six-year embodiment lag and no depreciation, they find a relatively large 
coefficient for the private R & D capital stock and a relatively small and statistically 
insignifiant coefficient for the  total  government R  &  D  capital stock.  When the 
hypothesis of an equal effect of both government contract R &  D and other R & D is 
relaxed, the first variable is significantly positive and the second is insignificant and 
negative.  The magnitude of  this effect, however, is much smaller than that of the private 
R & D.  According to the authors, ..  the effect of government-contract R & D on private-
sector productivity which is observed here may represent either the direct effect on the 
productivity of  performing companies or the indirect effects of producer goods developed 
as spillovers of government contract R & Don the productivity of the users of these 
products  ...  Their second study deals with the problem of measuring physical returns toR 
&  D  in which they report estimates for the US  telecommunications and computer 
industries.  They estimate both Cobb-Douglas and CES production functions with and 
without the restriction of constant returns to scale for the telecommunications industry. 
The estimated impact of both public and private R &  D  are quite close in the two 
equations but with high variability in their significance.  However, the R & D elasticities 
are very sensitive to the hypothesis about the returns to scale.  Inside the traditional 
Cobb-Douglas formulation,  the  government R  &  D  proves to have a  positive and 
significant impact on output but less than the private R &  D.  Moreover, separating 
physical returns to R &  D from returns to scale turns out to be a very difficult task. 
According to them another difficulty is in  really measuring the effect on productivity 
growth and price change of an industry of R & D performed in other industries.  The full 
effects of this outside R & D may not appear in an analysis of productivity growth 
because they are fully internalized by the source industry.  As an example, they show that 
changes in the R &  D capital stock in the computer industry explain a large part of the 
decrease in the price of computers.  Although government-funded R & D performed in 
150 the industry has largely influenced con1puter technologies, its marginal impact on the 
price, when this variable is jointly introduced with private R &  D, is insignificantly 
positive but significantly negative when introduced alone. 
From the analysis of French panel data, Cuneo (1984) provides evidence against 
the hypothesis that the rate of  return on R & D in an industry is all the weaker as the share 
of public funding is high 1.  Yet, as public funding is more oriented towards risky 
projects and the support of private R & D, Cuneo argues that it may not directly influence 
the productivity of firms but that it may create value added at the research process stage 
and not at the production stage.  So, the R & D capital stock of a firm will be all the more 
useful and its impact on productivity all the higher as the firm will benefit from public 
funding.  The same argument holds for fundamental research.  If this argument is right, 
the R & D elasticity should not be a constant but a function of the public contribution to 
total R & D.  Nevertheless, in order to simplify estimations, he picks up these effects by 
introducing dummy variables in his empirical model for enterprises receiving more than 1 
percent in public funding or investing more than 1 percent in fundamental research.  He 
also considers that the two types of research have a specific effect on productivity.  The 
model is separately estimated on a firm sample of the scientific industry and the heavy 
industry.  For the latter, the impact of fundamental research is insignificant.  The main 
results reported by Cuneo are presented in table 5.3. and his main findings can be 
summarized as follows.  First, the effects of publicly-funded R  &  D  only become 
positive when it exceeds a certain threshold of  total expenses of R & D per capita.  Below 
this threshold, enterprises which do not benefit by government-supported R & D are 
more productive than enterprises which do.  Above this threshold, the level of R &  D 
activities seems to be sufficient to ensure a return to government support.  The estimated 
relative thresholds are two for the heavy industry and four for the scientific industry, i.e. 
the R & D capital stock for enterprises benefiting by public support must be respectively 
twice and four times as big as the average R & D capital stock of the sector involved. 
Second, the publicly-funded research lengthens the research process, thereby involving 
firms in long-term research, which explains why enterprises must have a high R &  D 
capital stock.  Indeed, if enterprises have a low R & D capital stock, yielding a profits 
from these researches will be more difficult than for more R & .D intensive enterprises. 
None of the studies reviewed so far tackles the problem of the differential impact of 
the components of publicly-funded R & D.  What is the contribution of publicly-funded 
basic research to the productivity growth ?  In the hypothesis that public funding as a 
1  This idea was clearly made explicit by Griliches (1979) who points out that "a con~ntration of fede-
rally supported R & D expenditures in one area may lead to an overall decline in the rate of return to 
all R & D there". 
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 whole is ineffective, we cannot conclude that all the components of publicly-funded R & 
D are not potent.  Only few studies have tried to shed light on this issue.  Although not 
directly investigating the issue of the effectiveness of public funding, Mansfield ( 1980) 
has attempted to estimate the rate of return on basic research as opposed to applied 
research and development.  This analysis is an extension of Terleckyj's studies.  In this 
analysis, the sources of funds  are considered separately for applied research  and 
development (privately financed versus publicly financed) but not for basic research.  As 
shown in table 5.4, all the variables are insignificant.  Yet, an alternative result based on 
total applied research and development expenditure gives significant coefficients of 
respectively 1.49 for this variable and .07 for basic research.  Another regression 
introducing an expected R &  D payoff variable (calculated as the percentage of the 
industry's firms that expected their R & D expenditures to pay off in no less than six 
years) shows a  significant rate of return on publicly-financed applied research and 
development but not on the privately-financed one.  From complementary regression 
results, Mansfield concludes that the productivity growth of an industry seems to be 
directly and significantly related to the extent to which its R & D is long-term investment. 
Yet, although the results are very mitigated, they throw a new light on Terleckyj's 
negative findings about the real rate of  return on publicly-fmanced R & D.  An additional 
evidence against the negative diagnoses about the effectiveness of  publicly-funded R & D 
is given by Li~  (198lb) from a more disaggregated analysis of  finn data.  In his model, 
he separately introduces company-financed and government-financed basic research and 
applied research plus development expenditures.  In addition to results similar to 
Mansfield's ones, his results suggest that government-financed basic research is also a 
significant determinant of finn productivity growth but its impact is about half the value 
observed for company-financed basic research as shown in table 5.4.  The impact of 
government-financed applied research plus development is near zero and insignificant. 
On the other hand, the private applied research and development is marginally significant 
and compared to basic research its impact its quantitatively marginal. 
In a nutshell, the studies dealing with the impact on productivity of government 
funded R & D generally lead to conclude that public support to R & D may be largely 
unproductive1•  Yet, some studies emphasize that the relationship between government R 
& D support and productivity may be more subtle than the link between private R & D 
and productivity growth.  The objectives of public support (defense, prestige and 
economic activity), the rules that govern the allocation of public funds to R  &  D 
(competitive contracts, cost sharing) and the character of use of  government R & D (basic 
1  While not reporting his results, Klette (1991) also points out from the analysis of  a_ large sample of 
Norwegian firms that his estimate of the private rate of return to publicly-financed R & D has turned 
, ; .  _ _out to be  non-si~nifica~t.. 
154 research, applied research and development) are all elements which strongly influence the 
effectiveness of  public R & D investments.  While the incentive of  an enterprise to invest 
in R & D may to a large extent come down to the profit maximization rule, the incentives 
of  public intervention are more complex and cannot easily be summarized in a single rule. 
Defense-oriented R &  D is not directly aimed at furthering economic growth, basic 
research certainly sustains more long-term economic growth than short-term economic 
growth and the effectiveness of  public support to new economic products and processes 
produced by business enterprises strongly depends on the own economic effectiveness of 
recipient private enterprise.  As pointed out by Mansfield (1988b) the higher effectiveness 
of applied R & Din Japan compared to the US is to have been much faster and more 
efficient imitators than American fmns.  Yet, there is no evidence that Japanese firms 
have been faster or more efficient innovators than American firms.  He adds that 
"American firms might respond by putting more resources into process R & D, which 
would make it more difficult for Japanese ftrms and others to appropriate a large share of 
the benefits from American product innovations.  Also, American firms might increase 
their own capacity to imitate quickly, efficiently, and creatively".  This shows that if 
public support is only an economically non-discriminant R & D support, the rate of  return 
on private R & D will to a large extent be the single mirror of  its rate of  return.  The main 
question regarding government support is perhaps more whether it is efficient than 
whether it is effective.  In other words, if public support toR &  D only sustains the 
private technological trends, its impact on productivity will be a duplication of  the effect 
of  private R & D.  What productivity studies shed light on is the relative inefficiency of 
government support to R &  D, not its ineffectiveness.  In our view, the investment 
approach is more appropriate to answer to the question of whether effective government 
R & D support is, i.e. effective in promoting private R & D. 
5.3.  How  Stimulating is  the  Publicly-Financed  R  &  D  ? 
In an early attempt to measure the impact of publicly-funded R &  D, Blank and 
Stigler ( 1957) arrive to contradictory conclusions on the basis of two alternative 
methodological approaches.  The first one which rests on aggregate data for seventeen 
industries in which firms are classified into two groups according to whether they are 
engaged in government research or not,  gives  strong  support to  the  substitution 
hypothesis.  They hypothesize that public R & D support is a substitute for private R & D 
if the ratio to total employment of scientists and engineers engaged in private research is 
higher for the first group of firms than for the second.  This hypothesis is verified for 
fifteen industries and for industry as a whole, which strongly buttresses the substitution 
155 hypothesis.  In the second approach they only consider firms that perform R &  D and 
only take their size into account  Industries with high ratios of scientists and engineers in 
private R & D also appear to have high ratios of scientists and engineers engaged in 
government R &  D.  This observation is particularly apparent for large firms.  These 
findings lead the authors to conclude that public R & D is complementary to private R & 
D.  Their global comment from these contradictory results is that the substitution effect 
derived from the aggregate data is grossly exaggerated in this type of  approach. 
However, this study used an indirect approach based on R &  D manpower to 
measure the effect of  public R & D on private R & D.  The recent literature covers a more 
direct approach to analyzing to what extent public resources allocated to R & D modulate 
privately-funded R &  D expenditures, the investment function approach.  Like the 
production approach, the investment models may be classified as either based on 
aggregate time-series, industry-level cross-sections or fmn-level cross-sections.  While in 
this approach, the interpretation of estimates is less ambiguous than in the production 
function approach, the models greatly diverge according to the specification of models 
and variables.  Some models simply investigate the link between company-financed R & 
D and government-financed R &  D by either using or not using transformed data and 
only controlling for industry- or fmn- fixed effects or demand shift  Others are designed 
in the Schumpeterian tradition and introduce additional relevant variables to measure 
market structure effects.  A last class of models are inspired by macroeconomics in that 
they are derived from demand models in which changes in output and relative factor 
prices, the adjustment process to equilibrium and/or the economic conditions are taken 
into account.  The main characteristics of  these empirical models are summarized in tables 
5.5 and 5.6.  Only models dealing with the impact of  publicly-financed R & Don private 
R & D are reviewed.  In table 5.5, the estimated coefficients are elasticities while in table 
5.6 they are marginal effects. 
Using a  general disequilibrium demand model, Nadiri  (1980) examines how 
publicly-funded R & D capital stock influences privately-funded R & D capital stock in 
three aggregated industries.  The estimated effects noticeably differ according to the 
industries  considered.  They  are  positive  and  statistically  significant  for  total 
manufacturing and in durables industries and significantly negative in non-durables 
industries.  His tests give some evidence that the effect of government financing is felt 
within the year but he suspects that the aggregation of  data could conceal the true timing 
rel-ationship.  The elasticities obtained are very small in all cases.  Although it could be 
concluded from this study that government support globally complements private R & D 
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 the substitution effect obtained for non-durables manufacturing makes the analysis 
inconclusive. 
More conclusive were the tests made by Scott (1984) on the basis of a large sample 
of observations on lines of business for 437 companies.  He estimates two alternative 
models.  First, he regresses company R &  D intensity on goverment-financed R &  D 
intensity with and without controlling for company and industry effects.  His first result, 
in which there is not control variable for fixed effects, shows that company R &  D 
intensity is greater in lines of business where government-financed R & dis greater.  In 
other words, government financing goes to firms that do a lot ofR & D.  When company 
indicators are introduced, the estimate remains significant which gives some evidence that 
government funds do not principally go to firms that invest a lot in R & D.  Instead of 
controlling for differences across firms, one can verify how the results can be altered by 
simply taking into account the industry effects.  This will provide some information on 
the possible concentration of public funds towards R &  D intensive industries.  The 
amplitude of the estimated coefficient and its significance imply that of this hypothesis 
has to be rejected.  From a last regression in which both company and industry effects are 
jointly intercepted, the author concludes that the significant impact of government 
financing on  company R  &  D  expenditures obtained  is  not  simply  the  result of 
government funds going toR & D intensive firms in R & D intensive industries.  Not 
only does government financing appear to be a complement to private R & D but it also 
stimulates R &  D.  An extra dollar spent by government in R & D generates an extra 
investment in company R &  D ·c,f eight to ten cents.  Yet, these results may only be 
spurious because sales are used in the construction of both the dependent and explanatory 
variables.  To confirm his results, he specifies an alternative model.  In  this second 
model, logarithmic values of company-financed R &  D are regressed with respect to 
logarithms of sales and government-financed R & D and a control variable for companies 
which do not receive any government support.  Although far less significant than in the 
preceding regression, the estimated coefficients are marginally significant and do not lead 
to a rejection of the complementarity hypothesis.  Moreover, in the margin, an increase in 
public financing stimulates an extra private R & D expenditure. 
In a comment on this paper, Link, referrring to his own works, insists on the 
subtleties of the relationship between government-financed and company-financed R & 
D.  Indeed, government-financed R & D not only stimulates the company-financed R & 
D but also affects the composition of R & D by category of use.  An illustration of this is 
given by Link (1982) in an  analysis of the determinants of R &  D expenditures by 
character of use, i.e. basic research, applied research and development.  The stimulus 
159 coefficient of federal R &  D intensity obtained from his firm-level data analysis is 
significant and of the same order of magnitude as those reported by Scott.  His regression 
results on the composition of R & D, that is on the percentage of the company R & D 
category of use, suggest that the impulse given to private R & D by an increase in federal 
R & D is primarily directed away from basic research and towards development and only 
very marginally influences applied research.  In his discussion of results, he refers to 
complementary tests based on a desaggregation of federal R & D data showing that the 
positive relationship between federal R & D intensity and private R & D intensity and the 
share of private funds allocated to development is primarily a result of federal applied 
research plus development expenditures.  In the case of the share of private funds 
allocated to basic research, it is the federal basic allocations which is the determinant 
factor. 
Contrasting with Scott's and Link's findings, Carmichael (1981) reports empirical 
evidence regarding the crowding-out hypothesis.  He develops a capital asset pricing 
model in which companies view R &  D investments in terms of their risk and return 
characteristics.  The latter are altered by R & D investments through the expected profits 
from sales and intra-frrm spillover.  By public R & D contracting, companies are to some 
extent able to separate these two sources of risk and return.  In his model, the author 
tends to demonstrate that while some public crowding-out of  private R & D is likely, this 
is almost certain to be incomplete.  From the theoritical model, he deduces that private R 
& D is an increasing function of the scale of the finn measured by sales and a decreasing 
function of publicly-financed R & D.  The application of this model to a sample of US 
transport firms gives some support to the partial substitution hypothesis.  Yet, this 
hypothesis is more conclusive for small frrms than for large firms.  By and large, this 
model implies that each dollar spent by government in R & D adds around 92 cents to 
total R & D spending, and decreases private R & D by 8 cents. 
Schrieves  (1978)  analysis,  whose results are summarized in  table 5.7,  also 
suggests a crowding out of private R & D by federal R & D.  In an analysis of the 
relationship between market structure and the intensity of  innovative effort, he regresses, 
among other variables, the logarithm of privately-financed R & D employment on the 
percentage of R & D activity financed by the federal government for a sample of 411 
firms classified into four industry groups.  For non-specialized producer durable goods 
and specialized durable equipment the crowding-out hypothesis is accepted.  For 
materials, public financing marginally stimulates the R & D activity in this industry.  The 
complementarity hypothesis cannot be rejected for consumer goods.  Yet, as the two 
durables industries concentrate a large part of R  &  D  activities, the crowding-out 
160 hypothesis cannot be globally rejected.  As these industries are heavily oriented towards 
electronics, aerospace, mechanical and electro-mechanical fields,  public support is 
particularly intensive in these industries.  So the government finances 26 percent of total 
R &  D  in durables against 4 percent in other industries.  The results show that the 
marginal crowding-out effect is roughly about -.20 and the government R & D elasticity 
-.04 for the industry as a whole.  The government R &  D  elasticity is highest for 
specialized durable equipment, its value is -.08.  For durables, the elasticity is about the 
same as that obtained by Nadiri, and for non durables, it is equal to zero. 
In a funds flow approach of  determinants of  industrial R & D applied to firm-level 
data, Switzer (1984) observes that government R & D expenditures do not significantly 
influence private R & D and, therefore do not raise total R & D. 
From a study reappraising the Schumpeter hypothesis that technological innova-
tions are more likely to be initiated by large rather than small firms, Rosenberg (1976) 
tests the hypothesis that government R & D financing stimulates private R &  D.  His 
dependent variable is defined as  the  percentage of total employment allocated to 
professional R & D personnel and his proxy for government R & D is the fraction of the 
firm's shipments originating in industries whose research is heavily subsidized by the 
government.  The estimates confirm the stimulus hypothesis as shown in table 5.7.  Yet, 
as his explanatory variable is contructed by accounting the ratio of firm's shipments to 
government on total shipments from industries whose R & D is subsidized at more than 
50 percent by government, the stimulus may arise from government R & D contracts as 
well as from government non-R & D contracts. 
In an examination of the simultaneous relationship between market structures and 
research intensity, Levin and Reiss  ( 1984)  tests  how  government policy  affects 
technological opportunity and appropriability and how technological opportunity and 
appropriability conditions influence government R & D decisions.  In their model, R & D 
intensity depends on the elasticity of unit cost with respect to own R & D, which is a 
measure of technological opportunity, and on the elasticity of unit cost with respect to 
industry wide R & D, which is a measure of technological appropriability multiplied by 
the conjectural variation with respect to R & D and divided by the Herfindahl index of 
concentration.  On the one hand, the technological opportunity variable indicates the 
responsiveness of cost to own research effort and on the other hand, the technological 
appropriability variable represents how much a frrm  benefits from an increase in the 
common R  &  D  pool.  Among the determinants of opportunity, they assume that 
161 Table 5. 7.  About  two  Models  Based  on  Other Specifications 
Study  Sample  Specification and  Subsamples and other  Impact of  R2 
additional variables  details  public 
R&D 
Rosenberg  United  - company R & D  R & D intensity  2.35  .43 
(1976)  States  employment intensity  (2.64) 
100 firms  -concentration and en-
1964  try  barrier  dummies, 
market  share,  firm's 
revenue, technological 
opportunity 
- shipment fraction  in 
heavily R & D subsi-
dized fmns 
Shrieves  United  - logarithm of priva- manufacturing  -.53  .56 
(1978)  states  tely financed R & D  (2.05) 
411 firms  employment 
non-specialized durable  -.89  .68  1965 
- logarithm of sales,  goods  (1,77) 
product-market and 
materials  1.26  .59  technological charac-
teristics  (1.63) 
-percentage of R & D  specialized durable  -1.02  .56 
activity financed by  equipment  (2.61) 
government 
consumer goods  -.78  .77 
(1.08) 
durables  -.82  .55 
(2.62) 
materials and  .10  .64 
consumer goods  (0.2) 
Note: values between parentheses are t-statistics. 
government-funded R & D is complementary to private R &  D and thus increases the 
elasticity of unit cost with respect to private R & D.  They also consider that government 
of R  &  D  restricts appropriability and thus increases the extent of spillovers in an 
industry.  The government-financed R & D intensity is entered in the model to measure 
the first effect and the government R & D intensity is multiplied by the Herfindahl index 
to grasp the second effect.  In the government R & D equation industry, technology 
bases, opportunity and appropriability conditions of industries as well as defense and 
non-defense oriented government purchases from industries are assumed to be the main 
determinants of government R & D intensity.  Their empirical model is run on a sample 
of twenty industries over three years.  When the appropriability effect of government R & 
D is not taken into account, the magnitude of the coefficient for the opportunity effect of 
government R & D implies that a one-dollar extra increase in government R & D funding 
spins off a  twelve cents extra increase in  company R  &  D  spending.  When both 
162 opportunity and appropriability effects are accounted for,  the extra increase is about 
seventy-four cents.  Yet, it seems that while government R & D stimulates private R & D 
by increasing technological opportunities, it also increases technological appropriability 
and so diminishes spillovers.  The authors explain these contradictory results by the fact 
that "much government funding supports R & D for large-scale, capital-intensive defense 
systems which are not cheaply replicable despite mandatory licensing and technology 
transfer provisions".  Another explanation is that as government R  &  D  funding 
principally flows  into industries with a  high concentration rate, the technologifal 
appropriability variable may also capture the diminushing return effect of  public funding 
on private R & D spending.  In the government R & D equation, defense procurement is 
the most significant variable.  Technological opportunity appears to offer little incentive to 
the government, which moreover seems to react with a substantial lag compared to 
private industry.  The extent of interindustry R & D spillovers appears to increase the 
likelihood of government support. 
Together with their analysis of the effects of government R  &  D  funding on 
productivity, Levy and Terleckyj (1983) studied at a macroeconomic level how effective 
government funding was to generate additional private R & D investments.  Besides the 
total federally-funded R & D performance, they look at how the allocation of these funds 
makes difference by distinguishing R & D contract from other categories of government 
R &  D spending.  They find some evidence that total government R &  D spending 
stimulates an additional private R & D expenditure of  21 cents per dollar.  However, this 
indirect effect seems attributable to R & D contracts and not to other forms of  government 
R &  D.  The impulse effect of government R & D contracts is of 28 cents per dollar 
against no effect for other government R & D.  The search for a lag structure of R & D 
contract has shown that the major impact occurs within the same year as the R &  D 
contract.  Their explanation is that "the performing companies have learned to form 
realistic expectations about future government support by developing R & D proposals 
for  the  government  in  a  way  which  takes  into  account  their plans  for  future 
complementary R & D funded with their own resources".  For other federal R & D, an 
average three-year lag was estimated.  When this lagged effect is taken into account, 
federal outlay for R &  D performed outside industry appears to induce an additional 
private R  &  D  expenditure of 19  cents per dollar.  However, this impact is only 
marginally significant.  These estimates of the effect of government R & Don private R 
&  D  are  largely  higher than  those  obtained in  the  other studies.  The authors' 
interpretation of  those divergences is that at the macroeconomic level, the estimates reflect 
the cross effects of government contract R &  D on private R &  D expenditures in 
companies other than those performing the R & D contracts. 
163 Studies measuring the indirect effects of government R & D funding on private R & 
Din other countries than the United States are not plentiful.  Holemans and Sleuwaegen 
( 1988)  focused on the role of government support in stimulating private R  &  D 
investment of foreign and domestic companies in Belgium.  Their sample bears on time-
series of firm-level data.  The other variables introduced in the model are sales and 
employment which are shown not to be simply a substitute for size measures, as often 
assumed in tests of the Schumpeterian hypothesis, but also to capture other effects. 
Payments for royalties and fees are also included to measure to what extent foreign fmns 
do less R & D than domestic firms due to a centralization of R & D functions within 
multinational companies.  Their estimates suggest complementarity between government-
financed R & D and privately-financed R & D and that the effects do not differ between 
foreign and domestic companies.  The elasticities are largely higher than those obtained 
for the US but similar to those reported by Antonelli for Italy. 
In his study, Antonelli ( 1989) investigates how declining profits and increasing 
competition can stimulate innovative efforts.  In his failure-inducement model, he 
introduces, besides the profitability, the size of fmns, the export and a dummy for large 
financial groups to explain the level of R & D expenditures for a sample of  Italian firms. 
He also takes into account the pressure of the international technological environment by 
including the private R &  D intensity of US f1rms.  Concerning public subsidies, he 
argues that they have helped Italian firms "to fund levels of R & D expenditures beyond 
those allowed by short-term payback criteria".  He respectively tests the linear and 
multiplicative specifications of the model which tum out to adjust itself in a noticeably 
similar way with regard to the ratio of public subsidies to total R & D expenditures. 
According to the estimates, the marginal effect and the elasticity are very high, which 
indicates a strong incentive effect of public subsidies on private R & D. 
Levy (1990) argued that the absence of significant effect of government R & Don 
productivity is due to the confusion of zero value of marginal product with zero marginal 
physical product.  If one supposes that government R & D can be employed without 
private cost, it is a public good that a f1rm  uses at zero wage and, therefore, in equi-
librium, the value of government financing's marginal product is zero.  In other words, 
the zero coefficient associated with government-financed R & Din the production ap-
proach results from the equalization by the f1rms of  the value of the marginal product of 
public R & D to their cost of utilizing this public R & D.  This implies that the measure-
ment of  the impact of government R & D on output cannot be directly evaluated when the 
production is measured in value terms.  Hence he suggests to use the indirect approach 
164 (12) 
which consists in measuring the impact of  public R & Don the supply of  private R & D. 
To test this account he pools the data of nine countries for the period 1963-1984.  In his 
time series cross-section analysis, he regresses private R & Don public R & D, both 
variables being subjected to the Box-Cox transformation.  His main results are sum-
marized in table 5.8.  The adding of  country-specific dummies interacting with the trans-
formed government R & D variable improve the model significantly.  Next, he tests how 
consistent the results are with the theory by considering three joint hypotheses.  First, is 
the contribution of government R & D (Rio) on private R & D (RiP) really negative for 
countries for which the country-specific RiG variable has a  negative coefficient ? 
Second, is the contribution of Rio systematically negative for countries for which the 
global impact (i.e. average impact plus additional country-specific impact) is negative ? 
Third, is the contribution of RiG positive for countries for which the country-specific 
RiG variable is positive ?  The application of a resampling inequality procedure gives 
good evidence to support the supply hypothesis in the US, Japan, Germany, Sweden and 
France (countries with a positive country-specific coefficient and tested through the third 
hypothesis).  This hypothesis is rejected for the UK and the Netherlands (second hypo-
thesis) and the test is inconclusive for Italy and Switzerland (first and second hypo-
theses).  In other to fix ideas about the impact of government R & Don private R & D, 
we have calculated both marginal effect and elasticity for each country on the basis of the 
mean value for several years.  The range of marginal effects varies from -1.43 for the UK 
to 7.18 for Japan and the elasticities stretch from -.73 for the UK to .41 for Sweden.  If 
we compare the values obtained for the US, the only country for which alternative 
estimates are available we observe that the elasticity estimated is comparable to Levy-
Terleckyj (1983)'s estimates.  Yet, the marginal effect is noticeably higher than the 
estimates obtained by other studies.  The most contrasting results are the strong negative 
estimates obtained for the UK and the high marginal effect measured for Japan.  From 
these results, we are not able to draw a clear-cut conclusion about the incentive or disin-
centive effect of  defense-oriented R & D.  The elasticities obtained for the US, Sweden 
and France are higher than the elasticities obtained for Japan, Germany and Switzeland, 
all of them countries devoting a very weak part of  public credits to defense R & D.  Yet, 
as the last countries spend less on R & D than the ftrst ones, they are located at a higher 
point on the curve of marginal effects so that the spin off  effect of an extra dollar invested 
by public authorities in industrial R & D is higher.  In the UK and the Netherlands, the 
negative coefficients indicate that publicly-financed industrial R & D crowds out private 
financing with average large marginal effect. 
Evenson ( 1984) uses a rather different way of looking at how government funding 
influences the innovative efforts.  In a large-scale analysis of patents, he regressed 
165 patents awarded to nationals in the US  by industry over the period 1964-1978 on R & D 
efforts, the proportion of government support, the proportion of basic research and the 
proportion invested in development  I. The introduction in the equation of the proportion 
of different types of R & D besides total R & D investment allows to control for some 
characteristics of the research system on patenting and provides a test similar to that 
performed by Griliches (1986) in order to verify if  private R & D and federal R & D were 
equally potent.  The potent elasticity of R & D is 1.23, which shows increasing returns of 
R & D in patenting while one cannot really reject the hypothesis of  constant returns.  The 
coefficient for government-funded R & D is 1.93, which indicates a large positive 
premium on federal R & D of 150 percent.  This result is very surprising given the often 
emphasized argument that federal R &  D carries restrictions on appropriability.  The 
coefficients of basic research and development are respectively 13.77 and 1.38, which 
provides evidence of the less patentable character of basic research and of the near-the-
market character of  experimental development. 
In several  successive articles,  Lichtenberg  ( 1984,  1987,  1988)  has  harshly 
criticized studies which found that the federal R & D expenditure in the US has a positive 
and significantly different from zero impact on private R & D expenditure.  He argues 
that studies of  the relationship between federal and company R & D are generally upward 
biased (Lichtenberg (1984)).  First, the hypothesis of exogeneity of federal R & D 
impulse on company R & D is largely unacceptable at the micro level because firm 
characteristics play an important role in the allocation of federal R & D contracts.  He 
strongly suspects that the disregard for these firm characteristics causes an upward bias 
of  estimates.  To obtain an unbiased estimate, he recommends to work on changes in the 
variables over time.  Second, he points out that deflating both company and federal 
expenditures by the same error-ridden deflator to measure the real inputs devoted to R & 
D induces spurious positive correlation between both variables, i.e. company and federal 
R & D expenditures.  As the bias is of unknown magnitude and direction, he suggests to 
supplement data with an analysis of direct quantity indices of R & D input such as R & D 
employment.  Third, he underlines that the conventional practice of dividing both 
·company and federal R & D by sales is likely to produce an upward bias in the estimates. 
Subsequently, he reports estimates which support his arguments.  Results of pooled 
regressions of changes in privately-funded R &  D expenditure and employment on 
corresponding changes in federally-funded R & D at the industry level over the period 
1963-1979 give an estimate insignificantly different from zero for the frrst measure and a 
negative coefficient with the second n1easure, which implies a crowding-out effect of 
federal-sponsored employment on con1pany-supported employment.  He also presents a 
1  He also includes industry indicators and some year dummies. 
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 second analysis based on finn data in which he successively regresses the levels and the 
changes in the R & D- sales ratios.  From his results summarized in table 5.9, one can 
observe for the level version a significant positive impact of federally-funded R & D in 
1967 and 1972 whilst the estimated coefficient is negative for 1977.  For the variation 
version, all the coefficients are negative and highly significant.  To conclude, he points 
out that his findings "make heavier the burden of proof on those who would claim that 
federal contract R & D makes a positive contribution to aggregate technical progress". 
Another argument puts forward by Lichtenberg (1987) is that previous estimates 
introducing sales or GNP as an explanatory variable are seriously upwardly biased 
because they fail  to control for shifts in the composition of final demand.  This 
misspecification is due to the existence of  a correlation between the federal demand and 
the federal R &  D  funding.  He contests the a priori hypothesis that sales to each 
customer identically affect the marginal returns on R &  D  and, therefore, that the 
composition of final demand does not influence the equilibrium private R  &  D 
expenditure.  As we are primarily interested in a consistent estimate of the impact of 
publicly-funded R & D, the restriction of  identical coefficients for sales to the government 
and to other customers cannot be maintained and this, for two reasons.  First, an increase 
in government purchases will tend to stimulate more private R & D investment than any 
increase in purchases from other customers.  Second, if  the government is a major source 
of R & D  financing, it is also an important customer.  So, not only the impact of 
government purchases is likely to be substantially higher than the effect of other 
purchases but government purchases are also expected to be strongly positively correlated 
with government-financed R & D. If  these propQsitions are right, part of the estimated 
effect of public R & D support on private R & D is statistically spurious.  The author 
provides some empirical evidence by estimating both restricted and unrestricted models 
for US aggregate time-series data and finn-level data.  From his main results reproduced 
in Table 5.10, on can observe that the federal  R  &  D  funding variable becomes 
insignificant when federal purchases are separately introduced into the equations.  So, 
controlling for the components of sales inverts the finding of a positive significant effect 
of federal R & D on private R & D and this, at both micro and macro levels.  What has 
been interpreted as the effect of federal  R  &  D  is nothing else than the effect of 
government demand. 
Continuing his analysis about the effectiveness of public R &  D  in promoting 
private R &  D, Lichtenberg (1988) gave further evidence by estimating regressions of 
private R & D expenditure on the value of  competitive and non-competitive R & D and 
168 Table 5.9. Impact of Federal R &  D on  Company R &  D 
in  the United  States 
Year  Federal R & D 
Sales 
1967/1967-72  0.05 
(2.11) 
1972/1972-77  0.10 
(4.72) 
1977/1967-77  -0.22 
(5.03) 
Sample: 991 fmns. 
Note: values between parentheses are t-statistics. 
Source : Lichtenberg (1984). 
A (Federal R & D) 
Sales 
-0.48 
(21.84) 
-0.17 
(14.05) 
-0.26 
(14.06) 
non-R & D government contracts and on non-government sales for a sample of  industrial 
firms.  Before synthesizing this analysis, it may be useful to specify that the firms 
composing his sample span a major defense buildup.  In the US, the government 
promotes private R & D investment by awarding contracts according to a procedure 
referred to as procurement by design and technical competition.  Finns are in  vi  ted to 
submit proposals in response to requests by qualified departments (principally the 
Defense) which select the most interesting proposal.  Such contracts are designed as 
competitive contracts.  The firms  which  have been awarded the contract receive 
subsequent contracts which are designed as noncompetitive ones.  These follow-on 
contracts are very substantial and it is often suggested that contractors can incur losses on 
the initial competitive contracts since they are virtually sure to make higher profits on the 
follow-on contracts.  Therefore, it is useful to question how private R & D responds to 
changes in the volume of  competitive and noncompetitive procurement as well as their R 
&  D and non-R & D orientation.  In his empirical analysis, Lichtenberg reports both 
ordinary least squares and instrumental variable estimates of  total and within regressions. 
He uses the instrumental variables method to take into account specification errors due to 
the omission of time-varying variables.  In his discussion of results, he essentially 
interprets the instrumental variables total estimates because he regards these estimates as 
the most consistent ones.  From the main estimates presented in table 5.11, it appears that 
non-competitive procurement tends to highly crowd out private R & D investment  At the 
stage of follow-up contracts, firms reduce R &  D spending, a behavior particularly 
marked in R & D procurement.  In order to compare the results with previous studies, 
alternative aggregated estimates are reported for total R & D contracts (competitive plus 
169 Table 5.10.  Impact of Government Sales and Federal R  & D on  Private 
R &  D in the United States 
Federal R&D 
Aggregate time series  0.33 
1956-83  (2.45) 
0.11 
(0.60) 
Flllll-level data  0.13 
187 firms  (4.91) 
1979-84  -0.0 
(0.06) 
Note: values between parentheses are t-statistics. 
Source : Lichtenberg (  1987). 
Government sales 
0.05 
(2.09) 
0.07 
(5.98) 
Table 5.11.  The Private R  & D Response  to  Competitive Contracts 
in  the United States 
Ordinary least squares  Instrumental variables 
Variables  Total  Within  Total  Within 
Competitive R & D  -0.05  0.09  0.86  0.17 
(1.29)  (1.87)  (1.01)  (0.08) 
Noncompetitive R & D  0.16  0.01  -2.11  -1.68 
(3.09)  (0.17)  (2.18)  (1.24) 
Competitive non-R & D  0.07  0.12  1.21  1.08 
(2.07)  (6.05)  (3.89)  (1.90) 
Noncompetitive non-R & D  0.04  0.05  -0.07  -0.05 
(4.05)  (6.42)  (0.96)  (0.32) 
Nongovernment sales  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.04 
(33.5)  (20.2)  (3.53)  (2.03) 
R & D contracts  0.04  0.05  -0.48  -0.93 
(1.98)  (2.56)  (2.63)  (2.05) 
Non-R & D contracts  0.05  0.05  0.15  0.13 
.  . '  ...  . ~  (7.09)  (7.92)  (7.14)  (1.94) 
Nongovernment sales  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.04 
(33.4)  (20.4)  (5.73)  (3.04) 
Sample.: 169 companies, 1979-84. 
Specification : private R & D investment 
weighted regressions using the reciprocal of sales. 
Values between parentheses are t-statistics. 
Source : Lichtenberg (1988). 
noncompetitive) and total non-R & D contracts.  The net effect of government R & D 
contracting on private R & D investment turns out to be significantly negative, the 
negative effect of  non-competitive R & D outweighing the positive effect of competitive R 
170 &  D.  In contrast, the net effects of non-R & D contracting is significantly positive, 
which indicates that the positive effect of  competitive non-R & D procurement outweighs 
the negative effect of noncompetitive non-R & D contracts.  As non-R & D procurements 
are largely higher than other forms of procurement, the net effect of procurement as a 
whole is positive and quantitatively important.  Nevertheless, in contrast to previous 
studies and in agreement with his preceding findings, Lichtenberg finds that the net effect 
of R &  D procurement on private R & D is negative.  The important role that the US 
government plays in the allocation of R & D resources is apparently stronger when it acts 
as a purchaser of goods and services than when it directly stimulates private R & D via R 
& D contracting.  Hence, the relationship between government-financed and company-
financed R & Dis more subtle than suggested by global approaches.  The allocation 
process of publicly-funded  R  &  D  and  market  structures heavily  influence  the 
effectiveness of  directly and indirectly publicly-funded R & D programmes. 
5.4. How Effective is  the Public Support to  R  &  D Projects ? 
Another method was used by Meyer-Krahmer (1990) to evaluate the impact of 
public incentives for the R & D and innovation activities of small and medium-sized 
enterprises in Germany over the period 1979-1981.  During the period, aid toR & D 
personnel expenditures was granted by the German government to enterprises "without 
regard to the field of technology concerned, the magnitude of the attendant risks, the 
quality of the work or the prospects of economic success".  The idea is  to make a 
comparison of R & D personnel expenditures between subsidized and unsubsidized 
enterprises before and after the launching of the programme by regression analysis.  He 
considers that the incentives can change either the level of R & D or the R & D intensity 
or both.  If the government support changes the level of R & D, this effect can be 
captured by a dummy variable which has the value 0 before and 1 after the governmental 
action.  The stimulus effect on  R &  D intensity, for its part, can  be picked up by 
measuring how the slope of the relationship between turnover and R & D expenditures 
has changed.  The explanatory variables of the model are turnover and time.  The latter is 
included in order to separate the conjunctural effect from the input of the incentives. 
According to the author, the programme did not change the R & D intensity but it did 
change the R &  D level.  The model was run for different subsamples of enterprises 
grouped according to the branch to which they belonged and R & D intensity and fitted 
better for branches and enterprises with a high R & D intensity than for those with a weak 
R & D intensity.  Although his results give evidence of a positive effect of government 
171 support, he declares the model inappropriate to calculate accurately the additional R & D 
expenditures caused by the government policy due to data heteroscedasticityl. 
Although not based on the econometric approach, Mansfield and Switzer (1984) 
gave some evidence of the complementarity effect of federal support by analyzing 
answers of fmns to a questionnaire.  Their sample covers 25 US fmns investing in 
energy R & D.  For each dollar increase in federal support these finns have, on average, 
increased their own support of  energy R & D by 6 cents in each of the first two years and 
nothing from the third year.  Conversely, for each dollar cut in federal support they 
would reduce their own support by 25 cents in each of  the fll'St two years and of 19 cents 
in the third year.  So, federal support appears to exert asymmetric effects on private R & 
D.  Any reduction has a higher impact on private R & D than any increase.  Moreover, 
these estimates are consistent with the complementarity effect detected by econometric 
studies.  They also tested the relationship between sales, R & D expenditures and federal 
support without success.  Another question tackled by Mansfield and Switzer is to what 
extent finns receive government support for projects they would otherwise have financed 
alone.  To answer this question, they constructed a sample of  41 federally-funded energy 
R & D projects carried out by eleven fmns.  They evaluated that about 20 percent of the 
work would have been carried out with the fum's funds if government support had not 
been available.  In addition, they observe that, on average, about 64 percent of the funds 
allocated to the projects would have been spent on R & D if the projects had not been 
carried out.  A last question considered by the authors is how likely a project supported 
by government is to spin off projects in which the firm invests its own funds2.  This 
topic is investigated by estimating a logit model giving the probability that a government-
financed R & D proj&t results in a spinoff.  The explanatory variables are the originator 
of the project (government or enterprise)  and the degree of separation  between 
government-financed and company-financed R & D.  With the fll'St binary variable, they 
measure to what extent the contribution of the fmn to the formulation of the project is 
likely to create spinoffs because the fmns can so orientate the proposals in a direction that 
suits the commercial objectives of the fmn, which leads the firm to invest its own funds. 
The second binary variable is concerned with the integration or the separation of the 
project into or from the firm's R & D program because the interaction and coupling of 
both financing sources are likely to promote spinoffs.  Their results indicate that the 
probability of a spinoff is about 20 to 30 percent lower if the project does not originate 
within the firm.  On the other hand, the separation of  resources does not seem to impair 
1  By comparing participating and non-participating enterprises, he nevertheless ascertains that 60 per-
cent of  public subsidies was invested in additional R & D expenditure. 
2  See also Switzer (1985). 
172 the likelihood that a government-financed project will lead to spin off of private R & D. 
Finally, they observe that, because of spinoffs, the effect of  government-financed R & D 
on productivity is higher than its direct effect On average, the projects directly contribute 
50 percent of what could have been achieved with the company's own funds.  These 
results are consistent with the econometric studies that have found that federal R & D has 
a relatively weak impact on productivity.  Yet, the federally-financed R & D to a large 
extent generates further R & D into which the fmn invests its own funds.  On a whole, 
government support proves to be more a complement to private R & D than a substitute 
for it. 
A probabilistic approach was also used by Bhanich Supagol (1990) in his analysis 
of a sample of 45 R & D contracts in the area of transportation in Canada.  From a 
contractor survey about these contracts, he observed that the commercial spinoffs were 
greater for unsolicited projects than for government-initiated projects and for contracts 
with property rights vested in the contractors.  A project officer survey gave him a more 
contrasted assessment in that no clear-cut divergence was detected about the spinoffs by 
sources of project and with respect to property rights.  This evidences how different the 
perceptions can be depending on the person in charge who is being surveyed.  A second 
issue examined is the probability of making commercial benefits depending on contract 
and contractor characteristics.  Among the relevant explanatory variables, he introduces 
an initiation indicator (i.e. industry or government), the proportion of government-
fmanced R & D, the squared term of  the proportion of government-financed R & d and a 
government utilization indicator (i.e. contract successfully used by the government or 
not).  He estimates a linear probability model but assumes that the relationship between 
the probability of a spin-off and the proportion of government-financed R & Dis non-
linear.  This is why the uses a squared term variable.  His estimates confirm that the more 
the contractor is engaged in the formulation of the project, the higher the likelihood of 
commercial spinoffs is.  The proportion of  government-financed R & D negatively affects 
the probability of commercial spinoffs.  Yet, the existence of a non-linear relationship 
cannot be excluded.  His explanatory is "that a fmn with significant R & D dealing with 
the government may have established a special unit or facility for managing government 
research and bringing research results to their commercial applications".  About the last 
variable which concerns the government utilization of the contract, it does not provide 
evidence of a possible trade-off between government and commercial benefits.  Among 
the other variables taken into account, the retrocession of property rights to the contractor 
stimulates the private commercial exploitation.  The probability of a spin-off is also all the 
higher if the number of patents granted to the firm is high, if the size of the firm is large 
173 and if the firm is young.  The last result may be explained by a higher incentive in 
younger fmns to pursue commercial spin-offs.  Finally, foreign ownership and the use of 
resources which otherwise would have been idle prove to affect the probability of spin-
offs negatively. 
Seldon ( 1987) suggested an extension of the production function approach to 
measure the rate of return on research investment in terms of consumer and producer 
surpluses.  He rightly underlines that in the traditional production function approach it is  . 
the marginal productivity or the value of the marginal product of  R & D from which the 
value of  the marginal internal rate of  return on R & D is derived but not the internal rate of 
return.  Both are different as the former is represented by the discount rate which equates 
marginal benefits to marginal cost while the latter is the discount rate which equates total 
benefits to total cost.  The measures of the internal rate of  return and of  the marginal rate 
of  return allow to evaluate to what extent government underinvests or overinvests in R & 
D.  Indeed, according to the economic theory, the internal rate of return is maximized 
when it is equal to the marginal internal rate of  return.  It increases when it is inferi~r to 
the latter and decreases in the opposite case. 
His development of the supply function approach is based on the estimation of a 
production function for the industry from which the industry supply function is derived 
by applying the rule of profit maximisation as illustrated in table 5.12.  In the industry 
production function, both private and government R & D efforts are assumed to have 
separated lagged impacts on productivity. So, in this model, both private and government 
R & D effects are considered not to influence the productivity immediately but after a 
gestation period which differs according to the sources of fmancing.  Moreover, these 
effects are not punctual but assumed to decrease geometrically over time.  Assuming 
equilibrium in each period so that the maximum profit is zero, the supply function is 
obtained by substituting the production function into the profit equation, solving the 
profit maximization problem for traditional production factors and replacing the latter in 
the zero profit equation.  An industry demand function is then specified.  On the basis of 
these supply and demand functions, the changes in the producer and consumer surpluses 
due to government R & D spending in any period are measured by keeping all other 
variables at their initial levels and considering the convergence process to the equilibrium 
price.  The economic benefit as a whole is equal to the sum of producer plus consumer 
surplus calculated at their present values.  Subtracting R & D expenditures, the internal 
rate of return in each period is given by the value of the discount rate which equates the 
net economic benefit to zero.  Besides, the marginal rate of  return on government R & D 
expenditures in any period is derived from the estimated production function. 
174 Seldon (1987) and Seldon and Hyde (1991) applied this approach respectively to 
the US softwood plywood and softwood lumber industries for the 1950-1980 period. 
Their results are summarized in table 5.13.  In the softwood plywood supply equation, 
lagged total revenue is used as a proxy for private R & D and government scientists 
employed in these fields of research for government R & D efforts.  The optimal lag 
structure was obtained for a two-year lag on private and public R &  D efforts.  The 
output elasticity for government R & D employment is equal to .191.  The estimated rate 
of return on government R & D expenditures is 499 percent, a higher value than those 
suggested by other studies of agricultural market.  In the second study, private R & D 
efforts are not taken into account and government scientists employed in sofwood lumber 
research are used as the measure of government R & D efforts.  Seldon and Hyde obtain 
an output elaticity for government R & D of .92 in the sofwood lumber industry.  The 
best fit is yielded when government R & D efforts are given a five-year lag.  The internal 
rate of return on government  R  &  D  expenditures  (taking  the  average  cost of 
implementation in.to account) is estimed at 27 percent while the marginal internal rate of 
return amounts to 15 percent.  The lower value of the latter by comparison with the 
former provides evidence that average returns decreased during the period and that, 
therefore, government overinvested in this field of  research. 
Table 5.12. The Measurement of the Return on  Government Financed R  & 
D by  the Supply Function Approach 
1.  Framework 
Production function 
where: 
and 
A =  efficiency parameter 
a  =  rate of disembodied technical change 
, L_=labor 
K =  physical capital 
R =  R & D capital 
1  Given the lagged effects, this elasticity is equal to J.1/ (1 - A.). 
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(1) R =  ;  (G~.  cu.)Ai-io 
i=io  t-1-ko  t-1 
with :  io =  lag on the initial private effect 
ko =  difference between the public and private R & D lags 
A  = lag coefficient net of  depreciation rate 
G = government R & D 
C =  private R & D 
Objective function of  the firm 
where: 
where: 
max  1tt = Pt Qt-Wt 4 -I\  Kt- Ct 
Lt;,Kt 
P =price of the output 
W=wagerate 
R =  user cost of capital 
'Y = fraction of  total revenue spent on private R & D 
2.  Derivation  of demand  and supply  functions 
(2) 
(3) 
Substituting (1) into (2), solving (2) for Land K, substituting (3) for C and solving 
for 1t = 0 gives the supply equation : 
00  •  •  •  • 
-'\ '\ 1-1()  au'l1-1o 
Qt =  B Pt a(a+~) e9t Wfaa Rfap  1t  (l.."'~l\,  G  t:"'- )  (4) 
i=io  t-1  t-1-ko 
where B is a mixed constant term composed of  the coefficients (a,(3,y,8) 
a  =  (1 - a - (3)-1 
Taking the log of (4) and subtracting A* Qt-1, we obtain the_ supply function to be 
estimated: 
qt = (1 -A) b + 8 (9t- A.et-1) +a (a+  (3) <Pt- APt-1> -8a (Wt- AWt-1> 
-a~  (rt- Art-1> + al>Ct-io + a~gt-io-ko + Mlt-1 
176 where small letters represent logarithms of  capitalized letters. 
Similarly, the demand equation is defined as : 
where z is a log-linear function of prices of outputs and costs of inputs to the 
downstream industries so that the components of the  derived demand from  other 
industries are taken into account. 
Given an R & D level of  G in period t, keeping all other variables at their levels at 
time t except output price, the supply and demand system may be written : 
where Q? and 0:, are the level terms of  predetermined variables. 
Calculated on the basis of these equations, the equilibrium price pE is equal to : 
3.  The  internal rate  of return  on  government R  &  D 
The changes in the consumer and producer surpluses due to government R & D in 
period t are respectively equal to : 
177 where  11 =  8 (1 +e) I [e- 8 (a+  ~)] 
The present values of the consumer and producer surpluses at time t due to 
government R & D in period t are respectively approximated as : 
where p =  discount rate. 
Net economic benefit from government R & D in period t is equal to : 
where ~  is the ratio of  the private cost of  implementation of  government-financed R 
& D to government-financed R & D. The internal rate of  return is  de~ned  as the value of 
p which equates the equation NBt to zero. 
4.  Marginal product  and marginal internal rate  of return 
The marginal internal rate of  return of  government-financed R & D in period t upon 
the output in period t+n is calculated by estimating the value of  the marginal product as : 
aQt+n 
VMPt+n =  Pt+n  d Gt  I (1 + p)n (1 + ~)  \::1  n ~  io + ko 
With the Cobb-Douglas specified above, we obtain : 
VMPt+n = J,J.An-io-ko Pt+n Qt+nl Gt (1 + p)n (1 + ~) 
The total value of  the marginal product of  R & D expenditures at time t is given by :· 
178 =  J.L Pt Qtl (1 + p- A.)  (1 + p)io+ko-1 Gt (1 + ~) 
Source: Seldon (1987), Seldon and Hyde (1991) 
Table 5.13.  Applications  of the Supply Function  Approach 
Indus tty  Private  Government 
R&D  R&D 
Softwood plywood  .066  .025 
(3.03)  (1.89) 
Softwood lumber  - .026 
(1.73) 
Note : values between parentheses are t-statistics. 
Source: Seldon (1987) and Seldon and Hyde (1991). 
A.  lmplemen- Internal rate  Marginal 
tation cost  ofretmn  internal rate 
ratio  of  return 
.869  .26  4.99  -
(23.0) 
.972  .09  .27  .15 
(42.46) 
In a recent paper, Leyden and Link ( 1991) have argued that infratechnology is the 
critical link between governmental and private R & D and that the stimulus-response 
effect is a consequence of technical complementarity at the production level between 
funding, infratechnology and knowledge sharing. 
In their model, they assume that the fmn engages in private R & D in order to 
increase its profits and that it receives a governmental R & D allocation to engage in a 
separate government-oriented R & D process. As a result, both R & D processes lead to 
private technological knowledge and governmental technological knowledge respectively 
through separate production functions. Nevertheless, the latter are assumed to share the 
same infratechnology if conducted within the same fmn. Consequently, a proportion of 
private and public funds will be devoted to the production of infratechnology which will 
also depend on spillovers. These spillovers are represented by the level of the firm's 
activity in sharing intellectual activities and the level of R &  D activity of the firm's 
competitors. Then, they consider that the firm maximizes its profits over its own 
contribution to R & D activities and its knowledge sharing effects as decision variables. 
Given that a governmental R & D allocation will increase the level of infratechnology at 
no net cost, a firm will never refuse such a contract because it will increase profits. Then, 
they define a third equation which represents the government's  de~and for infra-
technology. 
179 They test their model on a sample of data covering 137 US R & D laboratories in 
1987. Three equations are simultaneously estimated and bear on the private R & D, the 
governmental R & D and the shared technical knowledge. The exogenous explanatory 
variables of the model are respectively a proxy for the R & D effort of competitors, an 
indicator of the presence of  cooperative sharing agreements, an indicator of the presence 
of basic R & D activity and a dummy variable for enterprises engaged in biological or 
chemical research. The main estimates are summarized in table 5.14. 
Table 5.14.  Infratechnological  Complementarity  of 
Publicly-Funded R  & D 
Shared technical  Government  Cooperative 
Equation  effort  Private R&D  R&D  sharing 
agreement 
Private R&D  3.35  1.99  -5.73 
(2.08)  (2.57)  (2.40) 
Government  -0.72  0.29  8.61 
R&D  (1.35)  (4.31)  (2.15) 
Shared  -0.10  0.32  1.92 
technical  (0.35)  (2.49)  (1.68) 
knowledge 
Source: Leyden and Link (1991). 
The results provide evidence that governmental R & D not only stimulates private R 
&  D but also encourages technological spillovers. Taking into account the feedback 
effects which link the equations, the authors find that a one dollar exogenous increase in 
governmental R & D stimulates a 2.3 dollar increase in private R & D. Furthermore, a 
same increase in governmental R & D impels about 1% increase in the proportion of  time 
spent on sharing technical knowledge. 
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Chapter 6 - Publicly-Funded R  &  D in  a  Competitive 
Environment 
Henri Capron and Olivier Debande 
Since Arrow's major contribution emphasizing the incomplete appropriability of the 
output of R & D activity, it has generally been accepted that public funding in this area 
should correct market failure. Yet, while Arrow underlined that underinvestment in R & 
D was likely, he also pointed out that "from the standpoint of efficiently distributing an 
existing stock of information, the difficulties of  appropriation are an advantage".  Despite 
works undertaken to improve our knowledge of  R & D process on competitive markets, 
economic theory is presently unable to give normative guidance for public policy in the 
field of science and technology, which policy largely remains fuzzy and uncertain about 
the real attainment of  objectives. 
At the roots of public funding, there are strategic issues which motivate government 
action. The strategic issues of the technological race explain why public authorities have 
reinforced their science and technology policy and thoroughly integrated it as a structural 
competitiveness instrument of  economic policy. 
Strategic issues are vital in the design of science and technology policies because 
their main concern is international competitiveness. Furthermore, governments often act 
as strategic oligopolists in the design and the implementation of their policies. Only some 
of these issues, which are presently covered by the theoretical and empirical literature, 
will be discussed hereafter. 
Some important theoretical papers dealing with both technological rivalry between 
firms and public incentive policies promoting R & D investments have been developed in 
recent years.  Therefore, in the present state-of-the-art of the literature about strategic 
issues, what can we learn from  an  approach like game-theoretic models in order to 
implement appropriate R & D policies ? Another issue concerns the design of R & D 
policies, which, among other components, must take into account the specificities of  each 
industry and international trends in R & D activities. Finally, a last issue investigated is 
how advisable modelling strategic issues in policy assessment and impact evaluation is. 
181 6.1.  Technological  Rivalry  and  Public  Incentive  Policies 
As technology has become a competitive weapon, technology policy is increasingly 
being viewed as a strategic activity.  The role of governments in organizing, stimulating 
and funding R & D investment clearly is of the utmost importance in shaping a favorable 
environment and in channeling resources for technological innovation.  Yet, enterprises 
move in dynamic interactive economic surroundings where the decisions taken by public 
authorities influence their allocation of  resources.  So, according to Weiss and Birnbaum 
(1989), a technological strategy is a functional strategy, i.e. "a set of means and errors 
chosen within a specific function within a business unit, which is a part of the overall 
strategy of a business unit". Especially in the technological field, strategies are long-term 
plans, created with a view to achieving general objectives, such as increasing the market 
share in high-technology industry or becoming the leader on the international market for 
specific products. However, the potential objectives and the behaviour differ with the 
type of  firm. For example, larger firms might be thought not to pursue the same objective 
as small or medium-sized firms. Hence, they might have recourse to different instruments 
to achieve their objectives and the efficiency of incentives might be different depending 
on the size of the enterprises!. 
Among the important strategic issues enterprises are faced with technological change 
is a crucial one. Yet, technological change is not a homogeneous process and, therefore, 
may be thought to be linked to different stages of the decision-making process inside the 
enterprise depending on whether research is oriented toward product innovations and 
processinnovations2: 
- product innovation is developing specialized (radical innovation) or improved (incre-
mental innovation) products as part of  establishing or protecting a competitive advan-
tage based on product differentiation and is more demand-oriented. 
- process innovation aims at achieving cost or quality leadership within the product 
markets and may be expected to affect supply. 
1  Acs and Audretsch (1988) provide evidence that innovative activities in the small-and large-flfDls are 
likely to respond to different economic and technological conditions.  In an industry, small-firms tend 
to perform better by using alternative strategies to those adopted by large firms.  Regarding R & D 
policy effectiveness, FOister (1991) observes on the basis of a survey of Swedish firms, that small 
firms are more sensitive to subsidies than large flfDls. 
2  While we agree with Baily and Chakrabarti (1988) that in some cases "since a typical new product is 
just a variant of an old product, the old products do have to compete with new products.  The rapid 
productivity gains that occur for new products also had down the prices of old products and, hence, 
reduce the increase in the industry price index even if it excludes these new products ... New products 
do increase measured productivity, but the increase as now measured is understated relative to a true 
economic measure of productivity", we think that product innovations are driven by the potential 
demand and that they are a major component of actual demand to enterprises. Besides, PfOCe8S innova-
tions mainly affect costs and only indirectly influence demand through price reductions and quality 
improvements. 
182 In order to establish a generic competitive advantage, a fmn endeavours to develop 
capabilities that distinguish it from and cannot be copied by its competitors. It tries to 
implement a strategy that enables it to acquire uniqueness through differentiation and cost 
leadership.  Hence, Lunn (1986) has shown that the determinants of both product and 
process innovations differ and that the latter have a  differentiated impact on  the 
endogenous variables of the firm (such as cash flow, capital intensity, advertising). 
Process innovation aims at reducing cost and,  hence,  may more directly lead  to 
concentration while product innovation may be conducive to product differentiation and 
advertising.  His main results are summarized in table 6.1. 
Table 6.1.  Differentiated Effects  of Firm Variables on  Innovative  Activity 
Concentra- Cash flow  Market size  Capital  Technologi- Advertising 
tion  intensity  cal opportu-
nitv 
PROCESS  .51  1.37  60.51  0.36  21.63  -
(2.23)  (2.30)  (6.76)  (2.18)  (2.62) 
PRODUCT  .43  3.03  89.10  - 94.62  3.55 
(0.86}  (2.50}  (4.66}  (5.33)  (1.69j 
NOTE : Values between parentheses are t statistics. Technological opportunity is captured by a dummy 
variable identifying technologically progressive industries. 
Source : Lunn (1986). 
Yet, to maintain i~s technological advantage, a ftnn must continuously invest in the 
improvements of its products and processes or in the creation of new ones because 
information rapidly leaks out to rivals. On the basis of the analysis of a random sample of 
fmns, Mansfield ( 1985) measured the speed at which a fmn's decision to develop a new 
product or process leaks out to its rivals.  His results help to explain why industrial 
innovations are so rapidly imitated after being introduced.  Indeed, in a preceding study, 
Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner (1981) found that about 60 percent of the patented 
innovations were imitated within four years.  Information about the decision to develop a 
new product or process is known to the rival firms within , on average, one to one and a 
half years after the decision.  Moreover, rival fmns know the nature and operation of a 
new product or process developed by other firms within about a year after development. 
As Mansfield points out, "these results provide new insight into· the problem involved in 
providing proper incentives for innovation in a free-enterprise economy".  Turning then 
to issues of public policy, his results provide evidence of "the magnitude of the 
difficulties faced by ... attempts by the US government to prevent the outflow to other 
countries of  new American technology". 
183 One way often put forward  to  in1prove  technological capabilities is to promote 
cooperation between firms through different research programmes. The debate on the 
potential advantages or disadvantages of R & D cooperation is still largely open and it 
might therefore be useful to recall some of the positive social welfare effects resulting 
from cooperation. Jacquemin (1988) distinguishes between the private and public costs 
or/ and benefits of cooperative R & D and, on the private side, he finds three potential 
benefits to cooperation. 
First, cooperative agreements can be used instead of pure market transactions or 
complete integration into an economic entity. Pure market transactions may, indeed, be 
costly and inefficient principally because, on the one hand, an R & D project requires 
repeated and prolonged interaction between the different partners to exploit or develop 
complementarities, and on the other hand, the market transactions in the R & D field hold 
two main risks, moral hazard and adverse selection.  A merger or a take-over is not 
optimal to achieve an R  &  D  project either. Indeed, an increasing size generates 
diseconomies of scale due to rigidities in the corporate structure. The time-span required 
for the research capabilities, strategies and partners to fit in with each other is too long. 
The second advantage of R & D cooperation is that it accelerates the speed of invention 
and innovation with less risk. Through cooperation, the money required to undertake an 
R & D project can be gathered more rapidly. Moreover, the partners profit from the risk-
spreading advantage (i.e. sharing the benefits and the costs of the project) and the risk-
pooling advantage (i.e. realizing more risky projects). Thirdly, by pooling comple-
mentary resources in R & D, they can benefit by three main advantages: better  conditions 
on borrowed financial capital, sharing the high fixed and sunk costs of technological 
development and the creation of synergetic effects by pooling R & D knowledge from 
firms which may be located on different but connected technological trajectories. 
Yet,  if the  potential  benefits  of R  &  D  cooperation  can  be  important,  the 
implementation of R & D agreements remains a difficult task. In the starting stage of 
cooperation, an important impediment is the selection of  partners. Because of imperfect 
information about the level of technological knowledge of potential partners, the risk of 
strengthening a competitor is real. An other restraint is the definition of a well-balanced 
contribution, i.e. a trade-off between collaboration and independence, which is more 
easily achieved in vertical agreements than in horizontal ones and which will often cause a 
complicated organizational structure to be set up.  In the operational phase, in order to 
fully exploit the benefit of cooperative research, concerted manufacturing development 
and cooperation in the marketing policy have to be implemented, which will riot be 
without causing problems. 
184 Jacquemin's conclusion is that "limiting cooperation to pure R & D or to the so-called 
precompetitive level will then exercise a strong deterrent effect on the emergence of such 
cooperative arrangements". 
This description must be fitted to take into account the characteristics of  each product 
or process. The risk and necessity to cooperate at the competitive level will be different 
depending on the innovation rate of the industry considered. With regard to the public 
cooperative R & D, the problem that needs to be taken into account is whether there is 
market failure or not, i.e. absence or not of  complete appropriability of returns. With or 
without substantial R & D spillovers, the potential benefit for the innovator firm will lead 
to underinvestment compared to the socially optimal amount of  R & D and to pricing R & 
D results at a cost above the marginal cost of dissemination. Cooperative R & D can be 
viewed as a  means of internalizing the externalities created by significant R  &  D 
spillovers and sharing information among firms more efficiently.  Other side-effects are 
generated through partial appropriation,  among which, inefficiently low  levels of 
utilization by other firms, wasteful duplication of research and opportunism as well as 
asymmetric information limiting the effectiveness of  the market for R & D. 
Katz and Ordover (1990) suggest different ways to correct the gap between private 
and public returns to R & D investment and the insufficient sharing of  the fruits of  R & D 
projects, i.e. direct or indirect subsidies to restore incentives, strengthening incentives to 
engage in ex post cooperation and encouraging greater ex ante cooperation.  Table 6.2. 
gives an overview of the advantages and disavantages of these alternative policies.  To 
evaluate the impact of ex ante cooperation versus ex post cooperation, we must take into 
account the induced effect (of the firms forming an R & D coalition) on the consumer 
surplus as well as on the non-member firms' responses to changes in R & D levels. 
Moreover, when evaluating the global positive or negative effect of cooperative 
decision-making on the R & D investment, competitive and technological spillovers are to 
be taken into account. Even with strong intellectual property rights protection, R & D in-
vestment by one firm may affect other fmns through competition in innovative activities 
as well as on the market. Without technological spillovers, cooperative decision-making 
reduces (increases) R & D incentives if the products are substitutes (complements). Yet, 
the intensity of the spillovers is function of the quality of the protection effected by 
intellectual property rights.  When innovators are product-market  competi~ors and 
intellectual property rights are strong (weak), cooperative decision-making tends to 
decrease (increase) R & D investment incentives. 
185 Table 6.2.  Pros and Cons  of Alternative  Policies 
Advantages  Disadvantages 
1)  Direct or indirect subsidies to  restore incentives 
•  effective in markets where technological  •  insufficient dissemination of R & D 
spillovers are high  results not corrected 
•  moral hazard, i.e. the government has 
no perfect information about the cost 
structure of  the fum  ... 
•  require to levy additional taxes 
2)  Strengthening incentives  to  engage  in  ex  post cooperation 
•  incentive to conduct R & D because they 
allow a fum to appropriate the benefits 
of  innovation more fully 
•  better diffusion due to the better infor-
mation control exerted by the innovator 
•  limit the possible spillover and, hence, 
the efficient sharing of R & D 
•  reduction in R & D investtnent incen-
tives for non frrst-generation innovators 
•  risk of  cartel by using licensing contracts 
in a downstream product market 
3)  Encouraging greater ex  ante cooperation 
•  greater amount of  R & D investtnent : 
internalizes the externalities created by 
technological spillovers while continu-
ing the efficient sharing of  information 
•  greater efficiency of  R & D investtnent : 
- more R & D projects are started due to 
costs being shared 
- the effective amount of R & D is 
higher 
- intangible assets are shared, financial 
problems resolved and the unavailabi-
lity of insurance against the failure of 
an R & D investtnent due to moral 
hazard is made up for 
- eliminates wasteful duplication 
•  intense rivalry between the different 
fnms at the competitive stage 
Reaching an agreement at the ex ante level might lead to an increased monopolistic 
power on the product market which can compensate for the gains accruing to consumers 
rather than to the firms,  generating a  lower collective effect of R &  D. Regarding 
international competitiveness, the technology transfers through a cooperative agreement 
may substantially strengthen the foreign partner and diminish the rents accruing to 
domestic firms which are not members of  the coalition. 
An ex post cooperation is possible by concluding a licensing agreement against a fixed 
fee. When strong intellectual property rights exist, ex ante cooperation leads to weaker R 
& D investment incentives. Given that the licenser has the bargaining power, each firm is 
186 motivated to conduct R & D in order to appropriate surplus that might otherwise accrue to 
its rival. The collective R & D investment incentive under ex ante cooperation is lower 
than the individual incentive under ex post cooperation. When the protection afforded by 
secrecy is strong, when spillovers are high, ex post cooperation may be limited. The fact 
that the ex post market power of  firms can exceed their ex ante market power implies that 
e'  ante cooperation can lead to less severe monopolistic pricing distortions in the pricing 
of R & D results. 
Consequently, a potential strategic public policy is to implement cooperation in sectors 
with some specific characteristics. These policies might for instance : 
- meet the need to increase the international competitiveness of  domestic firms; 
- stimulate industries with a high spillover, 
- induce precompetitive research which furthers long-run relationships between firms and 
by-passes the problem of benefit sharing; 
- implement programmes dealing with complementary products. 
The technological positions of  the different countries are not unalterable. The capacity 
to innovate changes over tin1e. Since the Second World War, the US has been the refer-
ence level against which the technological positions of the industrial countries have been 
evaluated. Any technological policy must build upon a check-up of  innovative capabili-
ties, i.e. assessing the present situation and the possible modifications of the "country's 
position" on a potential pe:rformance scale. 
A study by Glismann and Horn (1988) looking at the invention performance of the 
main industrialized countries on the basis of patents granted in the United States shows 
that the heterogenous economic structures  which characterize the  main European 
countries materialize in distinct technological advance rates. 
Their analysis covers the innovation performances in France, Italy, Japan, United 
Kingdom, the former USSR and West Germany, compared with the United States over 
the past twenty years.  Japan has filled the technology gap between itself and the United 
States by using imitation as its strategy.  Today, Japan and the United States are often 
thought to be more successful in producing new  technology than West European 
countries.  Glismann and Horn's analysis provides evidence of the position of the seven 
countries in the technological race.  To assess the innovative activities by country and 
field of  activity, they use the patents granted in the US between 1963 and 1983. 
They consider respectively, 
187 - the relative average invention performance of countries over time calculated as the 
ratio of the number of patents granted to country j in field i to the number of patents 
granted to the United States in field i: 
i 
·  1  n  Patents· 
....J  J  RAlt'! =- l:  · 
J  n t= 1 Patents  1 
us 
- the estimated relative starting position of  country j as measured by coefficient "a" in 
the equation : 
i 
Patentsj 
----=.~-- = a.eb.t 
1 
Patentsus 
- the estimated relative evolution of patent activity of countty j  as measured by 
coefficient "b" in the previous equation. 
They observed that the number of non-US patents represented only 25 percent of the 
number of patents granted to the United States with West-Germany and the United 
Kingdom having a leading position.  On the one hand, non-US patents per year rose six 
percentage points faster than the United States patenting.  On the other hand, Japan, 
West-Germany and the USSR performed significantly better than the United States, 
while France and Italy did only just a little less well.  For its part, the United Kingdom 
revealed a similar profile to that observed for the US.  The US  lost less in high-
technology fields than in average technologies.  Regarding the highest country share of 
patents granted to non-US citizens, West-Germany and Japan had a leading position and 
only Japan in high-technology fields.  They also emphasized a positive correlation 
between the  performance in technological  activities  and the countries' economic 
performance and stressed the reduction of the technological gap between European 
countries and the United States, an adjustment process highly contrasted for each 
European country with West-Germany in a leading position and the development process 
in the United Kingdom matching to the American business cycle.  The heterogeneous 
economic structures among European countries result in distinct rates of technological 
advance. 
An important factor determining the innovative performance and the catching-up pro-
cess is the increase in the level of investment devoted to inventive activities. Another 
major factor is the institutional change. The development of the European Patent Office, 
188 for instance, allows the European firms to develop innovation in a favourable context in 
terms of appropriability conditions. 
The working horizon and the cost constraints are also crucial factors to implement an 
R & D program. Especially to develop technology, long-term investments that need not 
meet very short-term perfonnance criteria have to be made. 
So, Mansfield (1988a) showed that innovation time and innovation cost are central to 
success. Japanese firms tend to develop and commercially introduce new products and 
processes more quickly and cheaply than American fmns. As a consequence, there has 
been a technological depreciation of  American products. Here, it is worth noting that the 
perception of American and Japanese products has been completely inverted in forty 
years' time. This example illustrates how important a technology policy is to preserve and 
improve competitiveness. 
In his examination of the outcome of the technological race between Japan and the US 
on a sample of American and Japanese firms he questions how quickly and economically 
each nation's firms can develop and commercially introduce the new products and 
processes and how essential it is for them to succeed.  He looks at two variables of 
innovation : 
- the innovation time : which is the length of time elapsing from the beginning of 
applied research by the innovator on a new product or process to the date of the new 
product's or process's first commercial introduction; 
- the innovation cost : which is all the costs involved in developing and introducing the 
innovation, including R & D, plant and equipment, and startup costs. 
The Japanese advantage is confined to external technologies (i.e.  technologies 
developed outside the innovating finn).  In internal technology, developed within the 
innovating frrm, there is no significant difference between both countries.  Innovation 
based on external technologies is an imitation process.  The higher commercialization cost 
in the US arises from the inability of American firms to improve significantly on the 
imitated products and to reduce their production costs substantially.  The process of 
resource allocation differs between the US and Japan.  The Japanese firms devote more 
resources in the innovation process to tooling and manufacturing equipment and facilities, 
which include preparation for manufacturing, design, construction, and acquisition of 
manufacturing facilities for the new product, as well as tooling and equipment.  The 
189 American firms spend n1ore money on the manufacturing startup, which is linked to the 
quality problem of their products.  There has been a technological depreciation of the 
American products over time.  The US  has now acquired a  reputation for quality 
problems that compels the US to offer its goods at a lower price than Japanese or German 
manufacturers, for instance. 
A  recent study by van Hulst, Mulder and Soete (1991) emphasizes the narrow 
relationship between a country's technological ability and its export performance.  The 
case of the US is relevant to look at the link between technology and competitiveness.  In 
1970, the US had a lead in technology over other industrial countries, which allowed it to 
maintain a trade surplus in manufactured products in spite of higher unit labor costs in 
most industries than elsewhere.  But suffering from too high a currency and interest rate, 
and above all from an  upgrading of the products provided by Japanese and German 
firms, US firms have lost market share in manufactured goods.  The US advantage in 
technology and quality has eroded a way and the US products have now acquired a 
reputation for quality problems that compels the US to offer its goods at lower prices than 
its rival manufactures.  The American case shows how important it is to conduct a 
technological policy that gives the home finns_the capacity to compete with foreign firms 
and to increase their market shares in sectors with high added value. 
The public policy has to take into account the original characteristics of  each country. 
Moreover it has to be oriented to create new comparative advantages.  According to van 
Hulst and al. (1991), "the degree to innovativeness of  each country in any one particular 
technology is explained through the complex interplay between (i)  science-related 
opportunities, (ii) country-specific and technology-specific institutions which foster/ 
hinder the emergence of new technologies and (iii) the nature and intensity of economic 
stimuli, which  stem from abundance of particular inputs, or, alternatively, critical 
scarcities, specific patterns of  demand as well as levels and changes in relative price". 
In an analysis of the erosion of the American leadership, Nelson ( 1990) argues that it 
will be investments in R & D and in physical and human capital, and perhaps particularly 
the latter and not so much organizational differences, that will determine the classification 
of  countries regarding technological and economic levels.  According to him, "technology 
is only a public good for those who have made the investments to be able to tap in ... it is 
differences in these that largely explain why Japan has done so well and the US recently 
relatively poorly  ... it is these  latter investments  (investments in new plant and 
equipment, and in worker skills) that will largely determine who is in the best position to 
develop and exploit technological developments, and relative national living standards". 
190 In a recent study, Dornbusch, Krugman and al. (1990) emphasized the important gap 
between the US and Japan.  While education expenditures are slightly weaker in Japan 
than in the US, studying hours, the study of mathematics and foreign languages and the 
number of students in technological fields are higher in Japan than in the US.  These 
differences may point to inadequacy of the American educational system to train enough 
human capital able to improve and develop the know-how and the technical knowledge 
which high-tech industries need. 
6.2.  Models of R  &  D Strategy 
Game-theoretic models are more and more used to describe the competitive process. 
However, a restriction to the use of this type of model is the great variability of results 
depending on the initial assumptions made. Indeed, depending on the assumptions of the 
model, the conclusions can substantially differ. Reinganum (1984) showed how sensitive 
the result is to the selected assumptions by studying the model of Loury ( 1979) and Lee 
and Wilde ( 1980). These models use a process of stochastic invention in  which the 
probability of success by firm i at the given time t is an exponential function. They only 
differ in the specification of costs, i.e. Loury uses lump-sum R & D expenditure (fixed 
cost) whereas Lee and Wilde use a flow cost of R & D expenditure. On the basis of these 
alternative hypotheses, they obtain the opposite results summarized in table 6.3. So, the 
predictive power of a game-theoretic model is strongly limited by the assumption at the 
basis of the model. 
Table 6.3.  Compared  Results  of two  Game-Theoretic  Models 
Loury (1979)  Lee and Wilde ( 1980) 
1  . The amount invested by an individual  1  . The rate of investment by an individual 
fmn decreases with the number of  firm increases with the number of  firms 
firms engaged in R & D; however,  engaging in R & D; a fortiori, the ag-
aggregate industry investment increases  gregate industry investment rate in-
with the number of firms.  creases with the number of firms. 
2. In a Nash equilibrium with unrestricted  2. In a Nash equilibrium with unrestricted 
entry, there will be excess capacity in  entry, there will be no excess capacity 
the R & D technology.  in the R & D technology. 
3. At equilibrium, an increase in aggregate  3. At equilibrium, an increase in aggregate 
rival investment results in a decrease in  rival investment rate results in an in-
investment by a single fmn.  crease in the rate of investment by a 
single firm. 
191 Table 6.4.  gives a  general overview of the main theoretical models of R  &  D 
competition developed in the literature, which can be viewed as significant benchmarks of 
this research field.  Complementarily to this general description of models, one may add 
the following comments : 
1. Symmetric models give an appreciation of  the extent to which rivalry and appropri-
ability interact to determine the incentives for individual fmn investment in R & D.  The 
main issues investigated are : what is the aggregate noncooperative investment in R & D 
and how it is distributed across firms and across time ?  How many firms enter the race 
and what is the resulting equilibrium date of innovation ?  The extent of appropriability 
will guide the investment decision of  fmns under entry.  Finn will overinvest compared 
to the cooperative optimum if rewards to innovation are appropriable and conversely 
[Reinganum (1989)]. 
2. Asymmetric models are developed by referring to the auction and stochastic racing 
paradigms.  The choice of paradigm proves to be important because the associated 
models are found to give opposite results.  Under uncertainty, a firm with a large market 
will invest at a lower rate than a potential entrant for an innovation promising the winner a 
large market and conversely under a determinist scheme.  As innovative activity may take 
more or less time and money than expected and might not yield a worthwhile end-
product, the stochastic racing model seems more accurate while the auction model may 
well  be preferred for the  analysis of the development phase as  any  substantial 
technological uncertainties have already been resolved [Reinganum (1989)]. 
3. These models provide evidence of the existence of market failures, and hence 
justify public intervention. Yet, they remain relatively silent on how government policy 
may act to reduce market failures. When government action is taken into account in these 
models, their counterfactual settings limit the practical range of  results. Therefore, so far 
they have not been able to guide an efficient R & D policy. For example, the next two 
questions remain largely open : Where are the most prominent sources of market failure 
in R & D ? How efficient is a public policy encouraging research joint ventures to correct 
market failures ? 
One difficulty, stressed by Cohen and Levin ( 1989), in testing the implications of 
game-theoretic models of  R & D rivalry is that they analyze behaviors in highly simplified 
models, omitting important aspects of industrial competition. Moreover, the utilization of 
game-theoretic tools implies that we must use unverifiable assumptions concerning the 
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d
e
p
e
n
d
s
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
s
u
i
t
 
i
n
 
a
 
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
R
&
D
 
e
f
f
o
r
t
 
o
f
 
f
i
n
n
s
 
(
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
-
s
e
t
t
i
n
g
 
C
o
u
r
n
o
t
 
p
l
a
y
e
r
s
 
i
n
 
o
f
 
e
a
c
h
 
f
m
n
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
f
f
o
r
t
.
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
)
 
a
n
d
 
l
o
s
e
r
s
 
m
a
y
 
r
e
a
p
 
p
o
s
i
-
2
)
 
I
n
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
m
a
y
 
b
e
 
u
n
d
e
r
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
t
i
v
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
s
t
-
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
.
 
w
i
t
h
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
o
p
t
i
m
u
m
.
 
3
)
 
B
e
f
o
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
f
m
n
s
 
m
a
y
 
m
a
k
e
 
3
)
 
L
e
e
 
a
n
d
 
W
i
l
d
e
'
s
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
 
s
t
i
l
l
 
h
o
l
d
s
 
w
h
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
p
o
s
t
-
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
w
i
n
n
e
r
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
.
 
a
s
 
w
e
l
l
 
a
s
 
t
h
o
s
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
l
o
s
e
r
s
 
d
o
 
n
o
t
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
f
m
n
s
.
 
4
)
 
R
e
i
n
g
a
n
u
m
 
(
1
9
8
2
)
 
1
)
 
F
l
o
w
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
l
i
k
e
l
i
-
1
)
 
I
n
 
t
h
e
 
n
o
-
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
 
c
a
s
e
,
 
t
h
e
 
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
 
h
o
o
d
 
o
f
 
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
 
a
c
c
u
m
u
l
a
-
o
f
 
a
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
 
i
s
 
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
a
c
c
u
-
t
i
o
n
.
 
m
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
.
 
2
)
 
F
i
n
n
s
 
m
a
y
 
a
d
j
u
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
i
n
 
2
)
 
F
o
r
 
P
L
 
>
 
P
f
,
 
a
n
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
P
L
 
s
t
i
m
u
l
a
t
e
s
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
t
o
 
e
l
a
p
s
e
d
 
t
i
m
e
 
a
n
d
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
e
a
c
h
 
f
i
n
n
 
t
o
 
a
c
q
u
i
r
e
 
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
 
a
t
 
a
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
r
a
t
e
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
s
u
m
m
a
r
i
z
e
 
r
i
v
a
l
 
p
r
o
g
r
e
s
s
.
 
w
h
i
l
e
 
a
n
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
P
F
 
c
a
u
s
e
s
 
e
a
c
h
 
f
m
n
 
t
o
 
r
e
-
3
)
 
I
m
p
e
r
f
e
c
t
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
.
 
d
u
c
e
 
i
t
s
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
 
a
c
q
u
i
s
i
-
4
)
 
L
e
a
l
e
r
'
s
 
o
r
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
o
r
'
s
 
p
a
y
o
f
f
 
(
P
I
)
 
~
 
f
o
l
-
t
i
o
n
.
 
l
o
w
e
r
'
s
 
o
r
 
i
m
i
t
a
t
o
r
'
s
 
p
a
y
o
f
f
 
{
P
J
:
)
.
 
3
)
 
F
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
c
a
s
e
 
o
f
 
p
e
r
f
e
c
t
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
,
 
a
n
 
5
)
 
F
i
n
i
t
e
 
p
l
a
n
n
i
n
g
 
h
o
r
i
z
o
n
.
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
n
 
(
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
f
m
n
s
)
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
6
)
 
T
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
 
i
s
 
n
o
t
 
c
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
 
o
v
e
r
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
f
m
n
 
a
n
d
 
t
i
m
e
 
a
n
d
 
m
a
y
 
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
o
r
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
f
 
a
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
t
i
m
e
 
t
i
l
l
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
F
o
r
 
u
s
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
d
i
s
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
.
 
t
h
e
 
c
a
s
e
 
o
f
 
i
m
p
e
r
f
e
c
t
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
,
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
-
7
)
 
T
h
e
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
s
 
s
u
i
t
 
i
s
 
a
m
b
i
g
u
o
u
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
o
n
l
y
 
o
n
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
.
 
p
a
y
o
f
f
s
 
t
o
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
o
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
i
m
i
t
a
t
o
r
s
.
 
8
)
 
U
s
e
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
c
e
p
t
 
o
f
 
N
a
s
h
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
a
 
i
n
 
f
e
e
d
-
b
a
c
k
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
e
s
.
 
5
)
 
R
e
i
n
g
a
n
u
m
 
(
1
9
8
1
)
 
1
)
 
C
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
m
o
n
g
 
f
m
n
s
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
c
o
o
r
d
i
-
1
)
 
N
o
n
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
r
i
v
a
l
s
 
w
i
l
l
 
(
o
n
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
)
 
s
u
e
-
1
)
 
c
r
.
 
L
o
u
r
y
 
1
)
.
 
n
a
t
i
n
g
 
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
o
f
 
c
e
e
d
 
s
o
o
n
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
f
m
n
s
 
w
h
o
 
a
r
e
 
2
)
 
A
p
p
r
o
p
r
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
i
s
 
t
a
k
e
n
 
i
n
t
o
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
b
y
 
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
.
 
u
n
a
b
l
e
 
t
o
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
.
 
m
o
d
u
l
a
t
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
-
2
)
 
S
p
i
l
l
o
v
e
r
s
 
i
n
 
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
 
a
r
e
 
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
.
 
2
)
 
A
s
s
u
m
i
n
g
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
.
 
P
a
t
e
n
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
n
o
t
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
s
t
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
p
r
o
-
3
)
 
T
h
e
r
e
 
i
s
 
a
c
t
u
a
l
l
y
 
n
o
 
d
u
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
e
x
c
e
e
d
s
 
h
a
l
f
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
,
 
t
h
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
n
o
n
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
-
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
 
o
f
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
 
4
)
 
A
l
l
 
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
 
i
s
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
a
b
l
e
.
 
t
i
v
e
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
 
a
c
q
u
i
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
l
e
s
s
 
t
h
a
n
 
i
s
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
m
o
r
e
 
p
o
w
e
r
f
u
l
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
f
l
u
e
n
c
e
 
t
h
e
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
l
y
 
o
p
t
i
m
a
l
.
 
I
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
l
l
 
o
n
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
b
e
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
u
r
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
.
 
d
e
l
a
y
e
d
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
l
y
 
o
p
t
i
m
a
l
 
d
a
t
e
.
 
3
)
 
N
o
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
I
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
b
y
 
N
a
s
h
 
r
i
v
a
l
s
 
w
i
l
l
 
o
n
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
o
c
c
u
r
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
l
a
t
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
d
a
t
e
.
 
4
)
 
c
r
.
 
L
o
u
r
y
 
4
)
.
 6
)
 
S
p
e
n
c
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
B
r
a
n
<
b
'
 
1
)
 
T
w
o
-
s
t
a
g
e
 
g
a
m
e
 
(
R
&
D
 
a
n
d
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
)
 
p
l
a
y
e
d
 
1
)
 
O
v
e
r
u
s
e
 
o
f
 
R
&
D
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
a
b
s
e
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
-
1
)
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
s
y
m
m
e
t
r
i
c
.
 
(
1
9
8
3
)
 
b
y
 
t
w
o
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
n
g
 
f
i
r
m
s
,
 
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
m
e
n
t
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
.
 
2
)
 
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
v
a
l
u
a
b
l
e
 
f
o
r
 
a
n
y
 
k
i
n
d
 
o
f
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
-
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
 
2
)
 
W
i
t
h
 
a
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
 
t
o
 
s
u
b
-
m
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
n
o
t
 
o
n
l
y
 
R
&
D
.
 
T
h
e
 
m
a
j
o
r
 
i
n
s
i
g
h
t
s
 
2
)
 
I
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
a
l
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
p
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
s
i
d
i
z
e
 
R
&
D
,
 
t
h
e
 
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
 
i
s
 
e
q
u
i
v
a
l
e
n
t
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
c
a
n
 
b
e
 
o
b
t
a
i
n
e
d
 
b
y
 
a
n
y
 
s
u
b
s
i
d
y
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
a
i
m
e
d
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
t
e
x
t
 
o
f
 
a
n
 
i
m
p
e
r
f
e
c
t
l
y
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
 
o
n
e
 
o
b
t
a
i
n
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
a
d
e
r
-
f
o
l
l
o
w
e
r
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
r
e
d
u
c
i
n
g
 
c
o
s
t
s
.
 
w
o
r
l
d
 
c
a
s
e
.
 
3
)
 
T
h
e
 
C
o
u
m
o
t
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
i
m
p
l
i
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
 
s
u
b
s
i
d
y
 
3
)
 
R
&
D
 
i
s
 
u
n
d
e
r
t
a
k
e
n
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
e
d
 
3
)
 
W
h
e
n
 
b
o
t
h
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
 
t
o
 
s
u
b
-
i
s
 
a
l
w
a
y
s
 
w
o
r
t
h
w
h
i
l
e
 
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
 
i
t
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
i
s
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
a
n
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
s
i
d
i
z
e
 
R
&
D
,
 
t
h
e
y
 
d
o
 
i
t
.
 
d
e
m
a
n
d
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
f
i
r
m
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
u
s
 
i
t
s
 
p
r
o
-
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
f
 
R
&
D
 
o
n
 
h
o
w
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
 
c
a
n
 
b
e
 
4
)
 
I
f
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
c
a
n
 
s
u
b
s
i
d
i
z
e
 
b
o
t
h
 
e
x
p
o
r
t
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
t
s
.
 
w
o
n
.
 
R
&
D
,
 
i
t
 
w
i
l
l
 
h
a
v
e
 
a
n
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
t
o
 
t
a
x
 
R
&
D
 
4
)
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
s
 
t
a
k
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
(
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
o
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
)
 
a
n
d
 
t
o
 
s
u
b
s
i
d
i
z
e
 
e
x
p
o
r
t
 
f
o
r
m
s
 
:
 
R
&
D
 
s
u
b
s
i
d
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
/
o
r
 
e
x
p
o
r
t
 
s
u
b
-
(
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
)
.
 
s
i
d
i
e
s
.
 
5
)
 
A
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
c
a
n
 
c
r
e
d
i
b
l
y
 
c
o
m
m
i
t
 
i
t
s
e
l
f
 
t
o
 
R
&
D
 
(
o
r
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
)
 
s
u
b
s
i
d
i
e
s
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
R
&
D
 
d
e
-
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
m
a
d
e
 
b
y
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
f
i
r
m
s
.
 
6
)
 
O
u
t
P
u
t
s
 
o
f
 
e
a
c
h
 
f
i
r
m
 
a
r
e
 
s
u
b
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
s
.
 
7
)
 
D
i
x
i
t
 
(
 
1
9
8
8
)
 
1
)
 
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
u
m
 
o
f
 
f
m
n
s
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
R
&
D
 
1
)
 
T
h
e
 
o
p
t
i
m
a
l
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
i
s
 
t
o
 
a
l
t
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
a
p
p
r
o
p
r
i
-
1
)
 
C
f
.
 
L
e
e
 
a
n
d
 
W
i
l
d
e
.
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
.
 
a
b
l
e
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
w
i
n
n
i
n
g
 
f
m
n
 
b
y
 
m
e
a
n
s
 
o
f
 
a
n
 
2
)
 
P
a
r
t
i
a
l
 
p
r
o
g
r
e
s
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
R
&
D
 
r
a
c
e
 
n
o
t
 
c
o
n
-
2
)
 
A
 
l
u
m
p
-
s
u
m
 
c
o
s
t
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
o
u
t
s
e
t
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
a
w
a
r
d
 
(
t
a
x
)
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
i
s
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
i
n
g
 
i
n
s
u
f
f
i
-
s
i
d
e
r
e
d
.
 
f
l
o
w
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
R
&
D
 
r
a
c
e
.
 
c
i
e
n
t
 
(
e
x
c
e
s
s
i
v
e
)
 
R
&
D
 
e
f
f
o
r
t
 
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
3
)
 
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
u
m
 
o
f
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
i
n
 
a
 
s
y
m
m
e
t
r
i
c
 
w
o
r
l
d
.
 
3
)
 
S
u
c
c
e
s
s
 
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
a
c
r
o
s
s
 
f
m
n
s
.
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
.
 
~
 
4
)
 
r
m
n
'
s
 
h
a
z
a
r
d
 
r
a
t
e
 
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
t
i
m
e
 
a
n
d
 
o
f
 
2
)
 
T
h
e
 
l
a
r
g
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
f
m
n
,
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
r
e
 
i
t
 
w
i
l
l
 
i
n
t
e
r
-
R
&
D
 
f
l
o
w
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
.
 
n
a
l
i
z
e
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
(
i
.
e
.
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
5
)
 
N
o
 
n
e
w
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
c
e
.
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
l
e
a
d
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
a
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
l
y
 
e
x
c
e
s
-
6
)
 
S
u
c
c
e
s
s
 
p
u
t
s
 
a
n
 
e
n
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
.
 
s
i
v
e
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
 
o
f
 
R
&
D
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
)
.
 2
)
 
I
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
t
e
x
t
 
o
f
 
a
s
y
m
m
e
t
r
i
c
 
m
o
d
e
l
s
 
a
)
 
T
h
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
a
m
o
n
g
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
d
i
d
 
n
o
t
 
c
o
n
f
e
r
 
a
n
 
e
x
 
a
n
t
e
 
a
d
v
a
n
t
a
g
e
 
u
p
o
n
 
a
n
y
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r
 
f
i
r
m
.
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
s
 
8
)
 
R
e
i
n
g
a
n
u
m
 
(
1
9
8
5
)
 
9
)
 
V
i
c
k
e
r
s
 
(
1
9
8
4
)
 
A
s
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
s
 
1
)
 
E
a
c
h
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
d
r
a
s
t
i
c
 
i
.
e
.
 
o
n
e
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
l
e
a
v
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
v
e
n
t
o
r
 
a
 
m
o
n
o
p
o
l
i
s
t
.
 
2
)
 
A
n
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
 
m
o
n
o
p
o
l
i
s
t
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
(
n
 
-
1
)
 
i
d
e
n
t
i
c
a
l
 
c
h
a
l
l
e
n
g
e
r
s
 
f
o
r
 
a
 
n
e
w
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
3
)
 
F
'
m
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
s
y
m
m
e
t
r
i
c
 
i
n
 
a
l
l
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
s
 
i
.
e
.
 
t
h
e
y
 
f
a
c
e
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
.
 
4
)
 
T
h
e
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
c
o
n
c
e
p
t
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
b
g
a
m
e
 
p
e
r
-
f
e
c
t
 
N
a
s
h
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
.
 
5
)
 
T
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
w
i
n
n
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
r
a
c
e
 
i
s
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
l
o
s
i
n
g
 
i
t
 
(
t
r
u
e
 
b
y
 
i
n
-
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
)
.
 
6
)
 
T
h
e
r
e
 
a
l
w
a
y
s
 
e
x
i
s
t
s
 
a
n
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
f
o
r
 
a
 
c
h
a
l
l
e
n
g
e
r
 
f
o
r
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
g
r
o
s
s
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
s
 
e
x
c
e
e
d
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
l
o
s
i
n
g
 
i
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
l
y
.
 
1
)
 
A
 
s
e
q
u
e
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
n
o
t
-
s
o
-
d
r
a
s
t
i
c
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
s
 
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
e
d
 
s
o
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
f
l
o
w
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
t
w
o
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
t
y
p
i
c
a
l
l
y
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
 
u
p
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
 
o
f
 
t
e
c
h
-
n
o
l
o
g
y
.
 
2
)
 
T
h
e
 
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
i
c
a
l
 
r
a
c
e
 
t
a
k
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
r
m
 
o
f
 
a
 
s
i
m
p
l
e
 
a
u
c
t
i
o
n
.
 
3
)
 
F
i
r
m
s
 
a
r
e
 
a
s
s
u
m
e
d
 
n
o
t
 
t
o
 
d
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
 
t
h
e
 
f
u
t
u
r
e
.
 
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
1
)
 
T
h
e
 
N
a
s
h
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
s
t
a
g
e
 
i
s
 
s
y
m
m
e
t
r
i
c
 
a
m
o
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
c
h
a
l
l
e
n
g
e
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
-
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
s
 
l
e
s
s
 
t
h
a
n
 
e
a
c
h
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
c
h
a
l
l
e
n
g
e
r
.
 
T
h
e
 
l
a
t
t
e
r
 
c
o
n
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
 
g
i
v
e
s
 
r
i
s
e
 
t
o
 
a
 
t
u
r
n
o
v
e
r
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
i
c
a
l
 
l
e
a
d
e
r
s
h
i
p
 
s
i
m
i
l
a
r
 
t
o
 
S
e
b
u
m
-
p
e
t
e
r
'
s
 
"
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
 
o
f
 
c
r
e
a
t
i
v
e
 
d
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
"
.
 
2
)
 
E
a
c
h
 
f
m
n
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
s
t
a
g
e
 
r
a
t
h
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
a
 
c
h
a
l
l
e
n
g
e
r
.
 
W
h
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
i
s
 
v
e
r
y
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
,
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
i
s
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
 
d
o
m
i
n
a
n
c
e
;
 
i
n
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
c
a
s
e
s
,
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
i
s
 
a
 
r
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
.
 
R
e
m
a
r
k
s
 
1
)
 
I
n
 
t
h
i
s
 
m
o
d
e
l
,
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
n
o
p
o
l
i
s
t
 
h
a
s
 
n
o
 
a
d
v
a
n
-
t
a
g
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
i
c
a
l
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
.
 
I
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
-
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
 
h
a
s
 
s
o
m
e
 
c
o
s
t
 
a
d
v
a
n
t
a
g
e
,
 
i
t
 
m
a
y
 
h
a
v
e
 
a
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
t
o
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
 
i
n
 
R
&
D
 
t
o
 
a
v
o
i
d
 
e
n
t
r
y
.
 
2
)
 
T
h
e
 
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
a
p
p
r
o
p
r
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
i
s
 
r
e
s
o
l
v
e
d
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
t
h
e
 
n
o
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
d
r
a
s
t
i
c
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
3
)
 
T
h
e
r
e
 
i
s
 
n
o
 
s
p
i
l
l
o
v
e
r
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
a
n
d
 
n
o
 
l
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
4
)
 
S
i
n
c
e
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
d
r
a
s
t
i
c
,
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
i
n
c
e
n
-
t
i
v
e
 
o
n
l
y
 
i
n
t
e
r
f
e
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
c
h
a
l
l
e
n
g
e
r
 
h
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
g
r
e
a
t
e
s
t
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
t
o
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
e
.
 
N
e
i
t
h
e
r
 
s
p
i
l
l
o
v
e
r
s
 
n
o
r
 
l
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
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-
-
-
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-b
)
 
T
h
e
 
n
a
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
a
s
y
m
m
e
t
r
y
 
c
o
n
f
e
r
s
 
a
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
a
d
v
a
n
t
a
g
e
 
u
p
o
n
 
o
n
e
 
f
i
r
m
.
 
1
 
0
)
 
F
u
d
e
n
b
e
r
g
 
a
n
d
 
a
l
.
 
1
)
 
B
o
t
h
 
f
r
r
m
s
 
a
r
e
 
s
u
f
f
e
r
i
n
g
 
f
r
o
m
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
1
)
 
T
h
e
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
 
i
s
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
g
 
i
n
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
1
)
 
R
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
r
r
m
'
s
 
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
t
o
 
v
a
r
y
 
i
t
s
 
(
1
9
8
3
)
 
a
n
d
/
o
r
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
l
a
g
s
 
r
e
g
a
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
o
f
 
a
c
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
e
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
J
.
t
m
s
.
 
I
f
 
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
.
 
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
r
i
v
a
l
s
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
f
e
a
t
u
r
e
 
a
l
l
o
w
s
 
t
h
e
y
 
a
r
e
 
s
u
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
l
y
 
c
l
o
s
e
 
e
a
c
h
 
o
t
h
e
r
,
 
t
h
e
y
 
2
)
 
T
h
e
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
 
c
r
u
c
i
a
l
l
y
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
s
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
f
r
r
m
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
r
e
 
o
n
l
y
 
s
l
i
g
h
t
l
y
 
b
e
h
i
n
d
 
t
o
 
c
a
t
c
h
 
u
p
 
c
h
o
o
s
e
 
a
 
h
i
g
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
t
o
 
t
r
y
 
t
o
 
w
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
-
l
a
g
 
i
n
 
e
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
.
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
a
d
i
n
g
 
f
i
r
m
 
c
a
n
 
a
c
t
 
t
o
 
p
r
e
v
e
n
t
 
i
t
.
 
g
i
c
a
l
 
r
a
c
e
.
 
I
n
 
t
h
e
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
c
a
s
e
,
 
i
t
 
d
r
o
p
s
 
o
u
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
2
)
 
I
n
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
 
o
c
c
w
s
 
a
s
 
s
o
o
n
 
a
s
 
o
n
e
 
f
r
r
m
 
h
a
s
 
a
c
-
r
a
c
e
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
m
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
f
r
r
m
 
c
h
o
o
s
e
s
 
a
 
l
o
w
e
r
 
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
e
n
o
u
g
h
 
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
 
(
t
o
t
a
l
 
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
r
a
t
e
.
 
a
n
d
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
)
.
 
2
)
 
A
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
o
f
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
l
a
g
 
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
,
 
3
)
 
V
a
r
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
l
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
g
 
i
n
 
e
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
 
f
o
r
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
e
r
 
o
f
 
l
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
 
a
r
e
 
s
t
r
i
c
t
l
y
 
c
o
n
v
e
x
.
 
s
t
i
l
l
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
e
s
 
a
l
s
o
 
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
.
 
4
)
 
W
i
t
h
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
,
 
e
a
c
h
 
f
i
r
m
 
m
u
s
t
 
c
h
o
o
s
e
 
i
t
s
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
 
a
c
q
u
i
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
-
o
u
t
 
k
n
o
w
i
n
g
 
i
t
s
 
r
i
v
a
l
'
s
 
c
h
o
i
c
e
.
 
5
)
 
B
o
t
h
 
p
l
a
y
e
r
s
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
 
e
q
u
a
l
l
y
 
a
n
d
 
f
a
c
e
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
c
o
s
t
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
1
1
)
 
H
a
r
r
i
s
 
a
n
d
 
V
i
c
k
e
r
s
 
1
)
 
T
h
e
 
t
w
o
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
m
o
v
e
 
a
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
l
y
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
I
f
 
o
n
e
 
p
l
a
y
e
r
 
i
s
 
f
a
r
 
e
n
o
u
g
h
 
a
h
e
a
d
,
 
t
h
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
1
)
 
T
h
i
s
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
i
s
 
a
 
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
i
s
t
i
c
 
r
a
c
e
 
i
n
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
(
1
9
8
5
)
 
f
J
t
S
t
 
f
m
n
 
t
o
 
r
e
a
c
h
 
a
 
g
o
a
l
,
 
w
i
n
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
i
z
e
.
 
g
i
v
e
s
 
u
p
.
 
T
h
e
 
n
o
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
s
 
t
o
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
i
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
z
e
d
 
b
y
 
a
l
l
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
b
u
t
 
2
)
 
P
r
o
g
r
e
s
s
 
i
s
 
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
e
d
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
.
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
p
l
a
c
e
d
 
o
n
 
w
i
n
n
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
o
n
e
 
e
x
i
t
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
r
i
g
h
t
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
o
u
t
s
e
t
.
 
3
)
 
T
h
e
 
n
o
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
i
s
 
s
u
b
g
a
m
e
 
p
e
r
-
a
c
h
i
e
v
i
n
g
 
a
 
w
i
n
.
 
A
 
d
i
s
t
i
n
c
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
e
d
 
b
e
t
-
T
h
e
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
 
i
s
 
a
 
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
f
e
e
t
 
N
a
s
h
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
.
 
w
e
e
n
 
s
a
f
e
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
t
r
i
g
g
e
r
 
z
o
n
e
s
.
 
I
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
c
a
s
e
,
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
,
 
i
n
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
o
f
 
a
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
u
n
i
t
s
 
o
f
 
4
)
 
F
i
r
m
s
 
p
l
a
c
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
w
a
r
d
 
t
h
e
 
w
i
n
n
e
r
 
i
s
 
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
o
c
e
e
d
s
 
a
s
 
t
h
o
u
g
h
 
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
e
a
c
h
 
f
r
r
m
 
i
s
 
f
a
c
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
.
 
a
n
d
 
f
a
c
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
c
o
s
t
 
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
n
o
 
r
i
v
a
l
 
e
x
i
s
t
e
d
,
 
t
h
i
s
 
r
i
v
a
l
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
i
n
g
 
n
o
t
h
i
n
g
.
 
I
n
 
2
)
 
T
h
e
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
a
d
v
a
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
e
a
c
h
 
p
l
a
y
e
r
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
t
r
i
g
g
e
r
 
z
o
n
e
,
 
t
h
e
 
f
m
n
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
i
s
 
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
 
t
o
 
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
,
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
m
a
k
e
 
t
h
e
 
f
t
r
S
t
 
m
o
v
e
 
j
u
m
p
s
 
i
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
l
y
 
t
o
 
i
t
s
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
,
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
o
f
 
s
a
f
e
t
y
 
z
o
n
e
.
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
 
R
&
D
 
a
n
d
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
 
o
f
 
a
c
q
u
i
r
e
d
 
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
.
 
3
)
 
T
h
e
r
e
 
i
s
 
a
 
p
l
a
c
e
 
f
o
r
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
m
a
y
 
s
p
e
e
d
 
u
p
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
-
e
m
p
t
i
o
n
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
.
 1
2
)
 
G
r
o
s
s
m
a
n
 
a
n
d
 
S
h
a
p
i
r
o
 
1
)
 
E
x
t
e
n
s
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
r
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
L
e
e
 
a
n
d
 
1
)
 
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
m
o
s
t
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
e
 
w
h
e
n
 
b
o
t
h
 
1
)
 
C
f
.
 
L
e
e
 
a
n
d
 
W
i
l
d
e
 
2
)
.
 
(
1
9
8
7
)
 
W
i
l
d
e
 
(
1
9
8
0
)
.
 
f
u
m
s
 
a
r
e
 
e
v
e
n
 
a
n
d
 
e
a
c
h
 
h
a
s
 
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
d
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
i
-
2
)
 
N
o
 
s
p
i
l
l
o
v
e
r
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
e
x
i
s
t
e
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
t
w
o
 
2
)
 
A
 
f
i
r
m
 
w
i
n
s
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
c
e
 
w
h
e
n
 
i
t
 
h
a
s
 
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
d
 
t
i
a
l
 
p
h
a
s
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
L
 
s
t
a
g
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
a
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
e
r
 
t
o
 
c
a
t
c
h
 
u
p
 
t
h
e
 
t
w
o
 
e
q
u
a
l
l
y
 
d
i
f
f
i
c
u
l
t
 
p
h
a
s
e
s
 
o
f
 
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
a
n
d
 
2
)
 
W
h
e
n
 
a
 
l
a
g
g
i
n
g
 
f
u
m
 
d
r
a
w
s
 
e
v
e
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
 
r
i
v
a
l
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
a
d
e
r
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
a
l
l
o
w
 
t
o
 
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
e
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
L
 
t
h
a
t
 
w
a
s
 
f
o
r
m
e
r
l
y
 
a
h
e
a
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
c
e
,
 
b
o
t
h
 
f
u
m
s
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
 
3
)
 
F
u
l
l
 
i
n
f
o
n
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
R
&
D
 
e
f
f
o
r
t
s
.
 
r
i
v
a
l
s
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
i
c
a
l
 
r
a
c
e
.
 
3
)
 
W
h
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
w
o
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
a
r
e
 
a
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
s
t
a
g
e
s
 
i
n
 
4
)
 
F
o
u
r
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
 
a
r
e
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
e
d
 
r
e
g
a
r
d
-
t
h
e
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
o
n
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
i
s
 
a
h
e
a
d
 
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
e
a
c
h
 
f
u
m
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
-
h
a
s
 
a
 
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
t
o
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
 
i
n
 
R
&
D
 
t
h
a
n
 
g
i
c
a
l
r
a
c
e
.
 
t
h
e
 
o
n
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
i
s
 
b
e
h
i
n
d
.
 
5
)
 
T
h
e
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
c
o
n
c
e
p
t
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
b
g
a
m
e
 
p
e
r
-
4
)
 
W
h
e
n
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
i
s
 
r
o
o
m
 
f
o
r
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
o
r
 
f
e
e
t
 
N
a
s
h
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
o
f
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
L
 
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
'
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
,
 
a
l
t
e
r
n
a
-
l
i
v
e
 
f
o
n
n
s
 
o
f
 
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
r
e
 
m
o
s
t
 
l
i
k
e
l
y
 
t
o
 
i
n
-
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
s
 
w
h
e
n
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
-
\
0
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
n
o
n
-
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
f
u
m
s
 
i
s
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
e
.
 
0
0
 
1
3
)
 
J
u
d
d
 
(
1
9
8
5
)
 
1
)
 
F
i
n
n
s
'
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
a
d
v
a
n
t
a
g
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
n
o
t
 
e
x
o
g
e
-
1
)
 
N
o
n
-
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
i
n
 
o
v
e
r
-
1
)
 
O
n
e
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
w
i
n
n
e
r
'
s
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
i
s
 
n
o
u
s
 
b
u
t
 
a
r
e
 
a
c
q
u
i
r
e
d
 
e
n
d
o
g
e
n
o
u
s
l
y
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
i
m
e
,
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
o
p
t
i
m
u
m
 
a
n
d
 
o
f
 
a
r
b
i
t
r
a
r
i
l
y
 
s
m
a
l
l
 
v
a
l
u
e
.
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
.
 
n
o
n
-
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
u
n
d
e
r
t
a
k
e
 
m
o
r
e
 
r
i
s
k
 
t
h
a
n
 
2
)
 
S
p
i
l
l
o
v
e
r
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
n
o
t
 
t
a
k
e
n
 
i
n
t
o
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
L
 
2
)
 
T
w
o
 
t
y
p
e
s
 
o
f
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
 
a
r
e
 
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
i
s
 
j
o
i
n
t
l
y
 
o
p
t
i
m
a
l
,
 
e
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
l
y
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
e
q
u
a
l
s
 
r
e
g
a
r
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
r
i
s
k
 
d
e
g
r
e
e
.
 
t
h
e
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
.
 
3
)
 
F
i
n
n
s
'
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
i
e
s
 
a
f
f
e
c
t
 
t
h
e
 
2
)
 
I
f
 
o
n
e
 
f
m
n
 
a
d
v
a
n
c
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
,
 
l
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
 
b
u
t
 
n
o
t
 
t
h
e
 
m
a
g
n
i
t
u
d
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
-
t
h
e
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
f
i
r
m
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
s
 
i
t
s
 
R
&
D
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
g
 
j
u
m
p
s
.
 
r
i
s
k
i
e
s
t
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
 
a
n
d
 
m
a
y
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
t
s
 
R
&
D
 
i
n
-
4
)
 
P
r
i
c
e
 
a
n
d
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
s
m
a
l
l
.
 
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
s
s
 
r
i
s
k
y
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
L
 
3
)
 
I
n
 
t
e
n
n
s
 
o
f
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
o
p
t
i
m
a
l
 
w
a
y
 
i
~
 
t
o
 
a
l
l
o
w
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
t
o
 
p
r
o
c
e
e
d
 
u
n
t
i
l
 
o
n
e
 
f
m
n
 
h
a
s
 
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
l
y
 
a
c
h
i
e
v
e
d
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
.
 1
4
)
 
B
e
a
t
h
,
 
K
a
t
s
o
u
l
a
c
o
s
 
a
n
d
 
1
)
 
D
u
o
p
o
l
i
s
t
i
c
 
h
o
m
o
g
e
n
e
o
u
s
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
,
 
1
)
 
R
&
D
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
w
i
l
l
 
b
e
 
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
(
l
o
w
e
r
)
 
i
n
 
1
)
 
C
f
.
 
L
o
u
r
y
 
1
)
,
 
2
)
.
 
U
l
p
h
 
(
1
9
8
8
)
 
f
a
c
i
n
g
 
e
q
u
a
l
 
c
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
 
u
n
i
t
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
u
n
d
e
r
t
a
k
-
a
 
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
v
e
n
t
u
r
e
 
(
R
J
V
)
 
t
h
a
n
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
r
i
v
a
l
r
y
 
2
)
 
I
n
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
G
r
o
s
s
m
a
n
 
a
n
d
 
S
h
a
-
i
n
g
 
R
&
D
 
i
n
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
t
o
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
u
n
i
t
 
c
o
s
t
s
.
 
w
h
e
n
 
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
e
a
s
y
 
(
d
i
f
f
i
c
u
l
t
)
.
 
p
i
r
o
'
s
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
(
1
9
8
7
)
,
 
t
h
e
y
 
s
u
p
p
o
s
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
2
)
 
T
h
e
 
t
i
m
e
 
u
n
t
i
l
 
a
 
f
m
n
 
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
-
2
)
 
F
i
r
m
s
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
 
a
n
 
R
J
V
 
t
o
 
r
i
v
a
l
r
y
 
w
h
e
n
 
i
m
i
t
a
-
r
e
w
a
r
d
s
 
o
n
 
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
R
&
D
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
 
a
r
e
 
l
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
d
 
e
x
p
o
n
e
n
t
i
a
l
l
y
.
 
l
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
e
a
s
y
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
a
n
 
R
J
V
 
a
n
d
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
r
i
v
a
l
r
y
,
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
3
)
 
T
h
e
 
h
a
z
a
r
d
 
r
a
t
e
 
s
o
l
e
l
y
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
s
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
'
s
 
t
h
e
 
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
p
a
y
o
f
f
s
.
 
F
i
r
m
s
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
 
r
i
v
a
l
r
y
 
w
h
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
.
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
f
l
o
w
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
R
&
D
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
.
 
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
d
i
f
f
i
c
u
l
t
,
 
e
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
l
y
 
w
h
e
n
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
3
)
 
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
:
 
4
)
 
I
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
a
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
 
i
m
p
l
y
i
n
g
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
e
 
(
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
-
t
h
e
r
e
 
a
r
e
 
n
o
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
e
s
 
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
d
 
b
y
 
r
u
n
n
i
n
g
 
a
n
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
o
r
 
i
s
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
l
i
o
n
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
>
 
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
)
.
 
R
J
V
 
r
a
t
h
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
a
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
f
m
n
s
 
t
o
 
p
r
o
c
e
e
d
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
l
o
s
e
r
.
 
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
l
y
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
R
J
V
 
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
s
 
r
u
n
n
i
n
g
 
5
)
 
T
h
e
 
e
a
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
o
f
 
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
t
h
e
 
R
&
D
 
l
a
b
o
r
a
t
o
r
i
e
s
 
o
f
 
a
l
l
 
f
i
r
m
s
.
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
f
e
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
.
 
4
)
 
T
h
e
r
e
 
i
s
 
n
o
 
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
c
a
n
 
r
e
s
t
r
a
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
a
t
t
r
a
c
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
o
f
 
s
u
c
h
 
R
J
V
 
a
n
d
 
m
o
r
e
o
v
e
r
,
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
 
o
f
 
a
p
-
p
r
o
p
r
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
 
i
s
 
n
o
t
 
e
l
u
c
i
d
a
t
e
d
.
 1
5
)
 
B
e
a
t
h
,
 
K
a
t
s
o
u
l
a
c
o
s
 
a
n
d
 
1
)
 
T
w
o
 
f
m
n
s
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
 
i
n
 
a
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
 
o
n
e
-
s
t
a
g
e
 
T
w
o
 
f
o
r
c
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
i
n
 
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
:
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
1
)
 
C
f
.
 
D
e
a
t
h
 
a
n
d
 
a
l
.
 
(
1
9
8
8
)
 
1
 
)
.
 
U
l
p
h
 
(
1
9
8
9
)
 
r
a
c
e
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
t
h
e
 
f
r
r
s
t
 
t
o
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
e
.
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
T
h
e
 
f
o
n
n
e
r
 
c
o
r
r
e
s
-
2
)
 
T
h
e
y
 
h
a
v
e
 
a
 
c
o
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
r
y
 
a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
 
t
o
 
2
)
 
C
f
.
 
D
e
a
t
h
 
a
n
d
 
a
l
.
 
(
1
9
8
8
)
 
2
)
.
 
p
o
n
d
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
s
i
r
e
 
t
o
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
s
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
B
r
a
n
d
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
S
p
e
n
c
e
r
'
s
 
m
o
d
e
l
,
 
a
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
d
e
-
3
)
 
C
f
.
 
D
e
a
t
h
 
a
n
d
 
a
l
.
 
(
1
9
8
8
)
 
3
)
.
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
s
t
 
o
f
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
-
r
i
v
e
 
s
o
m
e
 
p
r
e
l
i
m
i
n
a
r
y
 
c
o
n
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
a
n
 
4
)
 
A
 
f
i
n
n
 
m
a
y
 
h
a
v
e
 
a
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
 
a
d
v
a
n
t
a
g
e
 
m
e
n
t
.
 
T
h
e
 
l
a
t
t
e
r
 
i
s
 
r
e
f
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
o
p
t
i
m
a
l
 
s
u
b
s
i
d
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
.
 
o
v
e
r
 
i
t
s
 
r
i
v
a
l
s
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
i
n
g
 
f
r
o
m
 
a
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
r
a
c
e
.
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
o
r
'
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
n
o
n
-
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
o
r
'
s
 
3
)
 
T
h
e
 
t
w
o
 
f
o
r
c
e
s
 
b
e
i
n
g
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
s
i
s
 
o
f
 
a
n
y
 
5
)
 
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
o
f
 
w
i
n
n
i
n
g
 
o
r
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
s
.
 
A
 
m
a
j
o
r
 
d
e
t
e
n
n
i
n
a
n
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
d
y
n
a
m
i
c
 
a
d
j
u
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
,
 
t
h
i
s
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
l
o
s
i
n
g
 
a
r
e
 
k
n
o
w
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
 
b
y
 
b
o
t
h
.
 
m
a
g
n
i
t
u
d
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
t
w
o
 
f
o
r
c
e
s
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
e
a
s
e
 
o
f
 
b
e
 
e
x
t
e
n
d
e
d
 
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
l
y
.
 
6
)
 
B
o
t
h
 
f
m
n
s
 
f
a
c
e
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
e
c
h
n
o
-
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
l
o
g
y
 
a
n
d
 
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
.
 
1
)
 
I
f
 
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
i
m
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
,
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
d
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
a
d
e
r
 
f
m
n
 
u
n
d
e
r
t
a
k
e
s
 
m
o
r
e
 
R
&
D
 
t
h
a
n
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
t
v
 
8
 
b
e
 
o
p
t
i
m
a
l
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
s
 
i
t
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
m
a
k
e
 
i
f
 
i
t
 
w
e
r
e
 
s
u
r
e
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
t
h
e
 
w
i
n
n
e
r
.
 
2
)
 
I
f
 
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
e
a
s
y
,
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
d
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
p
r
o
m
p
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
 
l
e
s
s
 
i
n
 
R
&
D
 
a
n
d
 
w
i
l
l
 
i
n
-
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
s
 
b
y
 
f
r
e
e
-
r
i
d
i
n
g
.
 
3
)
 
I
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
a
s
e
 
o
f
 
a
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
u
b
s
i
d
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
,
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
d
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
,
 
a
 
s
u
b
s
i
d
y
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
h
o
m
e
 
f
i
n
n
 
w
i
l
l
 
r
e
-
s
u
i
t
 
i
n
 
a
n
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
R
&
D
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
r
i
v
a
l
 
f
i
r
m
 
(
o
v
e
r
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
)
.
 
4
)
 
I
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
a
s
e
 
o
f
 
a
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
u
b
s
i
d
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
,
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
d
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
-
l
i
v
e
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
,
 
a
 
s
u
b
s
i
d
y
 
i
s
 
n
o
t
 
o
p
t
i
m
a
l
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
f
r
e
e
-
r
i
d
e
r
 
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
.
 1
6
)
 
D
e
l
b
o
n
o
 
a
n
d
 
D
e
n
i
c
o
l
o
 
1
)
 
D
u
o
p
o
l
i
s
t
i
c
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
f
a
c
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
a
s
-
1
)
 
U
n
d
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
s
m
o
o
t
h
 
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
y
,
 
e
i
t
h
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
-
1
)
 
c
r
.
 
B
e
a
t
h
 
a
n
d
 
a
l
.
 
(
1
9
8
8
)
 
1
)
.
 
(
1
9
9
1
b
)
 
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
s
 
1
)
 
t
o
 
5
)
 
o
f
 
B
e
a
t
h
 
a
n
d
 
a
l
.
 
(
1
9
8
9
)
.
 
f
i
t
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
m
a
y
 
p
r
e
-
2
)
 
C
f
.
 
B
e
a
t
h
 
a
n
d
 
a
l
.
 
(
 
1
9
8
9
)
 
3
)
.
 
2
)
 
T
w
o
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
r
e
g
a
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
i
l
,
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
s
-
3
)
 
T
h
e
y
 
d
e
r
i
v
e
 
a
 
l
a
r
g
e
 
r
n
n
g
e
 
o
f
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
b
e
h
a
v
-
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
R
&
D
 
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
y
 
:
 
c
o
u
n
t
 
r
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
"
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
"
 
o
f
 
R
&
D
 
e
x
-
i
o
u
r
s
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
r
e
s
t
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
o
f
 
-
w
e
l
l
-
b
e
h
a
v
e
d
 
R
&
D
 
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
y
 
e
x
h
i
b
i
t
i
n
g
 
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
.
 
I
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
 
r
a
t
e
 
i
s
 
h
i
g
h
 
(
l
o
w
)
 
B
e
a
t
h
 
a
n
d
 
a
l
.
 
T
h
e
i
r
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
i
s
 
l
i
m
i
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
s
m
o
o
t
h
l
y
 
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
;
 
a
n
d
/
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
R
&
D
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
i
s
 
i
n
t
e
r
f
i
r
m
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
i
n
t
e
r
-
-
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
 
m
o
d
e
l
l
e
d
 
b
y
 
a
s
s
u
m
i
n
g
 
t
h
a
t
 
l
o
w
 
(
h
i
g
h
)
,
 
t
h
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
(
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
-
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
.
 
R
&
D
 
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
i
s
 
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
l
y
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
s
i
b
l
e
.
 
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
)
 
t
e
n
d
s
 
t
o
 
d
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
.
 
2
)
 
U
n
d
e
r
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
f
m
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
s
 
i
n
 
R
&
D
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
a
s
 
m
u
c
h
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
m
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
-
t
i
v
e
 
t
h
r
e
a
L
 
I
n
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
e
i
t
h
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
n
n
e
r
 
h
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
t
t
e
r
 
t
o
 
w
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
,
 
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
n
n
e
r
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
n
e
.
 
3
)
 
U
n
d
e
r
 
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
w
i
t
h
 
h
i
g
h
 
s
i
z
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
a
n
d
/
o
r
 
r
e
-
d
u
c
e
d
 
c
o
s
t
 
g
a
p
,
 
b
o
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
w
o
r
k
 
i
n
 
f
a
v
o
u
r
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
u
r
-
r
e
n
t
l
y
 
h
i
g
h
 
c
o
s
t
 
f
m
n
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
t
h
e
r
e
f
o
r
e
 
h
a
s
 
a
 
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
n
g
.
 
I
f
 
t
h
e
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
i
s
 
s
m
a
l
l
 
a
n
d
/
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
s
t
 
g
a
p
 
i
s
 
l
a
r
g
e
,
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
i
n
-
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
g
o
 
i
n
 
o
p
p
o
s
i
t
e
 
d
i
r
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
w
h
i
l
e
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.
 distribution of inforn1ation, the identity of the decision variables and the sequence of 
moves. Reinganun1 ( 1984) also questions the availability of  data. 
If theoretical developments yield statements which should be investigated empirically, 
they are, as such, of little help. Basic hypotheses drastically condition the results of theo-
retical models and very often, a slight modification of hypotheses results in controversial 
conclusions. However, the strategic game-theoretic approach is still in an early develop-
ment stage and future researches will certainly substantially improve our understanding of 
finn behavior in the technological race framework. As Reinganum (1984) pointed out in 
her survey article, "although individual models have unambiguous implications, the array 
of existing models still generates considerable controversy ... In order to move in the 
direction of  empirical testing, we must both extend these models in more realistic direc-
tions to accommodate existing data, and attempt to gather the specific data required to test 
directly such models of  finn behavior".  She also concludes from her survey [Reinganum 
(1989)]  that,  so far,  the analyses "have used stark models in order to identify the 
significant characteristics of firms, markets and innovations which are likely to affect 
incentives to invest and/or adopt.  But since it is largely restricted to these special cases 
(e.g. deterministic innovations, drastic innovations, two firms, symmetric firms) this 
work has not yet had a significant impact on the applied literature in industrial organiza-
tion; its usefulness for policy purposes should also be considered limited. For these 
purposes, one needs a predictive model which encompasses the full range of firm, 
industry and innovation characteristics". 
These different studies which use the game-theoretic approach have derived some 
general results regarding an optimal subsidy policy. In general, they only look at the 
effect of  a subsidy at the R & D investment level and its direct effect on the market share, 
the competitiveness of the home firm compared to rival firms. Yet, they remain silent 
about the real design of public R & D policies. Regarding this point, Foister (1988) has 
tried to make out an optimal structure for a subsidy. He suggests that the government 
"can save public funds by supporting only projects that are socially valuable and that 
firms would not conduct of own initiative". But identifying research projects that are 
socially worthwhile in order to subsidize only projects that firms would not conduct with-
out subsidies, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, in order to prompt firms to be-
have efficiently, requires quite a lot information. 
The incentive subsidy requires no ex ante judgement by the public authorities because 
the exact size of the subsidy is determined after the project has been conducted. This ex 
post  judgemen~  allows to have a more accurate assessment of social and private values of 
.......  '!'-._  --
202 research projects. The incentive subsidy contains different elements that directly affect the 
cost function of the firm : 
- compensation for a loss due to the project, 
- tax on the profit made on the project, 
-reward equal to a fraction of  the social value of  the project 
Such a policy implies that a firm does not apply for subsidies on the basis of  a project 
that has an expected negative social value. According to Foister, the incentive subsidy 
policy is socially more efficient than the normal subsidy policy or conditional loans. The 
arguments that support the incentive subsidy as a superior alternative are summarized in 
table 6.5. 
6 •  3 •  Imitation, Purchase or Inducement : The Search for 
an Optimal Strategy 
When a potential strategic public policy is being designed, the endogenous character-
istics of  each industry must be taken into account to use the most appropriate instruments. 
Indeed, different innovative contexts will induce different effects of R & D policies.  The 
firm's behaviour will be different depending on whether it is part of a high-, stable- or 
low-technology industrial sector. In the case of high-technology industries like aero-
space, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, computers or other electronic and electrical industries, 
firms' incentives to promote internal R & D can be higher if the environment is rich in 
opportunities for appropriation by the frrm and spill-over into other projects. If it is not 
the case, the frrm may prefer to imitate or purchase in order to minimise the risks. More-
over, high technology industries are unstable, which property decreases the possibility of 
creating lasting advantage in these sectors.  The alternative potential ways of acquiring 
innovations are : imitation, purchasing, internal R & D. The cost-benefit characteristics of 
these innovation routes is presented in table 6.6. As can be seen, each way has its own 
advantages and disadvantages and the choice between these alternative roads must be the 
result of  a technological audit of  the investigated sector.  · .. 
By subjecting the amount of subsidies granted to the R & D strategy adopted by a 
firm, i.e. by granting a certain amount of subsidies if, for instance, a fmn imitates and a 
different amount if the fmn purchases a licence, public authorities have a powerful tool to 
induce firms to improve their R & D's. This selective approach incorporates the specific 
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 technological trajectory of  each indusny by allowing fmns to choose between several op-
tional ways of  improving technological efficiency : imitation, purchase and R & D initia-
tion. Besides, they can also choose not to engage in R & D at all. 
If the fmn is rational, i.e. makes choices that maximize its expected benefits, the ex-
pected welfare that firms get from a specific choice can be measured by the income flow. 
This income flow can be decomposed into different variables. On the one hand, we have 
variables that are functions of the selected option and, on the other hand, we have vari-
ables which are independent of the selected option. For the former, the main variables are 
expected profits, subsidies and/or tax credit from public authorities. For the latter, the 
structural characteristics of the firm which are not affected by any alternative have to be 
considered. To model and assess the determinant of alternative choices whose impact on 
the fmns can be assumed to be constant, it is preferable to resort to conditionallogit 
rather than multinomiallogit 1 [Hoffman and Duncan (1988)]. A mixed conditionallogit 
should be used because some explanatory variables are sectoral characteristics and the 
other variables are characteristics related to the selected alternatives i.e. varying from one 
option to another. The function associated to the fmn i under the option j is, then, defined 
as the following latent variable : 
Ve {Pe  S··  T  ..  X·}  2  "  ..  ,  IJ'  IJ'  1  IJ  IJ 
where  P~ 
IJ 
Sij 
Tij 
Xi 
expected profits of fmn i under the option j 
subsidies to finn i under the option j 
tax credit to fmn i under the option j 
structural characteristics vector associated to fmn i. 
In fact, Vij stands for the value of alternative j to firm i. Such models are especially 
well suited for the analysis of situations in which the government policy affects the attrac-
tiveness of an alternative by changing some relevant characteristics. Obviously, to assess 
the effect of government policies such as a subsidy policy, when possible, the policy 
parameters have to be directly included in the choice structure. 
Assuming that the indirect utility function is additive, we have : 
1  By contrast, the multinomiallogit model hypothesizes that the explanatory variables (individual cha-
racteristics) are constant across the alternatives. So, it measures the specific impact of these character-
istics (across individuals) on each choice. 
2  Other variables can be used such as the level of R & D expenditures which differs across industries and 
alternatives. The variables selected here are only a potential representation which must be modified ac-
cording to the amount of available information. 
206 I 
where  ~' "(,  a, a  j  unknown parameters 
Eij  residual that captures the effect of unmeasured variables and the 
imperfection in the optimization program. 
The mixed conditionallogit is based on the assumption that the error terms in Vij fol-
low an extreme value distribution and are independent across alternatives. This independ-
ence assumption is crucial because any other assumption leads to substantial computa-
tional difficulties involving the computation of  multivariate integrals. 
With a set of n firms facing m options, we can defme : 
- Cij = 1  if the ith fmn makes the jth choice 
i.e.  vij =max {Vi~' ...  ,Vi~) 
- Cij =  0  otherwise. 
j = 1, ...  , m  i = 1, ...  , n 
If  we assume that Eij are independently and identically distributed with an extreme-
value distribution, then the probability Pij that the firm i chooses alternative j, in the 
mixed conditionallogit, is : 
Pij = Prob (Cij =  1) 
e  I  = Exp  (~ pij +  'Y Sij + a Tij + aj Xi) I 
m  I 
L,  Exp  (~ P.ek +  'Y Sik + a Tik + 9k Xi) 
k=1 
1 
The estimation of the structural parameters of this equation through a maximum likeli-
hood procedure allows to simulate the different policies and determine the consequence of 
policy changes on the rate of R & D effort of each alternative. The expected profits Pij 
can be obtained by using questionnaires or sound estimates based on past profits. 
Another possible application of this sort of model is to classify the ftrms in respect of 
their R & D expenditure. Once again, using subsidy as an explanatory variable, we can 
study the effect of a modification in the subsidy level on the R & D expenditure of the 
firm. However, to measure the impact of the subsidy on the technological efficiency, it 
might be preferable to use a measure of output such as the number of patents issued. 
207 6. 4. Centres of Excellence  and  Agglomeration  Economies 
Through setting-up R & D programmes a country can avail itself of strategies that go 
beyond the subsidy policy. So, a potential alternative policy is to develop European 
centres of  excellence in research and innovation. 
The creation of a centre of excellence is a cumulative process if  decisions taken pre-
viously increase the likelihood of locating a research facility in a European centre. Hence, 
repeated investments in these centres strengthen their international position and their R & 
D ability, so creating agglomeration effects. These agglomeration effects may result from 
the user-producer interaction. Indeed, users' sophisticated requirements support the re-
search facilities of the technology producers and the ensuing feedback and joint testing 
procedure leads to incremental technological improvement. In addition, such centres of 
excellence improve the diffusion process and make a wider range of technological pro-
ducts available to the users. However, a major potential cause of failure is that these 
centres are 'locked in' to a path of  technological development. 
At the European level, the creation of  centers of  excellence, which go beyond the na-
tional boundaries, allows to develop and reorganize a network of  research facilities. It is 
-. 
important to strengthen the interaction between the different centers and to organize the 
participation of the European countries in function of their technological ability in a spe-
cific field and not in function of political considerations of balanced representation. 
Cantwell (1991) tested the significance of such a proposition on the basis of the pre-
vious argument that research tends to agglomerate geographically. He showed that the 
geographical concentration of technological activity has risen outside the U.S. and that 
Japan has increased its share. His analysis emphasizes the fact that many sectors show an 
agglomerative consolidation of their comparative (dis)advantages 1. 
In his empirical study, he draws up an index of the revealed technological advantages 
(RTA) of  locations in the following way : 
where Pij : number of US patents granted in sector i attributable to research in country j. 
1  He also assessed the contribution of foreign-owned research facilities to technological agglomeration 
and concluded that the location of foreign-owned research has, in general, contribtited to technical ag-
glomeration but not in a significant way. 
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 If RT  Aij > 1 : country j is comparatively advantaged in research in sector i 
If  RTAij < 1 : country j is comparatively disadvantaged in research in sector i. 
He makes a cross-country regression of the national shares of  patenting (Sjt) over the 
period 1978-1986 on the equivalent shares during the period 1963-1972 and, alterna-
tively, using the RT  A, i.e. : 
Sjt =at + Pt  Sjt-1 + £tjt-l 
RTAjt = a2 + P2 RTAjt-1 +£2jt-l 
To ascertain the proposition of agglomeration of technological activities two hypo-
theses are made : 
1) in any sector the variance of the cross-country distribution of patent shares or the 
RTA index has risen over time.  This hypothesis of geographical concentration of the 
1\  1\ 
technological activity over time is measured by PIR > 1 where P is the estimated slope 
coefficient and R the estimated correlation coefficient 
2) the weight of the initial important centres for innovative activity remains the same, 
i.e. p  ~ 1. 
Two different regressions were made : a firSt one on the cross-country distribution of 
national share of US patenting including the US and a second one excluding the US. 
When the regression is run using the cross-country distribution of national shares of US 
patenting, the agglomeration hypothesis must be  rejected.  Nevertheless, the first 
agglomeration hypothesis is accepted and the second is partly accepted when the 
regression is run for each sector (but excluding the US). On the basis of these results, 
neither the hypothesis of an increase of the geographical concentration of technological 
activity nor the hypothesis that the more important centres have on average retained their 
position can be rejected. 
Table 6.8.  Regressions  of the  Patent Shares 
a  ~  ~IR 
with US  2.13  0.74  0.76 
(14.84) 
without US  0.60  0.93  1.33 
(2.95) 
210 Table 6.7 .,  which  summarizes  Cantwell's results  shows  that the  trend  towards 
agglomeration is higher when patenting shares are used than when RTA is the reference 
measure.  Such an observation is only the consequence that patent shares are similar at an 
absolute value of technological advantage while RTA is a relative value measuring 
comparative technological advantages.  The first four quadrants show the sectors for 
which no agglomeration effect was detected.  The four following quadrants show the 
sectors characterized by a reinforcement of spatial concentration in foreign patenting 
shares combined with a weakening of comparative technological advantages.  This 
contrasted finding is explained by the high weight of small countries in the measurement 
of the RTA for these sectors which is not reflected by the patent shares.  Some of these 
sectors also correspond to cases in which Japan made strong absolute but not relative 
gains.  The next four lower quadrants represent the  sectors for which  the spatial 
concentration in patent shares becomes more dispersed and the concentration in terms of 
RTA rises.  So, in these sectors, while the patent shares come closer to each other, the 
leader countries strengthen their initial technological position.  The last four quadrants 
give the sectors for which  both  types of measurement provide evidence of strong 
agglomeration effects.  Only two high-technology sectors belong to this category : office 
equipment and electrical equipment.  The other high  technology  sectors,  such as 
bioengineering, instruments, semiconductors and pharmaceuticals, do not seem to be 
faced with a strong agglomeration trend.  Yet, the trend towards a higher concentration of 
these sectors in absolute value might be the source of future RTA.  Finally, it is worth 
noting that the analysis of patent shares does not include the US.  The map of sectors 
presented in table 6.7. would certainly have been different if the US had been included. 
Indeed, as shown in table 6.8., the results of total regressions with and without the US 
are noticeably different. 
However this may be, this analysis stresses that technological concentration exists and 
that the Japanese position is stronger, both in absolute and in comparative terms. The 
U.S.  position  is  weaker and  the  European  situation  is  relatively  contrasted.  One 
observes, however, a positive correlation between the technological position of a country 
and its industrial competitiveness. The poor performance of the U.K. points to the weak 
performance in its industrial sector whereas Germany affrrms its dominant position both 
in absolute and in comparative advantage terms. The existence of a European network of 
centres of excellence requires the availability of research professionals, i.e. a highly 
skilled human capital. Once again, a manpower that is highly skilled in the scientific and 
engineering field is a crucial factor to increase competitiveness. Besides, a favorable insti-
tutional environment, both on the labour market and on the capital market, should be 
211 created. In this respect, the completion of  the European internal market offers the possi-
bility to generate an environment conducive to R & D investment. 
The existence of critical mass is the main reason why R & D tends to agglomerate. 
The subsidization of R & D at one location will benefit R & D at the location and will 
attract researchers from other locations. It will be beneficial as long as domestic scale 
economies are available and can induce an  international redistribution of research 
activities. Such a policy strategy has clear advantages at the European level where lots of 
research centres do not reach the critical mass. Yet, its disadvantages are threefold. First, 
it may depress research activities in some regions and countries. Second, if other 
governments adopt a similar strategy, a large part of the redisnibutive effect may be lost. 
Third, the implementation of  a selective subsidy policy will encourage the beneficiaries to 
lobby for more and divert subsidies for non-innovative activities [Casson (1991)]. 
6.5.  Technological  Competition  and R  &  D Policy  in  Oligopoly 
R & D is a non-price competitive element and requires to be associated with all the 
other elements of the fmn's strategy. The issue of a fmn's optimal levels for all decision 
instruments has received considerable attention in the marketing literature. These exten-
sions of  the profit maximisation rule have nied to take into account other decision-making 
process variables than just the price. All these normative models have been developed 
along the lines defined by Dorfman and Steiner (1954)'s theorem for monopolistic com-
petition. 
Following the original contribution of Dorfman and Steiner, Hay and Morris ( 1991) 
have recently presented a basic model of innovation. Besides the frrm's own decision 
variables, they also include the rival's decision variables as determinant of the firm's 
demand. 
The demand curve for firm i is a function of its own price Pi and its own expenditure 
on R & D, Xit and of Pj and Xj vectors of prices and R & D expenditures of other firms. 
The expenditure Xi shifts the demand curve, () Qi I a  Xi > 0, but at a diminishing rate. 
The first order conditions can be obtained from the profit maximization process 1ti : 
where c (  Qi) is the production cost. 
212 S) 
By deriving, we obtain: 
1_.  1+.  1_  ax·  ~·  a  c  ~·  dpj - Pt .  Pi  q1 -dqi .  Pi  - 0 
a  c 
Then  Pi. - dQi __  1_ 
Pi  -I ed 
with Ei : price elasticity of  demand 
a  c 
and  _!j_ =Pi. - aQi (~ !i + ~  5  ~ Xj) 
Pi qi  Pi  a  xi  · ~  a  Xj  · qi  ·  Xi 
1  = leJ (1li + p 'llj) 
where 1li  elasticity of  response of  sales to one's own R & D expenditure 
1lj  elasticity of  response of  sales to other firms' R & D expenditure 
p  conjectural variation, i.e. degree to which the firm expects an increase in its 
own R & D expenditure to be matched by rivals. 
We observe from these results that the more elastic demand is with respect toR & D, 
the higher the R & D intensity will be.  Furthermore, the R & D intensity depends on the 
finn's expectations regarding competitors' R & D reaction.  If, besides, there are also 
conjectural variations on the price side, one can easily show that the R & D intensity will 
also depend on the finn's expectations regarding competitors' price reaction.  These 
relationships make clear that R & D decisions may depend on expectations relative to 
competitors' decisions. 
According to the market situation p can take different forms. p is equal to zero in the 
Coumot case, i.e. there is no reaction from rivals. 
In conditions that are optimal with respect to the level of  R & D expenditures, we note 
the impact of  the price elasticity of demand regarding R & D expenditures. The higher the 
elasticity with respect to the price, the lower the part of R & D expenditures in the total 
output of the i finn. A strong price inelasticity stimulates R & D investment by the firm 
213 due to the fact that non-price instruments are more efficient to obtain important market 
shares. 
This analysis can be extended to include the effects of a public incentive to private R & 
D.  Suppose the subsidy be equal to a fraction a of the private R & D so that the profit is 
equal to: 
withOSa<l 
In such a case, the R & D intensity equation becomes : 
which shows that the higher a is, the higher R & D intensity will be. 
However; this model is too simple to express a real situation. Considering zero con-
jectural variations is inealistic. But the definition of rational conjectural variations is not 
easy due to, for instance, the great part of uncertainty associated with R & D investment 
Moreover, each different non-zero conjectural variation implies a different type of reac-
tion function and, therefore, another equilibrium. 
Lambin and al. (1975) have derived an optimal marketing behavior model that is more 
consistent for the analysis of oligopolistic competition. We can extend this model to in-
corporate R & D and obtain an expression in terms of market share. 
In the process of maximization, a firm can use a set of decision variables, among 
which the level of R & D expenditure, the purpose being to determine the conditions in 
which each decision variable is likely to yield maximum profit 
We can derive the optimality conditions, considering first the company profit function 
for the case of monopolistic competition : 
1t = q . [p - c (q, o)] - x 
where  p  price 
o  organizational cost 
x  R & D expenditure. 
214 Let us write that u' = (p, x, o), this variable representing the company decision vari-
able vector. 
Deriving 1t with respect to each decision variable included in the u' vector and setting 
these expressions equal to zero, we obtain : 
a x  Pu  <fJ  a  c  a  c  Q_q)  a  x  --r:-:- =  [p - c (q  o  >l  + q  - ~  - -a . a  -~  =  o  ou  u  '  u  ou  q  u  ou 
Mter transformation, one obtains : 
-llq,p =  llq,x · fl!) =  llq,o · {  9  Ci  ) 
o <a  o) 
1 
=w* 
where  n  ••q,m 
w* 
elasticity of  demand to the m decision variable 
percentage of gross margin 1. 
which is similar to the Dorfman-Steiner rule. 
At the optimum, marginal cost must be equal to marginal revenue for each decision 
variable and the marginal revenue product of R & D expenditure must be equal to the 
inverse of  the percentage of gross margin : 
Otherwise, from the preceding optimality conditions, one deduces that : 
_x_ _  llg,x  _  llg,x 
q  .  p  - - llq,p  - I  E I 
We find a result similar to the one obtained by the first model where p.  Xi q.  = 
1 
1  •  1  I  Ei I 
(lli + p llj). In this case, we see that the ratio of R & D expenditures with respect to total 
output or sales is equal to the ratio of R & D elasticities with respect to price elasticities. 
llq,x corresponds to (lli + p llj) when p, representing the conjectural variation, is equal to 
zero. Thus, we have a Nash-Coumot equilibrium. 
1  w* = (p- MC) I p where MC =marginal cost. 
215 The preceding relation shows that the higher the percentage of  gross margin w* is, the 
lower the marginal product of  R & D expenditure is and the higher the profitable level of 
R & D expenditure is since we expect diminishing returns on R & D expenditure. We 
know that ~* =  I  e I  .  Hence, the previous situation implies a low price elasticity, i.e. the 
possibility for the frrm to charge high prices. 
A competitive situation is characterized by strong interdependences between rival 
fmns. In parallel with the concept of  conjectural variations, one can express two different 
forms of  interdependence. First, the performances of any fmn depend on the level of its 
rivals' decision variables, in particular R & D expenditure. Second, if  a firm modifies its 
R & D expenditure, other rival firms will react. 
To extend the model, let us decompose the Eq,u vector of total sales elasticities into 
three components which are : 
1)  the industry sales or output effect; 
2)  the direct partial effect in the company market share due to a change in the company 
decision variables 1; 
3)  the indirect partial effect in the company market share due to modifications in rival 
fmns' decision variables, i.e. brought about by a change in the competitive mix pres-
sure of  rival firms. 
By definition: 
m. _ _q_ 
,-Qr 
where  mi  market share of  the company 
q  company sales 
Qr  industry sales. 
1  The company market share can be represented as : 
ki p  ~1 X ~2 0 ~3 
1  1  1 
mi =  e  e  e  L ki p . 1  X •  2  0  • 3 
•  1  1  1 
1 
where the ej are the market share sensitivities with respect to each decision variable and for each frrm 
the numerator of this relationship can be defined as the competitive mix pressure of the firm. The 
elasticity of the market share to each variable is defined as : 
Ej = Cj  (1  - ffij) 
216 q =mi. Qr 
= mi (u, U) . Qr (u, U, Z) = mi (u, U (u)) . Qr (u, U (u), Z) 
where  u 
u 
z 
company decision variable vector 
competitors decision variable vector 
environmental variable vector. 
We derive q with respect to the u decision vector  : 
~  a  Qr  a  Qr  a u  ~mi  a  mj  a u 
d  u =midU +midl) ·du +Q.  u  +Q.dlf ·du 
d U  [d U1  dUn]  wheredu = LdU, ...  , dU  . 
where E refers to demand elasticities and R to multiple competitive reaction elasticities. 
According to Lambin (1976}, this result can be summarized regarding the alternative 
types of behavior and the nature of the industry demand : 
Non expansible industry demand 
(EQ=O) 
Expansible industry demand 
(EQ¢0) 
No reaction (R = 0) 
I  Eq,u = Emj,u + EQ,u 
Simple competitive reaction (R = Rd) 
Eq,u = Emj,u + R<t Emj,U  I  Eq,u = Emj,u + EQ,u + R<t £Emj.U + EQ,u] 
with R(i, diagonal matrix from R 
Multiple competitive reaction (R :1: 0) 
Eq,u = Emj,u + R Emj,U  I  Eq,u = Emj,u + EQ,u + R [Emj,U + EQ,U] 
Taking into account the intrinsic characteristics of  each industry and using a multiple 
competitive reaction behavior, one can measure the R & D-output elasticity for the dif-
ferent cases. 
217 First, we consider the case of an industry in its maturity phase. We know that in this 
case, the total demand is stable and has no influence on the R & D-output elasticity. This 
elasticity is only made up of  market-share components. One can write this decomposition 
in the following form, capital letter subscripts referring to competitors: 
Tlq,x =  Tlm,x + PP,x · Tlm,P + PX,x · Tlm,X + PO,x · Tlm,O  (1) 
This expression represents a general multiple competitive reaction in a stable industry 
demand. p expresses the different reactions of rival fums to an alteration in the level of R 
& D expenditure. Using this approach, one can formulate the reaction of American and 
Japanese firms to a modification in the R & D expenditure level of European firms. 
Moreover, all strategic variables could be taken into account so that one should be able to 
describe different kinds of strategic behaviour. 
Second, we look at an industry using new and expanding technologies (high-techno-
logy industry). This kind of industry is characterized by an expansible industry demand. 
In this case, R & D-output elasticity must take into account the reaction of the total 
demand to a modification of the R & D expenditure level and the hnpaet of the induced 
multiple competitive reaction of rival firms on the total demand. So, we have the follow-
ing decomposition of the R & D-output elasticity : 
Tlq,x = 11QT,x + llm,x + PP,x (11QT,P + Tlm,P) + PX,x (11QT,X + Tlm,x) 
+ PO,x (11QT,O + llm,O)  (2) 
In comparison with the first equation, we note that R & D-output elasticity includes 
both market share elements and total demand elements. The former equation is a particu-
lar case of the latter equation when the total demand is stable, which implies that 11QT,X = 
11QT ,P = 11QT,X = 11QT,O =  0. 
The previous analysis allows to analyze the effect of public policies. By stimulating 
the R & D decision variable, the public R & D policy will have a direct effect on the be-
haviour of the firm and on the competitiveness 1. The last two equations (1) and (2), de~ 
fined in terms of R & D-output elasticity, allow to take into account the reaction of the 
demand to an increase or decrease in the R & D subsidy and the impact of the induced 
multiple competitive reactions of rival firms on the demand. Moreover, the differentiated 
effects linked to the type of industry are integrated into the model. 
1  In such a case, for the sake of convenience, one can define Xi  as being the sum of both private and 
public R & D. However, more complex analytical hypotheses should be investigated by taking these 
two variables into account separately. public R & D not being a company decision variable. 
218 These relationships based on a concept of  competitive mix show that a competitor may 
react to a change in R & D expenditure not just by changing his own R & D expenditure 
(simple competitive reaction) but also by changing other non-price instruments or the 
price itself (multiple competitive reaction). This approach allows to express competitive 
interaction in terms of market share and to model the existing competition between 
European, Japanese and American firms. 
This approach using market share models can alternatively be used to describe the 
technological competition between the American, European and Japanese blocks. 
Indeed, if one assumes that : 
MSE1  :  market share of  European firms for a specific industry at time t 
MS At  :  market share of  American firms for a specific industry at time t 
MSJt  :  market share of Japanese fmns for a specific industry at timet 
then, one can try to study the evolution over time of these respective market shares. 
In other words, our purpose is to value the evolution dynamic of  market shares. To do 
that, we can define a transition matrix in which the different elements are probabilities of 
technological dominance (or alternatively competitive dominance) of each block. This 
matrix can help analyze the evolution of tendencies towards change inside the industry. 
By linking market shares and this matrix, we obtain an estimate of market shares in the 
next period. For example, a way to define this matrix is to use patent statistics. One 
knows the limits of such a measure but it gives an idea of the technological ability of each 
block. So, the process can be summarized as follows : 
(
PEE  PEA  PEJ  )  MSEt+t 
(MSE1 MSA1 MSJt)  PAE  PAA  PAJ  =  MSAt+l 
PJE  · PJA  Pn  MSJt+t 
where  MSit  = market share of i at period t 
Pij  =  transition probability of technological dominance of block i within block 
J. 
By definition, the sum on a line is equal to one and, in our example, PEE is equal to 
the number of patents granted in Europe to European industries divided by the total 
number of patents granted in Europe for a specific industry. The fact that the sum on a 
219 line is equal to one allows to relate it to the market share concept, since the sum of the 
market shares is also equal to one. Thus, the transition probabilities also correspond to 
market shares in terms of patents. Obviously, more complex technological indexes (or, 
alternatively, competitiveness indexes) could be designed. 
In order to define robust market share indicators, we can use the "sales" variable. 
Thus,  MSik (i =  E, A,  J)  is equal to country i's volume of sales divided by the total 
volume of sales for a given industry k. A correction or extension can be made to take into 
account or specifically analyze imports and exports. 
Through this approach, an equilibrium structure can be measured, i.e. when t tends 
towards infinity, one has : 
* 
(  Pu 
P12 
P13 J 
MSE 
*  (MSEt MSAt MSJt)  P21  P22  P23  =  MSA 
P31  P32  P33  *  MS1 
where n ~  oo. 
The equilibrium value is obtained after n iterations and gives an estimation of the tech-
nological leadership. 
However, we know that the absolute equilibrium value is a function of the endoge-
nous characteristics of each industry. The position of a product on the life cycle influen-
ces the level of demand. To take this effect into account, we can combine this approach 
with a diffusion-modelling framework. In this way, we can draw a parallel with the two 
expressions decomposing the R & D-sales elasticity which have been discussed in the 
preceding section. 
The matrix of transition probabilities can be interpreted as being the result of  two sets 
of interactive parameters, a retention factor ri which can be interpreted as a measure of the 
acquired technological advantage (or, alternatively, acquired competitive advantage) and 
an attraction factor ai as a measure of technological dynamism (or, alternatively, competi-
tive dynamism) where .'E ai = 1, all ai  ~  0 and 0 ~  ri  ~  1. 
Thus, we have : 
220 Market shares acquired over the next period 
Europe  u.s.  Japan 
Market  Europe  fE + (1 - fE) aE  (1- fE) aus  (1 - fE) aJ 
shares 
acquired 
over the  u.s.  (1- rus) aE  (1- rus) aus + rus  (1  - rus) aJ 
last period  Japan  (1 - rJ) aE  (1  - rJ) aus  I) + (  1 - rJ) a] 
This matrix defined in terms of patents must only be viewed as an example. More re-
presentative indicators of technological competition should be substituted for this ele-
mentary variable. 
This model remains very prospective and needs further investigations. 
221 Conclusion 
While econometric methods are extensively used as a tool for the evaluation of 
economic policy, its credibility and usefulness in the field of science and technology 
policy is very controversial, if not contested. The main arguments invoked against these 
techniques are the problem of causality links, the time lag structure, the variability of 
results, the complexity and uncertain nature of the innovation process which rend eco-
nometric investigations difficult. On the other hand, lots of evaluation studies point out 
that the evaluation processes are mainly focused on technological aspects and do not 
deal with the economic impacts. When the latter are covered, methods used are essen-
tially case studies and surveys. Yet, these methods have their own shortcomings and, in 
any case, only consider some direct and partial economic impacts. What must take the 
lead in the choice of a method is the issue at stake. As the evaluation process is funda-
mentally a  heuristic and subjective process,  there is seldom a  clear-cut definitive 
answer. In order to avoid costly erroneous decisions, any experiment should be, if pos-
sible, complemented by another one performed on the basis of an alternative method. 
Theoretical and empirical studies of the relationship between technical change 
and improvements in economic performance are principally based on the concept of 
production function. While the production theory is well developed, the treatment of 
technical change is still very abstract. This abstraction results from the neo-classical 
paradigm of exogenous technical change. In empirical works, despite their large efforts 
to analyze how technical change affects the production process, the way in which it 
works is not analytically dealt with. 
The most commonly used approach to materialize technical change in produc-
tion functions is to use R & D investment as a proxy and to treat it as a production fac-
tor. Although this variable is only an input measure of the knowledge production pro-
cess, output measures, like inventions and patents, are considered to be less appropriate 
to grapple with the full spectrum of knowledge activities. The accumulated empirical 
expertise about the relationship between R &  D investment and productivity empha-
sizes the significant impact of R & Don productivity growth. Two types of measure 
can be captured by the productivity approach, the R & D elasticity with respect to out-
put and the rate of return on R & D. The apparent diversity of results can be, to a large 
extent, explained by data characteristics. Yet, this approach suffers from some pro-
blems, among which, the interpretation of the rate of return (distinction between gross 
or net, private or social, in excess or not rate of return), data measurement (distinction 
223 between gross output, net output and total factor productivity), the specification of 
models (distinction between total regression, within regression, regressions with dum-
my variables and on average values) and choice of variables (distinction between R & 
D investment and R & D stock). So far, studies have essentially been concentrated on 
the measure of the impact of total R & D expenditure. More efforts should be devoted 
to the analysis of the time lag structure of the R & D effects on productivity growth and 
on the effects of R & D by character of use (basic research, applied research, develop-
ment, R & Don processes, R & Don products), the simultaneity between the firm's 
decisions and data improvements. The simultaneity problem has been considered in 
some studies making use of an adjustment cost model from which the input demand 
functions are derived. These studies provide evidence that R & D investments respond 
to changes in demand, prices and other inputs and that there are interactive adjustments 
between inputs. The latter model represents an important methodological step in the 
formalization of  relationships between R & D, output, prices, employment and physical 
investment. 
The measure of the impact of research efforts of a fmn or an industry on the 
productivity growth of this firm or this industry only provides a piece of information on 
the economic impact of research efforts. As research results are not fully appropriable, 
they spill over to other firms and industries. These spillover effects which make the dif-
ference between the social and private rate of return on R & D are generally very high 
but greatly vary across industries. Several methods have been suggested to measure 
these spillovers. A first category includes the approaches based on a proximity measure. 
The main drawback of these approaches is that the proximity weights are derived from 
intermediate input, patent or innovation flows, which are only able to capture a part 
of  knowledge transmission. The second category distinctively considers industries as 
sources or receivers of R & D spillovers whose rates of  return are estimated by specify-
ing cost or cost and demand functions of industries in a static or dynamic frarnework. 
The advantages of this approach are to capture the diversity of spillover effects across 
industries and to trace the flows of these effects by identifying the source- and receiver-
industries and to measure what is the magnitude of spillovers for each source- and 
receiver-industry. It provides evidence that the spillovers are circumscribed in some 
industries. Furthermore, a recent model based on the dynamic duality theory showed 
that spillovers affect both costs and demand and that adjustments are not instantaneous. 
A further extension of this model should be to emphasize how international competition 
affects both cost and demand functions by taking into account the spillover effects of 
foreign R & D. 
224 An important issue in the analysis of the economic impact of R & D is the issue 
of the differentiated effects of components of R & D investment. A disaggregation of 
interest is the distinction between privately-financed R & D and government-financed 
R &  D. Empirical investigations showed that the impacts on productivity growth of 
both types of  investment were largely different. On the one hand, government-financed 
R & D appears to influence at most marginally productivity growth while, on the other 
hand, privately-financed R & D significantly affects productivity growth. Yet, regard-
ing government-financed R & D, some studies showed that its relationship with pro-
ductivity growth was more subtle than for privately-financed R & D. A peculiarity of 
government-financed R & D is that it affects not only productivity growth but that it 
may also stimulate private R & D. So, concurrently to the productivity approach, an in-
vestment approach has been developed in order to measure to what extent government-
financed R & D crowds out, complements or stimulates private R & D. The empirical 
observations showed that publicly-financed R & D might only marginally crowd out 
private R & D in some cases but that, in a majority of cases, it stimulates private R & 
D. Yet, some studies have emphasized that specification problems might greatly affect 
the evaluation. Indeed, what is captured as a stimulation effect of government-financed 
R & D might simply be the stimulation effect of government purchases or the result of 
spurious correlation. These studies show that results obtained from the investment must 
be cautiously interpreted but, in any case, do not support the crowding-out hypothesis. 
The implementation of science and technology policy is, to  a large extent, 
guided by strategic considerations. Technology is a non-price competitive weapon on 
which governments act by developing their science and technology policy. Not only 
technological rivalry between frrms leads them to engage in a strategic race to innovate 
but also governments adopt a strategic behavior in the design of their policies. In the 
past few years, some nonnative models of technology rivalry have been developed but, 
so far, this new theoretical modelling approach has not provided clear-cut prescriptions 
about the guidance of R & D policy. Besides, some more pragmatic studies which con-
sider certain strategic issues show how difficult it is to implement an efficient R & D 
policy because of, among other things, the existence of agglomeration economies, the 
differences among industries, the outflow outside national borders of new knowledge, 
the specificities of the different types of R & D. As government actions in the field of 
science and technology are increasingly prompted by strategic issues, the evaluation of 
the economic impact of R & D policy should take this dimension into account. Future 
empirical investigations might consider models of  competitive behavior in oligopolistic 
markets. In this approach, the frrm's behavior is captured by estimating a market share 
model to measure how sensitive the market share of a frrm is to the competitive mix of 
rival fmns and competitive reaction models to evaluate how a frrm moves in reaction to 
225 a shift of the competitive mix of rivals. These models might be extended by including 
public policy variables and by modelling government behavior to evaluate to what ex-
tent government strategies are designed under oligopolistic behavior. 
The methodological choice for the conduct of the analysis has been to review 
the available methods for the evaluation of the economic impacts of R & D program-
mes, asking oneself how empirical economics deal with technical change. This way of 
proceeding has drastically reduced the field of investigation since it considers methods 
really in use. Yet, there are other candidate methods which might be fruitfully imple-
mented. They are measurement methods which can be implemented in a large variety of 
contexts and whose use is conditioned by four interdependent criteria : the objective of 
the evaluation, the data availability, the time to be devoted to the evaluation and the 
implementation cost. The measurement methods can be split into four large categories. 
A first category concerns quasi-experimental methods. In the field of policy 
formation, real controlled experiments are rarely performed because they are practically 
unfeasible and when they are, they are cost- and time-intensive. An alternative way is to 
conduct quasi-experiments by surveying a sample of firms affected by the policy in-
strument or by comparing some relevant variables obtained for the fmns affected by the 
policy to those characterizing a control group. This method can only cover a limited 
number of variables, only provides information on the direct effects of the programmes 
and may suffer from a bias between the actual effects and the perceived ones. 
In a second category, there are intervention analysis methods which consist in 
modelling a target variable in order to estimate by means of interrupted time series 
analysis techniques to what extent the evolution of the target variable has been in-
fluenced by the policy. In this analysis, the prepolicy variable is distinguished from the 
postpolicy variable on which the policy has exerted its impact and the time series data 
structures can bear on a single time series design or a time series panel design. Policy 
interventions can produce a wide array of effects, which leads to consider some alterna-
tive intervention models depending upon the duration of the impact. Three response 
patterns to a policy variable are generally contemplated. So, the impact is transcent if 
there are one-time shifts in the observations, permanent if the effect remains constant 
throughout the postintervention series or dampened if the initial effect declines over 
time toward the intervention level. This approach can be used when only some target 
variables or both target variables and the policy variable are known and other relevant 
explanatory variables are missing. Its main disadvantage is to only allow an evaluation 
of the direct impact of the policy on the target variable. 
226 Single multivariate methods represent a third category which essentially differs 
from the preceding one by the availability of  information on the other relevant explana-
tory variables for the modelling of the target variable. In these models, the impact ana-
lysis is performed by distinguishing between policy-on and policy-off periods and in-
troducing the policy variable as additional explanatory variable. These two last ap-
proaches are single equation impact models. If there are several targets, a single equa-
tion impact model can be specified for each target variable. Yet, if there are interde-
pendencies between target variables, the estimated impact effects can be biased. 
The general multivariate methods allow to cope with interdependencies and cau-
sality links between target variables, policy variables and explanatory variables and to 
estimate both the direct and indirect effects of the policy instruments implemented. 
Input-output analysis and macroeconometric modelling are the two main classes of 
j  I 
methods dealing with these problems. While largely used by policy makers as a tool for 
economic policy formation, these methods are regarded suspiciously in the field of 
science and technology policy. The main reason is their difficulty in dealing with tech-
nical change, and, concretely, the fact that they do not include target variables of 
science and technology policy. In order to increase their credibility as a science and 
technology policy tool, R & D investments should be endogenized in macromodels. 
If R & D subsidies are regarded as an instrument to recover technological lea-
dership or to promote knowledge production for its own sake, as the latter are not 
actually economic objectives, the measurement of their economic impacts is not a vital 
element in the evaluation process as only technological performances are at stake. On 
the other hand, if the objective is to improve the efficiency of  production structures, any 
evaluation of the efficiency of R & D policy cannot dodge the issue of the measurement 
of its economic impacts. The economic quantitative methods may help to cover this 
issue. The recourse to these methods and the choice of an appropriate method will de-
pend on the question under scruteny and, in any case, the results should be only viewed 
as a piece of information in the evaluation process. 
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